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Autism
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by qualitative impairments in 
social interaction, (verbal and nonverbal) communication, as well as by restricted, re-
petitive and/or stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities. Autism, a life-
long condition, affects approximately 1 in about 150 people and is three times more 
common in males than females (e.g., Fombonne, 2009). The last decades, there is a 
continuing debate on whether the prevalence of autism is rising. Most experts believe 
that the upward trend in rates of prevalence cannot be directly attributed to an increase 
in the incidence of the disorder, or to an “epidemic” of autism (see Fombonne, 2009; 
Fombonne, Quirke, & Hagen, 2009). Rather, the reported increases seem to result from 
other factors, such as changed diagnostic criteria and greater awareness and knowledge 
of autism. However, the contribution of environmental factors that have yet to be iden-
tified cannot be completely excluded (Rutter, 2005; Weintraub, 2011). Importantly, 
the high social and communicational demands of today’s society make individuals with 
autism more and more disabled, increasing their dependence on advanced health care 
interventions. Studying the neurobiological basis of autism might provide important in-
sights into the mechanisms and nature of autism and thereby contribute to the develop-
ment of effective clinical interventions. Given that qualitative impairments in language 
and communication belong to one of the defining domains of autism and that these 
skills are crucial in daily life, this thesis focuses on language processing in the brain of 
adults with (and without) autism.
Diagnostic symptoms and autism spectrum
In the first descriptions of autism Leo Kanner (1943) and Hans Asperger (1944) used 
the terms “autistic disturbances of affective contact” and “autistic psychopathy in child-
hood” to refer to a condition defined by marked problems in social interaction. There 
were many more commonalities between the children described by Kanner and Asperg-
er, including problems with affect, profound disturbances in communication and lan-
guage, resistance to change, and unusual and idiosyncratic patterns of interest. However, 
significant differences in these areas also existed (Klin, McPartland, & Volkmar, 2005). 
For instance, Asperger described fewer cases of delayed speech and language acquisition, 
more motor deficits and a later onset of behavioural and cognitive problems. 
The notable differences between Kanner’s and Asperger’s descriptions are illus-
trative for the large heterogeneity that exists in the behavioural characteristics of au-
tism. To capture the large variation in the autism phenotype and to emphasize that 
there is a continuum of autism and related disorders, the term autism spectrum disorders 
(ASDs) is used. It serves as an umbrella term and comprises the diagnoses autistic disor-
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der, Asperger’s disorder and pervasive developmental disorder - not otherwise specified 
(PDD-NOS). According to the DSM-IV-TR classification, these disorders belong to 
the broader diagnostic category of Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDDs), which 
also includes Rett’s disorder and childhood disintegrative disorder. Diagnostic criteria 
are listed in Box 1.
 Autistic disorder is considered the core (diagnostic concept) of the ASDs and 
often referred to as classic autism, Kanner’s autism or simply autism. The term high-
functioning autism (HFA), while not listed as an autism spectrum subtype, is frequently 
employed for the combination of autistic disorder and an average to above-average intel-
ligence. Asperger’s disorder is defined as a discrete condition in the DSM-IV-TR (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000) and the ICD-10 (World Health Organization 
(WHO), 1992). However, its definition as a diagnostic category distinct from autistic 
disorder remains controversial (Howlin, 2003; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000; Volkmar, State, 
& Klin, 2009). Asperger’s disorder is primarily distinguished from autistic disorder by 
the absence of a general delay in language and a preserved cognitive development in the 
first three years of life (according to DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10). The currently prevailing 
view is that Asperger’s disorder and autistic disorder are manifestations of a similar (bio-
logical) aetiology (see Frith, 2004; Sanders, 2009). PDD-NOS is diagnosed when the 
criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger’s disorder are not fully met. In the new edition 
of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, the DSM-5 (APA, 2012), the diagnostic subtypes 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder and PDD-NOS will be superseded by the broad 
category ‘autism spectrum disorder’. In addition, the current diagnostic domains of 
the DSM-IV-TR will be merged into two dimensions: (1) social communication/social 
interaction; and (2) restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, or activities.
In the experiments described in this thesis, only adults with HFA and Asperger’s 
disorder were included. We use the terms autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and autism 
interchangeably.
Cognitive theories
Since its first description, autism has been considered to be congenital (Kanner, 1943). 
The last decades accumulating evidence from neuroscience and genetics has shed more 
light on the neuropathology of autism: twin studies have demonstrated a strong he-
reditary basis and the structural and functional differences  found by neuroimaging 
studies in people with ASD have firmly grounded autism as a disorder in the brain 
(see Amaral, Schumann, & Nordahl, 2008; Geschwind, 2009, 2011; Stigler, McDon-
ald, Anand, Saykin, & McDougle, 2011). Despite the large advances in understanding 
the neurobiology of autism, the challenge remains to relate genes and brain circuits to 
behavioural and cognitive (dys)function in autism. Below we will briefly discuss three 
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Box 1. Diagnostic criteria for Pervasive Developmental Disorders according to the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (APA, 2000). (Criteria for 299.80 Rett’s 
Disorder and 299.10 Childhood Disintegrative Disorder are omitted.)
299.00 Autistic Disorder 
A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two from (1), and one 
each from (2) and (3): 
(1) Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the 
following:
• Marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours such as eye to-eye 
gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction
• Failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
• A lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with 
other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of inter-
est)
• Lack of social or emotional reciprocity
(2) Qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the 
following: 
• Delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied 
by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of communication such as 
gestures or mime)
• In individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate or 
sustain a conversation with others
• Stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language
• Lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate 
to developmental level
(3) Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities, 
as manifested by at least one of the following: 
• Encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped patterns of interest that 
is abnormal either in intensity or focus
• Apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals
• Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or 
twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
• Persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior 
to age 3 years: (1) Social interaction; (2) Language as used in social communication; (3) 
Symbolic or imaginative play. 
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett’s Disorder or Childhood Disintegra-
tive Disorder.
Introduction | 11
(Box 1., continued)
299.80 Asperger’s Disorder
A. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the 
following:
• Marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours such as eye-to-eye 
gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction
• Failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
• A lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with 
other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest 
to other people)
• Lack of social or emotional reciprocity
B. Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities, as 
manifested by at least one of the following:
• Encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns 
of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
• Apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals
• Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or twist-
ing, or complex whole-body movements)
• Persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
C. The disturbance causes clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning. 
D. There is no clinically significant general delay in language (e.g., single words used by 
age 2 years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years). 
E. There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in the development 
of age-appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behaviour (other than in social interaction), 
and curiosity about the environment in childhood. 
F. Criteria are not met for another specific Pervasive Developmental Disorder or Schizo-
phrenia.
299.80 PDD-NOS
This category should be used when there is a severe and pervasive impairment in the develop-
ment of reciprocal social interaction or verbal and nonverbal communication skills, or when 
stereotyped behaviour, interests, and activities are present, but the criteria are not met for a 
specific Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Schizophrenia, Schizotypical Personality Disor-
der, or Avoidant Personality Disorder. For example, this category includes “atypical autism”-- 
presentations that do not meet the criteria for Autistic Disorder because of late age of onset, 
atypical symptomatology, or sub-threshold symptomatology, or all of these.
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influential cognitive accounts that attempt to link the neurobiological origin of autism 
to its typical symptoms at the behavioural level: theory of mind, executive functions, 
and central coherence. 
Recently, aberrant processing by the mirror neuron system (MNS) has been ar-
gued to underlie the problems in social interaction and communication in autism (Ia-
coboni & Dapretto, 2006; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Williams, Whiten, Sud-
dendorf, & Perrett, 2001). The MNS, whose core regions in humans are inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL), becomes active both when actions are 
performed and observed, and is believed to play a key role in action understanding and 
imitation, among others (Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
However, experimental evidence in favour of a dysfunction of the MNS in autism is 
very limited (for a review see Hamilton, in press). In addition, there are reasons to ques-
tion the explanatory power of the MNS for understanding certain aspects of language 
and communication in general, such as social or communicative intentions of a speaker 
(Toni, de Lange, Noordzij, & Hagoort, 2008). Therefore, this account will not be dis-
cussed in the following.
Theory of mind account
The theory of mind account is probably the most well-known of the three theories. 
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to “the ability to attribute independent mental states to 
self and others in order to predict and explain behaviour” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), 
presumedly a prerequisite for normal social interaction. The assumption of the ToM 
account in autism is that individuals with autism are impaired in their intuitive under-
standing of mental states, such as beliefs, and the automatic attribution of mental states 
to themselves and to others. 
The first study investigating the hypothesis of impaired ToM in children with 
autism used the now classic Sally-Anne test, a false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985). In this paradigm, children are shown two dolls, one named Sally and one 
named Anne. Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sally puts a marble in her basket 
and then goes outside. While she is out, naughty Anne moves the marble from the 
basket to her own box. Now Sally comes back in and wants to play with her marble. 
Children are then asked, ‘where will Sally look for her marble?’ To answer correctly, a 
child must understand that Sally falsely believes that the marble is still in the basket and 
that this false belief will determine where she will look for it. To a normally developing 
4-year-old child, the answer seems obvious: since Sally doesn’t know that the marble 
has been moved, she will look inside her own basket. However, Baron-Cohen and col-
leagues found that 80% of the children with autism, with a mental age equivalent to a 
4-year-old or above, failed to answer this question correctly and pointed to where the 
marble really was (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). By contrast, 86% of the children with 
Down syndrome, with a generally lower mental age than the children with autism, and 
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85% of the normally developing children passed the test. These results led to the conclu-
sion that children with autism have a deficit in ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The 
findings that not all children with autism failed the test and that also some children 
with Down syndrome failed suggest that a ToM deficit, as measured by a first-order false 
belief task, is a trait neither universal nor specific to autism. 
Besides first-order ToM tasks (‘I think she thinks’), there are second-order ToM 
tasks (‘I think she thinks he thinks’). In a follow-up study, Baron-Cohen (1989) found 
that all ASD participants failed the more difficult second-order false belief task that 
typically developing children pass at a much younger age. This was regarded as further 
evidence for a universal ToM deficit in autism.
It has been suggested that the ability to pass false belief tasks is strongly related to 
verbal abilities and intelligence in ASD (Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & 
van der Gaag, 1999b; Frith, Happé, & Siddons, 1994; Happé, 1995). False belief tasks 
are usually linguistic in nature, and verbally able individuals with autism seem to use 
compensatory language-based strategies, or reasoning, to pass first and seconder order 
false belief tasks (Happé, 1995). Reliance on more conscious and (verbally mediated) 
cognitive strategies does not suggest that these individuals with autism are incapable of 
representing mental states, but rather that they do not employ the same intuitive men-
talizing abilities as neurotypicals (Boucher, 2012; Frith et al., 1994; Happé, 1995; Hill 
& Frith, 2003). 
Nowadays the term theory of mind has lost its tight linkage to false belief and is 
used in a much broader sense. This broadening of meaning is illustrated by the intro-
duction of the terms as ‘mentalizing’ (Frith, 1989) and ‘mindreading’ (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). Impairments in more complex ToM abilities have been revealed by studies in 
high-functioning children and adults with autism using more advanced ToM tests, such 
as (a) the ‘Strange Stories’ test, in which story comprehension is used as a context to in-
vestigate the ability to understand nonliteral use of language in e.g. double bluff or irony 
(Happé, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a; White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 2009); 
(b) the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ task, in which participants must ‘read’ a person’s 
mental state from photographs of the eye region of people’s faces (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 
2001); and (c) the ‘Faux Pas’ test, assessing the ability to recognize a ‘faux pas’ which 
requires reasoning about others’ reactions to socially inappropriate behaviours (Baron-
Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). These advanced tests all assess dif-
ferent aspects of the intuitive ability to understand what is going on in other people’s 
minds. Impaired performance on these tests provides evidence that, despite the presence 
of a more conscious ‘theory of mind’, this intuitive ability might be universally impaired 
in ASD (Happé, 2003; Hill & Frith, 2003; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007).
The ToM deficit hypothesis offers a good explanation for many of the social-
communicative impairments typically associated with autism. The non-social features 
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of autism however, including restricted, repetitive behaviour and interests, remain un-
explained (Hill, 2004a; Hill, 2004b; Hill & Frith, 2003). Furthermore, social dysfunc-
tion in autism precedes even the earliest precursors of ToM (Klin, Volkmar, & Sparrow, 
1992). Also, ToM deficits do not appear to be specific to or universal in autism (e.g., Bu-
itelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999a). As pointed out above, 
cognitively and verbally able individuals with ASD are capable of solving ToM tasks, 
albeit often using alternative strategies, while at the same time displaying impaired social 
behaviour in everyday life (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Ziatas, Durkin, & 
Pratt, 1998). Finally, the ToM account fails to explain why people with autism show not 
only preserved but often even superior skills in certain areas (Happé, 1999).
Executive dysfunction account
‘Executive function’ (EF) is an umbrella term for a wide range of functions such as plan-
ning, inhibition, impulse control, cognitive flexibility, working memory, and initiation 
and monitoring of action (Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009; Hill, 2004a; Pennington 
& Ozonoff, 1996). These manifold skills are required for the preparation and execution 
of goal-directed behaviour and to adapt to needs of the environment. Historically the 
term ‘executive functions’ was used in the context of behavioural deficits observed in 
patients with acquired damage to the frontal lobes; EFs have since been linked to (pre)
frontal cortex.
In autism, pronounced impairments in different components of EF have been 
reported in participants of different ages, across different developmental levels, and us-
ing a variety of tasks (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Geurts, 
Verté, Oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004; Hill, 2004a; Hill, 2004b; Pennington & 
Ozonoff, 1996; Russo et al., 2007). The most documented EF deficit in ASD is prob-
ably cognitive flexibility, also called mental flexibility or set-shifting. These terms refer 
to the ability to shift to a different thought or action called for by changes in a situation 
(Hill, 2004b). In autism, cognitive flexibility deficits seem to be most pronounced dur-
ing adolescence and adulthood, and harder to identify during childhood (Hill, 2004b; 
Russo et al., 2007). It is worth noting that in individuals with autism reduced cognitive 
flexibility might be more apparent in daily life than demonstrated by clinical neuropsy-
chological and experimental measures (Geurts et al., 2009), such as the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST) during which participants have to sort cards according to a silently 
changing rule (Berg, 1948).
The EF account proposes executive dysfunction to be the core deficit in autism, 
underlying the key characteristics of autism in both the social and non-social domains 
(Geurts et al., 2009; Hill, 2004a; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). The theory is success-
ful in particular at explaining repetitive behaviours and restricted interests (Hill, 2004a; 
Hill, 2004b). For instance, rigidity and perseveration, two consequences of poor execu-
tive functioning, can be attributed to a lack of initiative and the tendency to get stuck at 
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a given task (at the same time, the ability to carry out routine actions can be excellent) 
(Hill, 2004a; Hill & Frith, 2003).
Although the executive dysfunction account explains repetitive, stereotyped be-
haviours and restricted interests better than ToM and central coherence accounts (see 
below), it has its shortcomings as well. First, EF problems are common but do not ap-
pear to be universal in autism (see Geurts et al., 2009; Hill, 2004a; Russo et al., 2007). 
Moreover, no consensus exists as to which aspects of EF deficits are typical of ASD 
(Geurts et al., 2009; Hill, 2004a). Another important issue is that executive dysfunction 
is also seen in other neurodevelopmental disorders (for instance ADHD) and as such 
is not specific for autism (Corbett et al., 2009; Geurts et al., 2004; Hill, 2004a; Pen-
nington & Ozonoff, 1996; Sergeant, Geurts, & Oosterlaan, 2002). Given the overlap 
in EF profiles, no specific pattern of EF deficits that distinguishes ASD from other 
developmental disorders has yet been defined. This complicates the differentiation be-
tween clinical groups. Finally, a plausible account of how an EF deficit explains all the 
symptoms of autism, such as deficits in imitation, joint attention and ToM, is lacking 
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Taken together, despite clear evidence for an EF deficit 
in ASD, it is questionable whether this is the defining neurocognitive deficit in autism. 
(Weak) Central coherence account
The (weak) central coherence account has been proposed by Frith (1989), motivated 
by the belief that both deficits and assets in autism have the same cognitive origin. In 
typically developing children and adults, incoming information tends to be processed 
globally and for meaning, that is, information is combined to construct higher-level 
meaning and put in context, often at the expense of attention to or memory for details. 
This tendency was termed central coherence (CC) by Frith (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 
1994). For example, the gist of a story is easily recalled, while its literal form is quickly 
lost, and takes effort to retain. Individuals with autism, however, exhibit “weak central 
coherence”, that is, a detail-oriented processing style biased towards local and featural 
rather than global information (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé, 1999). In 
everyday life, this is illustrated by the observation that people with ASD are often preoc-
cupied with details and parts, while failing to extract gist or “see the big picture” (Happé, 
1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). 
Frith suggested that a weak CC could explain the outstanding skills as well as the 
impairments in autism. Based on this theory, she predicted that participants with autism 
would perform relatively well at tasks where attention to detail is advantageous, but poor 
at tasks requiring the recognition of global meaning or integration of stimuli in con-
text (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé, 1999). A growing number of studies 
support weak CC in autism in several domains, including perceptual, visuospatial-con-
structional, and verbal-semantic domains (see Happé, 1999 for a review). For instance, 
the Block Design Task (of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales) and the Embedded Figures 
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Test produce fairly consistent evidence for superior performance in both children and 
adults with ASD, which can be explained by a greater ability to segment the designs into 
smaller parts and the ability to see parts over wholes, i.e., a weak CC (Frith, 1989; Frith 
& Happé, 1994; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; 
Ropar & Mitchell, 2001; Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993). 
Another task that has provided robust proof for weak CC in autism is the read-
ing of homographs, words with the same spelling, but with a different meaning and 
pronunciation (such as ‘tear’ in the eye or in a piece of fabric). When reading sentences 
with homographs aloud, individuals with autism were less likely than control partici-
pants to use the preceding sentence context to determine the appropriate pronuncia-
tion (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b; Lopez 
& Leekam, 2003). Also at the level of combining sentences, or at text level, adults with 
high-functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome are less able to use context to interpret 
semantic or syntactic ambiguous sentences, to arrange sentences coherently or to make 
global inferences (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b, 2000).
It has been argued that weak CC should not be considered a deficit but a cogni-
tive style: a processing bias towards features rather than a deficit for wholes (Happé, 
1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). This idea is supported by studies showing that people 
with autism display an automatic preference for local processing that can be overcome 
with explicit demands for global processing (see Happé & Frith, 2006). For example, 
Snowling and Frith (1986) demonstrated that when instructed to read for meaning, 
individuals with autism were able to give the context-appropriate, but less frequent, 
pronunciation of homographs. 
The strength of the weak CC theory is that it explains assets as well as deficits and 
addresses aspects of autism neglected by other accounts, such as areas of talent, super-
acute perception, and lack of generalisation (Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). The 
most important limitation of the account is that the exact mechanism behind the weaker 
drive for central coherence remains to be specified (Happé & Frith, 2006; Hill & Frith, 
2003).
Altogether, it appears most plausible that autism results from impairments in sev-
eral core cognitive processes, including global-local processing (weak coherence), social 
cognition (ToM), and executive functions (see Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). 
Therefore, as all three cognitive theories might be necessary to explain the autism phe-
notype, they are best regarded as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive (Hill & 
Frith, 2003; Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2005; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). In 
line with this view, experimental evidence suggests that the key diagnostic features of 
autism are relatively independent at both the genetic and behavioural level. This makes 
the discovery of a unitary cognitive explanation for the full triad of impairments implau-
sible (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006). Instead, it seems more fruitful to look for suit-
able cognitive explanations for each defining diagnostic feature separately, or in other 
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words, to fractionate the autism phenotype. In support of this division, neuroimaging 
studies have reported different brain regions to be involved in the social, communicative, 
and rigid and repetitive impairments observed in autism (Happé et al., 2006).
Language in autism spectrum disorders
Language impairments in autism
Impairments in language and communication are defining characteristics of ASDs. Lan-
guage impairments observed in autism are extremely variable and there are likely to be 
subgroups within the spectrum with distinct language phenotypes, some of which have 
normal linguistic abilities (phonological skills, vocabulary, syntax, and morphology) and 
others with impaired language (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Flusberg & 
Joseph, 2003). On the one hand, the most striking difficulties concern pragmatic lan-
guage aspects (i.e., the ability to use and comprehend language in context), which are 
universal across individuals with ASD irrespective of their level of functioning (Rapin & 
Dunn, 1997; Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005). One of the most salient features of 
the impaired pragmatic language comprehension in autism is an overly literal interpre-
tation of utterances which causes problems in understanding humour, irony and meta-
phors, as well as in making inferences, and comprehending indirect requests (Happé, 
1993; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996). 
On the other hand, semantic language processing (i.e., constructing the content 
of a sentence based on just the meaning of the words) is often, but not universally, 
impaired in ASD (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2003; 
Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). In high-functioning individuals with autism, semantic lan-
guage skills seem to be relatively spared and difficulties with semantics are most evident 
when higher-level language processing is required, for instance, when word meaning 
depends on context (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b, 2000; Noens & van Berckelaer-
Onnes, 2005; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). Impaired ability to use context in compre-
hension can be evident in ASD even if linguistic abilities are at a normal level (Loukusa 
et al., 2007; Norbury & Bishop, 2002). 
One plausible explanation for these difficulties with language in context is that 
they arise due to a weak central coherence as explained above (Frith, 1989; for a review 
see Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). During language comprehension, this can 
lead to a stronger focus on individual word meanings instead of on the more global 
sentence context. Empirical evidence comes from studies on the reading of homographs 
as discussed above (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999b; Lopez & Leekam, 2003).
Another cognitive ability important for a correct interpretation of the context 
during language comprehension is mental flexibility. The reduced cognitive flexibility 
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observed in autism possibly influences the way in which context is handled during lan-
guage comprehension. Supporting evidence for this comes from a study showing that, 
during reasoning, individuals with autism have difficulties dealing with exceptions (Pi-
jnacker et al., 2009). 
Finally, pragmatic language difficulties might also be associated with deficits in 
ToM , given that pragmatics requires a correct representation of the thoughts, intentions, 
and feelings of a speaker or listener (see Tager-Flusberg, 1996). An example of this is 
provided by studies on figurative language (Happé, 1993, 1994), showing that individu-
als with autism are impaired in providing context-appropriate mental state explanations 
for story characters’ non-literal utterances, such as lies and jokes. At first, Happé related 
the results to impaired ToM. Later, however, she argued they might be better under-
stood within the framework of central coherence, for the reason that participants with 
autism did not give fewer mental state explanations than the control groups, but rather 
failed to give context-appropriate answers (Happé, 1994). As illustrated by this final 
example, the basis of pragmatic language is difficult to define and unlikely to be unitary. 
Therefore, it is probably best defined as the complex interplay of multiple cognitive abili-
ties (Martin & McDonald, 2003). 
 
Neural correlates of language comprehension 
As just mentioned, pragmatic language problems in autism are especially prominent 
when context is important. The online integration of incoming lexical information into 
a more global, context-based interpretation of an utterance is a process crucial for lan-
guage comprehension (Hagoort, 2005). In the past years, neuroimaging studies have 
elucidated the neural underpinnings of integrative processes during language compre-
hension in healthy participants. This research has revealed that our brains integrate 
different sources of incoming information immediately and in parallel to interpret the 
ongoing sentence or discourse (Hagoort & van Berkum, 2007). The left inferior frontal 
gyrus (LIFG) plays a key role in this integration process by unifying a broad range of in-
formation, such as knowledge about the context and the world, as well as co-speech ges-
tures (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Willems, Ozyurek, & Hagoort, 
2007). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; see Box 2) studies have shown 
that, in addition to the inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal cortex plays an important 
role in (spoken) language comprehension (see for a review Bookheimer, 2002). Within 
temporal cortex, there seems to exist a subdivision with inferior and middle temporal 
cortex being involved in storage and retrieval of lexical-semantic information and su-
perior temporal cortex supporting sound-based processes (Hickok & Poeppel, 2000, 
2007). Although the left hemisphere is seen as the language dominant one, an increasing 
number of fMRI studies have reported additional activation in right hemispheric brain 
regions during language comprehension. This seems especially so when task demands 
are increased and higher-level language processing is needed, for example in the compre-
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hension of semantically ambiguous sentences or discourse (Menenti, Petersson, Schee-
ringa, & Hagoort, 2009; Robertson et al., 2000; Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005; 
Zempleni, Renken, Hoeks, Hoogduin, & Stowe, 2007).
Neural correlates of language in autism spectrum disorders
Language difficulties in individuals with autism are most manifest at the sentence and 
discourse level, i.e. at the higher levels of language processing. Although there is behav-
ioural evidence for difficulties with integrative processing during higher-level language 
comprehension in ASD, the underlying neural processes have not been extensively in-
vestigated. An fMRI study on semantic processing at the sentence level (Just, Cherkassky, 
Keller, & Minshew, 2004) revealed decreased activation in LIFG for adults with ASD 
relative to control participants. In addition, increased activation in left middle/superior 
temporal gyrus was reported for the ASD group. Similar results have been reported for 
semantic processing at the word level (Gaffrey et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2006). These 
findings are taken to imply that, during semantic processing, the brains of individuals 
with ASD engage less in integrative processing (as taking place in LIFG), but focus 
more on lower level lexical processing. However, given the diverse nature of language 
tasks and lack of focus on semantic processing at the sentence level, this interpretation 
requires further experimental support.
Difficulties with language comprehension displayed in daily life by adults with 
autism are more evident at the pragmatic than at the semantic level: they show im-
pairments in comprehending language in context, but not in constructing a context-
independent meaning of an utterance. Nevertheless, few fMRI studies have examined 
neural correlates of pragmatic language comprehension. Two studies that did investigate 
pragmatics in children and adults with ASD found that making inferences from dis-
course and comprehending irony elicited increased activation in RIFG for the ASD 
group relative to a control group (Mason, Williams, Kana, Minshew, & Just, 2008; 
Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006). No differences were found in LIFG. In both 
studies, increased activity in the ASD groups fell within networks that were activated for 
the control groups. Since making inferences and comprehending irony seem to be more 
challenging for individuals with ASD, increased activation in right hemispheric regions 
in ASD could well reflect the higher task demands faced when interpreting discourse in 
context (Mason et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2006).
Taken together, behavioural and neuroimaging results suggest a link between 
problems with higher-level language comprehension and deviant integrative processes 
in autism. Furthermore, as revealed by fMRI studies, inferior frontal regions seem to 
play an important role in the neural differences in language comprehension between 
individuals with autism en control participants. The exact role of inferior frontal cortex 
in different aspects of semantic and pragmatic language comprehension remains to be 
determined.
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 Since the studies described in this thesis concern fMRI experiments, other neu-
roimaging methods employed to investigate neural correlates of language processing in 
autism, such as electroencefalography (EEG) – in particular using event-related poten-
tials (ERPs), or magnetoencephalography (MEG), were not discussed. These techniques 
provide more insight in the temporal aspects of language processing than fMRI. It is 
worth noting that ERP and MEG studies have reported differences in semantic language 
comprehension in children and adults with ASD, mostly related to the N400 (Braeu-
tigam, Swithenby, & Bailey, 2008; Dunn & Bates, 2005; Gold, Faust, & Goldstein, 
2010; McCleery et al., 2010; Megnin et al., 2012; Pijnacker, Geurts, van, Buitelaar, & 
Hagoort, 2010; Ring, Sharma, Wheelwright, & Barrett, 2007). 
Box 2. Magnetic resonance imaging
With magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) it is possible to assess brain function and 
structure non-invasively. In combination with its high spatial resolution this makes 
it one of the most popular tools in cognitive neuroscience. The MRI signal originates 
from the magnetic moment of hydrogen nuclei, which align as a result of the strong 
magnetic field of the scanner. Radiofrequency waves are then used to manipulate 
the magnetic moments, after which they can be measured. By spatially varying the 
magnetic field strength, the position of the nuclei is encoded and an image can be 
reconstructed.
Brain function is most commonly measured by means of the blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) effect. Upon activation of brain tissue several processes occur, 
the predominant being the inflow of oxygenated blood, thereby decreasing the lo-
cal concentration of deoxyhemoglobin. Since deoxyhemoglobin is paramagnetic, it 
disturbs the magnetic field which in turn causes a decrease in MR signal intensity. 
Consequently, brain activation leads to a signal increase. By following the MR signal 
over time, either resulting from externally applied stimuli or from spontaneous pro-
cesses, brain activation can be measured.
Brain structure can be examined in several ways. For example, anatomical infor-
mation can be obtained by collecting images with high contrast between the gray 
and white matter in the brain. Another popular method is diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI). Here, diffusion-weighting is applied to the data, which results in images that 
are sensitive to the movement of water in the brain. Since diffusion in white matter 
is generally non-isotropic, these images contain information about the (local) brain 
integrity and how white matter tracts connect different brain regions.
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Brain connectivity in autism
FMRI studies investigating the brain-behaviour relationship in autism have in general 
shown largely overlapping cortical regions during cognitive processing in individuals 
with autism and control participants. The most striking differences have been found in 
the patterns of activation (e.g., hypo- and hyperactivation) and in the synchronization 
of activation across cortical regions (see Minshew & Williams, 2007). This synchro-
nization, as measured by the strength of correlation of the time series of brain regions 
recruited during task performance, has been used as a measure of functional connectiv-
ity (e.g., Just et al., 2004). Functional connectivity is often interpreted as a measure of 
communication or coordination between brain regions. 
Reduced functional connectivity in individuals with autism relative to control 
participants has been reported using a wide range of cognitive tasks including language 
(Just et al., 2004; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2006), working memory 
(Koshino et al., 2005), visuospatial processing (Damarla et al., 2010), cognitive control 
(Solomon et al., 2009), executive functioning (Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Min-
shew, 2007), and social cognition (mentalizing and ToM) (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & 
Frith, 2002; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009). More specifically, ASD 
seems to be characterized by a reduction in long-range connectivity primarily between 
frontal cortex and other cortical regions, suggesting that communication between brain 
regions used to accomplish cognitive tasks differs between ASD and control groups 
(Minshew & Keller, 2010; Schipul, Keller, & Just, 2011; Vissers, Cohen, & Geurts, 
2012; Wass, 2011; Williams & Minshew, 2007). It seems likely that the reduced con-
nectivity observed in ASD also affects language comprehension, since this too requires 
coordinated brain activity within a distributed network to process and integrate infor-
mation.
Not only functional, but also structural connectivity between several brain regions 
appears to be weaker in ASD (e.g., Alexander et al., 2007; Barnea-Goraly, Lotspeich, & 
Reiss, 2010; see for an overview Vissers et al., 2012). Both the functional and structural 
under-connectivity have been reported to be related to behavioural abnormalities and 
symptom severity in autism (e.g., Cheung et al., 2009; Schipul et al., 2011; Thakkar et 
al., 2008; see Vissers et al., 2012).  Consequently, autism is considered by many to be a 
network rather than a localized disorder (Muller, 2007; Stigler et al., 2011; Wass, 2011). 
However, more research is needed to provide more details of the exact relationship be-
tween reduced connectivity and the behavioural symptoms of autism. 
Outline of this thesis
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the neural correlates of spoken language compre-
hension in the brains of adults with HFA or Asperger’s disorder. In particular, using 
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fMRI, we aim to explore the neural integration of different sorts of contextual informa-
tion during auditory sentence comprehension in autism by comparing adults with au-
tism and control participants. In Chapter 2 we describe an fMRI experiment in control 
participants in which we examine the brain regions involved in the integration of sen-
tence meaning and voice-based inferences about a speaker’s age, gender, or social back-
ground. Furthermore, we explore the role of LIFG as a unification space for linguistic 
and extra-linguistic information, by additionally including both correct sentences and 
sentences containing a world knowledge or semantic anomaly. We used a passive listen-
ing task to study automatic language processing and let listening conditions resemble 
those in everyday life. In Chapter 3 we look into the integration of speaker characteris-
tics and sentence content in autism by discussing the results of an fMRI experiment in 
which a control and ASD group were presented with spoken sentences whose meaning 
did (speaker-congruent) or did not (speaker-incongruent) match voice-based inferences 
about the speaker’s characteristics. Chapter 4 describes an fMRI experiment on the 
neural integration of different sorts of contextual information during auditory language 
comprehension in ASD. In this study spoken sentences were presented that were either 
correct or contained a semantic or world knowledge anomaly. Manipulating the context 
by using the sentence types described above provides an opportunity to look into dif-
ferent levels of integrative processes during language comprehension and their neural 
underpinnings in ASD. In Chapter 5 we address white matter microstructure in adults 
with ASD and matched control participants by discussing results from a diffusion tensor 
imaging (DTI; see Box 2) study. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary and discussion 
of the main findings of this thesis.
Unification of speaker and meaning in language comprehension | 23
Unification of speaker and meaning 
in language comprehension
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Abstract
When interpreting a message, a listener takes into account several sources of linguis-
tic and extra-linguistic information. Here we focused on one particular form of extra-
linguistic information, certain speaker characteristics as conveyed by the voice. Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined the neural structures involved 
in the unification of sentence meaning and voice-based inferences about the speaker’s 
age, gender, or social background. We found enhanced activation in the inferior frontal 
gyrus bilaterally (BA 45/47) during listening to sentences whose meaning was incongru-
ent with inferred speaker characteristics. Furthermore, our results showed an overlap in 
brain regions involved in unification of speaker-related information and those used for 
the unification of semantic and world knowledge information (inferior frontal gyrus 
bilaterally (BA 45/47) and left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21)). These findings provide 
evidence for a shared neural unification system for linguistic and extra-linguistic sources 
of information and extend the existing knowledge about the role of the inferior frontal 
cortex as a crucial component for unification during language comprehension.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Petersson, K. M., van Berkum, J. J., van den Brink, D., Buitelaar, 
J. K., & Hagoort, P. (2009). Unification of speaker and meaning in language 
comprehension: an fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, 2085-2099.
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Introduction
During speech comprehension, the human brain derives an interpretation of the speak-
er’s message by integrating different sources of information. In psycholinguistic models, 
phonology, syntax, and semantics are seen as the core aspects of our language faculty 
and the extraction of meaning from speech requires continuous and parallel use of in-
formation related to these linguistic information sources. In addition, for the listener’s 
understanding of a speaker’s message it is essential that the brain unifies sentence mean-
ing with other sources of information that contribute to the understanding of a spoken 
utterance. In the current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we fo-
cused on the unification of sentence meaning with one particular source of extra-lin-
guistic information that is inherent to speech, information about speaker characteristics 
conveyed by the voice. 
When listening to an unknown and invisible speaker, for instance on the tele-
phone, one not only hears the content of the speaker’s message, but also derives informa-
tion about this speaker from the voice, such as her gender, age, and social class. So not 
only is the human voice the carrier of linguistically coded information, it also implicitly 
conveys important non-linguistic information concerning speaker characteristics. Func-
tional neuroimaging studies have revealed cortical regions that are selectively sensitive to 
the human voice (see for a review Belin, Fecteau, & Bedard, 2004). These voice-sensitive 
regions can be found bilaterally along the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) and they appear to respond significantly more to human vocal sounds, whether 
speech or non-speech, than to other naturally occurring sounds, such as nonhuman 
and nonvocal sounds (Belin, Zatorre, Lafaille, Ahad, & Pike, 2000; Fecteau, Armony, 
Joanette, & Belin, 2004). 
While both anterior STS regions are sensitive to vocal sounds, each has a slightly 
different contribution. Left, but not right, anterior STS regions display stronger ac-
tivation when (intelligible) linguistic information is present in the voice than when 
the auditory input consists of non-speech vocalizations (Belin, Zatorre, & Ahad, 2002; 
Scott, Blank, Rosen, & Wise, 2000). Conversely, the right anterior STS shows a stronger 
voice-sensitive response to non-speech vocal sounds such as laughs and cries, and does 
not seem to require verbal content to be responsive to vocal sounds (Belin et al., 2002; 
von Kriegstein, Eger, Kleinschmidt, & Giraud, 2003; von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2004). 
In addition, the right anterior STS is involved in processing speaker identity character-
istics in the voice, or more specifically, in speaker recognition (Belin & Zatorre, 2003; 
von Kriegstein et al., 2003; von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2004). 
Although research has been done on voice perception, the issue of which brain 
regions support the unification of speaker characteristics inferred from the voice with se-
mantic information in speech has not been addressed. Recently, a model that deals with 
the unification of different aspects of language related information in the brain was put 
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forward (Hagoort, 2005). This framework distinguishes three functional components 
of language processing: memory (mental lexicon), unification (integration), and control. 
In the context of our study, the unification component is the most relevant of the three. 
Unification refers to the online integration of lexical information that is retrieved from 
memory (i.e., from the mental lexicon) into a representation of a multiword utterance. 
It is suggested that during language comprehension, as well as production, unification 
operations take place in parallel and interactively at the semantic, syntactic and phono-
logical levels of language processing (Jackendoff, 2007). Furthermore, the abovemen-
tioned model argues that the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) is a crucial brain region 
for unification (Hagoort, 2005). 
A number of neuroimaging studies have found evidence for the role of the left 
inferior frontal cortex in semantic unification, i.e., in the integration of word meaning 
into an unfolding representation of the sentence context. Studies investigating semantic 
unification are often based on the rationale that sentences containing semantic anoma-
lies or ambiguous words have a higher semantic unification load than correct sentences, 
because in anomalous sentences more effort is needed to integrate word information 
into the sentence context (Hagoort et al., 2004; Rodd et al., 2005). In functional neu-
roimaging studies exploiting this paradigm, an increased BOLD response in the LIFG 
(Brodmann area’s (BA) 45/47) was observed for sentences containing a semantic anom-
aly (Hagoort et al., 2004; Ni et al., 2000) or ambiguity (Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, manipulation of the semantic unification load by presenting 
sentences with semantic or world knowledge anomalies has revealed that the semantic 
unification area in the LIFG is not only involved in determining whether an interpre-
tation is semantically coherent, but it is also recruited to verify the meaning of an ut-
terance in relation to our knowledge of the world (Hagoort et al., 2004). Importantly, 
increased activation in the LIFG has also been observed for correct sentences, i.e., sen-
tences without any anomaly, relative to a low level baseline (Hagoort, 2005; Ni et al., 
2000). Taken together, these findings suggest that the LIFG is recruited during semantic 
unification. We would like to stress that there does not exist a true dichotomy between 
‘correct’ sentences and sentences with ‘anomalies’. Rather, there is a continuum from 
sentences that fit very well with our knowledge about the world and about our language 
to sentences that are not compatible with what we know. Ultimately, language allows 
us to communicate not only what we already know, but also what we didn’t know, i.e., 
new information. However, for the sake of simplicity the terms ‘correct’ and ‘anomaly’ 
will be used. 
So far we have used the term ‘unification’ to refer to the online assembly of com-
plex meaning during language comprehension. Although the term ‘integration’ is often 
used as a synonym for unification, we suggest that it is useful to make a functional 
distinction between the two (Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009). Semantic integration 
occurs if different sources of information converge on a common memory representa-
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tion. For example, the sound and the sight of an animal (e.g. a meowing cat). The sight 
of a cat, the meowing sound, and their combined occurrence most likely all activate a 
memory representation of ‘cat’ that is multimodal in nature. Semantic unification, on 
the other hand, is always a constructive process in which a semantic representation is 
built up that is not already stored in memory. Importantly, this distinction makes op-
posite predictions for the BOLD response. Semantic unification is always harder for 
semantic incongruities. The increased unification load for semantic incongruities should 
result in a stronger BOLD response than when semantically congruent items are pre-
sented. In contrast, during integration, congruent input provides converging support 
for a pre-stored representation, which might then be more strongly activated compared 
to a situation with incongruent input (Hagoort et al., 2009). Hence, in the case of in-
tegration the congruent condition will elicit a stronger BOLD response than the incon-
gruent condition. A few studies on multimodal integration have indeed reported activa-
tion increases in superior temporal cortex to matching stimulus combinations (Calvert, 
Campbell, & Brammer, 2000; Van Atteveldt, Formisano, Blomert, & Goebel, 2007).  
In this fMRI study, we investigated the neural underpinnings of unifying the 
meaning of a spoken sentence with extra-linguistic information conveyed by the speak-
er’s voice. We presented participants with spoken sentences whose meaning did (speak-
er-congruent) or did not (speaker-incongruent) match inferences of the listener about 
the speaker’s age, gender, or social background that were based on the speaker’s voice. In 
the speaker-incongruent sentences, there was one specific word at which the sentence 
became harder to interpret given the speaker’s characteristics as inferred from the voice 
(printed in italics in the examples that follow). Examples: “Every evening I drink a glass 
of wine before going to bed” in a young child’s voice, “My favorite colors are pink and 
lime green” in a male voice, and “I have a large tattoo on my back” spoken in an upper-
class accent. By manipulating the congruency of sentence meaning and voice-based 
inferences about a speaker we were able to identify brain regions that are responsive 
to variations in unification load. We also included sentences with standard semantic 
or world knowledge anomalies to examine whether there are common brain regions 
involved in unifying linguistic and extra-linguistic information. 
An experiment with event-related brain potentials (ERP) and the same materi-
als as used in this study found that ERPs time locked to the critical words elicited an 
N400 effect in the speaker-incongruent condition (Van Berkum, van den Brink, Tesink, 
Kos, & Hagoort, 2008). The N400 effect is an amplitude modulation of the N400 
component that is sensitive to semantic anomalies as well as to subtle manipulations 
in semantic integration processes (Hagoort & Brown, 1994; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 
1984). In addition, the results revealed that speaker-incongruent sentences elicited the 
same type of N400 effect as semantic or world knowledge anomalies. This suggests that 
voice-based inferences about the speaker affect the same early interpretation mechanism 
that is sensitive to lexical-semantic and world knowledge information. 
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Given the ERP and fMRI results reviewed above, we predict that unification of 
sentence meaning and extra-linguistic information from the speaker’s voice will engage 
the same brain region in the LIFG as the unification of lexical-semantic information 
and world knowledge. Although we mainly expect that the LIFG is recruited during 
unification, it is not uncommon to find homologue regions to be activated during lan-
guage tasks. In line with what has been found when unification is studied in a discourse 
context (Menenti et al., 2009), it is well possible that we will observe activation in the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG) during unification operations. Our findings extend 
the existing knowledge about the role of the left inferior frontal cortex as a crucial com-
ponent for unification of linguistic and non-linguistic information, such as for example 
for social information.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-three healthy right-handed native speakers of Dutch participated in the experi-
ment of whom forty-two were included in the final analysis (eighteen females; mean age 
± SD = 23.9 ± 4.6 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
normal hearing. None of them used any medication, had a history of head trauma, or 
neurological or psychiatric illness. Written informed consent was obtained according to 
the Declaration of Helsinki. One of the participants was excluded from the final analysis 
because of excessive head movement.
Stimulus material
The stimulus materials consisted of two sets of sentences: a set of speaker-inference sen-
tences and a set of sentences with semantic or world knowledge anomalies (see Hagoort 
et al., 2004). The stimulus materials used in this study were identical to those of the ERP 
study by Van Berkum et al. (2008). 
For the set of speaker-inference sentences, we constructed 160 sentences with a 
lexical content that was congruent with voice-based inferences about a particular speak-
er, but incongruent with inferences about another speaker. To increase variability and 
to cover a broad range of speaker information captured in the voice, sentence meaning 
could be incongruent with respect to three different speaker characteristics: age, gender, 
or social background. In total there were six types of speaker-incongruent utterances: 40 
sentences were odd when pronounced by a male speaker (“My favorite colors are pink 
and lime green”); 40 sentences were odd when pronounced by a female speaker (“On 
Saturdays I work as a bouncer in a club”), 20 sentences were odd when pronounced by 
a child (“Every evening I drink a glass of wine before going to bed”), 20 sentences were 
odd when pronounced by an adult (“I cannot sleep without my teddy bear in my arms”), 
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20 sentences were odd when pronounced by a speaker with a Dutch accent that is as-
sociated with an upper-class background (“I have a large tattoo on my back”), and 20 
were odd when pronounced by a speaker with Dutch accent that is associated with a 
lower-class background (“In my free time I enjoy listening to piano music by Chopin”). 
The sentences were created in such a way, that the speaker-incongruity always emerged 
at a specific word in the sentence, the critical word (here in italics), which was never 
sentence-final. Although some incongruities between voice-based inferences about the 
speaker’s characteristics and sentence content were truly anomalous, the majority merely 
violated (Dutch) social stereotypes. Furthermore, the fragment before the critical word 
was compatible with either speaker (“Yesterday I went to…”, “I have a large…”).
We recorded the speaker-inference sentences with a total of sixteen speakers (four 
males and four females, two children aged six and eight years and two adults, two speak-
ers with a Dutch accent typically perceived as lower-class, and two with a Dutch accent 
typically perceived as upper-class). We selected recordings in which the congruent and 
incongruent variant of an item were pronounced with a similar prosodic contour. Fur-
thermore, we matched speaker-congruent and speaker-incongruent recordings on: (1) 
acoustic duration of the critical words (speaker-congruent: mean = 520 ms, standard 
deviation [SD] = 149 ms, range = 236-1023 ms; speaker-incongruent: mean = 524 ms, 
SD = 140 ms, range = 212-921 ms); (2) duration of the preceding sentence fragment 
(speaker-congruent: mean = 1596 ms, SD = 492 ms, range = 485-3367 ms; speaker-in-
congruent: mean = 1629 ms, SD = 507 ms, range = 455-3261 ms); (3) sentence length 
(speaker-congruent: mean = 3182 ms, SD = 614 ms, range = 1638-5648 ms); speaker-
incongruent: mean = 3228 ms, SD = 629 ms, range = 1784-5509 ms).
To investigate whether overlapping brain regions are involved in the unification 
of speaker information and unification of semantic information and world knowledge, 
we included an additional set of 36 triplets of sentences. Within a triplet, the sentences 
were identical with the exception of one critical word. Each triplet comprised a sentence 
that was semantically coherent (correct condition: “Dutch trains are yellow and blue”), 
a sentence that contained a semantic anomaly (“Dutch trains are sour and blue”), and 
a sentence with a world knowledge anomaly (“Dutch trains are white and blue”; see 
Hagoort et al. 2004 for details). The world knowledge sentences were recorded with 
four female speakers and one male speaker. The three items of a sentence triplet (“Dutch 
trains are yellow/sour/white and blue”) were always pronounced by the same speaker and 
their critical words were matched across conditions on: (1) acoustic duration (correct: 
mean = 431 ms, SD = 109 ms; semantic anomaly: mean = 425 ms, SD = 94 ms; world 
knowledge anomaly: mean = 451 ms, SD = 133 ms); (2) word frequency (on 3.7 million, 
Corpus Spoken Dutch R6) (correct: mean = 136 ms, SD = 206 ms; semantic anomaly: 
mean = 115 ms, SD = 190 ms; world knowledge anomaly: mean = 121 ms, SD = 200 
ms); (3) duration of the preceding sentence fragment (correct: mean = 1870 ms, SD = 
517 ms; semantic anomaly: mean = 1842 ms, SD = 507 ms; world knowledge anomaly: 
2
30 | Chapter 2
mean =  1841 ms, SD = 508 ms); and sentence length (correct: mean = 3302 ms, SD = 
656 ms; semantic anomaly: mean = 3277 ms, SD = 642 ms; world knowledge anomaly: 
mean =  3303 ms, SD = 649 ms). 
Forty-two items consisting of reversed speech were inserted as filler sentences. 
These items were included for a study on language processing in adults with an autism 
spectrum disorder and will not be analyzed for the research question of the present study.
Overall, the experimental sentences varied in length from 1638 to 5648 ms, with 
the average sentence length being 3247 ms (SD = 597). The critical words had an aver-
age duration of 480 ms (SD = 136 ms).
We created six different pseudo-randomized trial lists such that each list con-
tained an equal number of items per condition (80 speaker-incongruent and 80 speaker-
congruent sentences, 36 sentences with a semantic anomaly, 36 sentences with a world 
knowledge anomaly, 36 correct sentences, and 42 reversed speech items). Furthermore, 
the items were distributed such that none of the participants heard more than one 
variant of the same sentence, with the constraint that no more than two items of the 
same condition were presented consecutively, and such that each speaker pronounced 
an equal number of congruent and incongruent sentences (for the speaker-inference 
sentences five of each type per speaker).
The materials of the present experiment were validated in a posttest in which an 
independent group of participants (twelve males and twelve females) listened to the six 
stimulus lists and were asked to rate on a five-point scale “how normal or strange you 
think it is to have the speaker say this particular thing” (1 = completely normal, 5 = very 
strange; see also Van Berkum et al. (2008)). As expected, utterances that contained a 
speaker-incongruity were rated as less plausible (mean = 3.5, SD = 0.8, range = 1.5-5.0), 
than the corresponding speaker-congruent sentences (mean = 1.6, SD = 0.4, range = 
1.0-3.1). Furthermore, utterances containing semantic anomalies were rated as highly 
implausible (mean = 4.6, SD = 0.3, range = 3.6-5.0), sentences with world knowledge 
anomalies were also rated as very implausible (mean = 4.2, SD = 0.5, range = 2.9-5.0), 
whereas the corresponding control sentences were perceived as acceptable (mean = 1.5, 
SD = 0.4, range = 1.0-2.6). The average semantic and world knowledge anomaly were 
considered to be more anomalous than the average speaker incongruity.
Experimental design and procedure
Each participant listened to a total of 314 sentences that were presented in an event-
related design. During image acquisition, subjects lay in a supine position in the MR 
scanner and head movements were minimized by an adjustable padded head holder. 
The spoken sentences were presented through nonmagnetic headphones (Commander 
XG, Resonance Technology Inc., Northridge, CA.; http://www.mrivideo.com), which 
dampened scanner noise. The fixation cross was presented via an LCD projector stand-
ing outside the scanner room, projecting the computer display onto a semi-transparent 
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screen that the subject viewed through a mirror device attached to the head coil. Stimu-
lus presentation was controlled by a PC running the Presentation software (version 9.70; 
Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA; nbs.neuro-bs.com). Participants were in-
structed to process each sentence attentively for comprehension. To ensure attentive 
listening, they were told that afterwards questions would be asked about the presented 
sentences. Before the beginning of the experiment, each participant received a practice 
block consisting of ten sentences. These items were also used to adjust the volume level 
for sentence presentation. The scanner was switched on during the practice run and par-
ticipants were asked to indicate whether the volume should go up or down. The volume 
level that suited each participant best was used in the experiment. The functional data 
acquired during the practice run were not used in the analysis. 
Each trial began with a fixation asterisk presented in the centre of the screen. Af-
ter 300 ms the fixation asterisk disappeared for 1000 ms and then returned to indicate 
that the sentence was about to start. During sentence presentation the asterisk remained 
on the screen and it lasted after sentence onset until the end of the trial. Trial onset was 
effectively jittered by adding 0, 500, 1000 or 1500 ms (mean = 750 ms) to the standard 
trial duration of 8200 ms. The experiment was divided into two blocks of 157 sentences 
each. Following the first block of sentences, there was a short break. At the start of each 
experimental block we inserted two filler items (neutral sentences) to minimize loss of 
data due to saturation transients at the beginning of each block. 
MRI data acquisition
During the listening task, we acquired whole head T2*-weighted EPI-BOLD fMRI data 
with a Siemens 1.5T MR-scanner using an ascending slice acquisition sequence (volume 
TR = 2440 ms, TE = 40 ms, 90° flip angle, 31 axial slices, slice-matrix size = 64 x 64, 
slice thickness = 3 mm, slice gap = 0.5 mm, field of view = 224 mm, isotropic voxel size 
= 3.5 x 3.5 x 3.5 mm3). Following the experimental session, a high-resolution structural 
MR image was acquired for each participant, using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence 
(volume TR = 2250 ms, TE = 3.93 ms, 15° flip angle, 176 sagittal slices, slice-matrix size 
= 256 x 256, slice thickness = 1 mm, no slice gap, field of view = 256 mm). 
MRI data analysis
Image pre-processing and statistical analysis were performed using SPM2 (www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm2). The first five volumes of each participant’s data set were 
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. The functional EPI-BOLD images were re-
aligned, and the subject-mean functional MR images were co-registered with the cor-
responding structural MR images. These images were subsequently slice-time corrected, 
spatially normalized (i.e., the normalized transformations were generated from the 
structural MR images and applied to the functional MR images), and transformed into 
a common space, as defined by the SPM Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 
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template. The functional EPI-BOLD images were then spatially filtered by convolving 
the functional images with an isotropic 3D Gaussian kernel (10 mm FWHM). 
The fMRI data were then statistically analyzed using the general linear model and 
statistical parametric mapping (Friston et al., 1995). At the first level, single-subject 
fixed effect analyses were conducted. Two models were tested in each participant’s data 
separately: one with the experimental conditions speaker-congruent and speaker-incon-
gruent and a second model included the three world knowledge conditions (sentences 
with a semantic anomaly, sentences with a world knowledge anomaly, correct sentences). 
These linear models included regressors to model the duration of the sentence presen-
tation from the onset of the critical word to the end of the trial. We then temporally 
convolved the explanatory variables with the canonical hemodynamic response function 
provided by SPM2. To remove any signal changes due to head motion, we included six 
realignment parameters describing the head-movements as confounds in the model. The 
data were high-pass filtered to account for various low-frequency effects. Temporal au-
tocorrelation was modeled as a first-order autoregressive AR(1) + noise process. For the 
second-level analysis, the generated single-subject contrast images for the main effects 
were entered in a random effects analysis.
Region of Interest Analyses
Given our a priori hypothesis regarding the role of the left inferior frontal gyrus as the 
primary focus of interest, a region of interest analysis (ROI) was performed. A meta-
analysis (Bookheimer, 2002) has shown that semantic processing is centered at the co-
ordinates [-42, 25, 4] (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), with a mean distance to the local 
maxima to this centre coordinate of 15 mm (Petersson, Forkstam, & Ingvar, 2004). 
Accordingly, we converted these Talairach coordinates to MNI coordinates and applied 
small volume correction using a spherical ROI with a radius of 15 mm around [-42, 26, 
6], thresholded at P = 0.001 (uncorrected). 
Whole-Brain Analysis
In addition to testing condition effects in the ROI, we also tested for the presence of 
other regions that were differentially activated by the experimental conditions. In the 
explorative whole brain search, the results of the random effects analyses were thresh-
olded at P < 0.001 (uncorrected). We employed cluster-size as the test-statistic for our 
whole-brain analyses and only considered activation clusters significant at a threshold 
of P < 0.05 (corrected for multiple non-independent comparisons). All local maxima 
are reported as MNI coordinates. Relevant anatomical landmarks and Brodmann areas 
were identified using the atlas of the human brain (Mai, Assheuer, & Paxinos, 2004), the 
Anatomy Toolbox (Amunts, Malikovic, Mohlberg, Schormann, & Zilles, 2000; Eick-
hoff et al., 2005) and the Talairach Daemon (Lancaster et al., 2000).
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Results
Since the main focus of this study is on the unification of speaker characteristics inferred 
from the voice with sentence content, we will first report results related to this experi-
mental manipulation. Then, we will go into effects found for the semantic and world 
knowledge conditions and look into brain regions that are common for the unification 
of semantic knowledge, world knowledge, and speaker characteristics.
Speaker-inference sentences
Region of Interest Analysis
We first investigated whether LIFG (BA 45/47) responded differently to sentences in 
which speaker characteristics conveyed by the voice were incongruent with sentence 
content. Using the ROI described in the methods section, we found that the LIFG (BA 
45/47) was activated significantly more strongly during speaker-incongruent sentences 
compared to speaker-congruent sentences (t(41) = 4.5, P = 0.001). This effect corre-
sponds to the predicted activation pattern and supports the hypothesis that the LIFG 
plays a role in unification of speaker characteristics during auditory sentence compre-
2
Figure 2.1. Fitted BOLD responses for speaker-incongruent and speaker-congruent sentences 
from the ROI in LIFG (15 mm sphere, centre [-42, 26, 6]). This figure shows the involvement 
of the LIFG in the processing of both speaker-incongruent and speaker-congruent sentences.
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hension. Extracting BOLD responses for speaker-incongruent and speaker-congruent 
sentences in LIFG showed that both conditions elicited an increase in activation in 
this region. This result is displayed in Figure 2.1 and is in line with earlier findings that 
showed that LIFG is not only recruited during the processing of sentences with anoma-
lies, but is also implicated in the comprehension of coherent sentences (Hagoort et al., 
2004; Willems et al., 2007).
Whole-Brain Analysis
In the whole-brain analysis, a comparison was made between speaker-congruent and 
speaker-incongruent sentences. The results of the two contrasts speaker-incongruent 
> speaker-congruent and speaker-congruent > speaker-incongruent are listed in Table 
2.1a and b. Next to significant activation in the LIFG, speaker-incongruent sentences 
Figure 2.2a. Speaker-incongruency effect. Activation clusters from the whole brain analysis for 
the speaker-incongruent sentences relative to the speaker-congruent sentences, pooled across 
speaker dimensions (age, gender, social background).
Figure 2.2b. Speaker-congruency effect. Activation clusters from the whole brain analysis for the 
speaker-congruent sentences relative to the speaker-incongruent sentences, pooled across speaker 
dimensions.
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Table 2.1a. Results from the whole brain analysis for the contrast speaker-incongruent > 
speaker-congruent sentences*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 398 4.50 -54 26 14
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45/47 4.22 -48 26 -2
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 4.07 -50 22 8
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 211 4.48 50 34 -12
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 4.47 48 24 -14
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 4.30 54 28 -6
L. middle temporal gyrus** 21 150 4.23 -62 -36 -8
L. middle temporal gyrus 21 4.18 -58 -42 -4
** P = 0.077 corrected at cluster level. BA = Brodmann area.
Table 2.1b. Results from the whole brain analysis for the contrast speaker-congruent > 
speaker-incongruent sentences*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
R. anterior transverse temporal gyrus 41 515 5.49 38 -28 12
R. anterior transverse temporal gyrus 41 4.62 46 -24 6
R. superior temporal gyrus 22 4.04 58 -10 6
L. anterior transverse temporal gyrus 41 706 4.94 -44 -26 6
L. planum temporale 42 4.53 -60 -16 12
L. superior temporal gyrus 22 4.33 -52 -10 4
R. lingual gyrus 18 211 4.72 10 -54 4
R. posterior cingulate cortex 29 3.50 6 -44 10
* Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
Significant activation peaks > 8 mm apart.
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elicited significant activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG, BA 47; see Table 
2.1a). A region in the posterior part of the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) showed 
a trend to respond more strongly to speaker-incongruent sentences than to speaker-
congruent sentences (P = 0.077). Figure 2.2a displays renderings with the clusters of 
activation for the speaker-incongruent sentences. 
Inspection of regions that were activated significantly stronger for speaker-con-
gruent compared to speaker-incongruent sentences revealed activation clusters in bilat-
eral superior temporal cortex (BA 22) extending into the anterior transverse temporal 
(Heschl’s) gyrus (BA 41), in the right lingual gyrus (BA 18), and in the right posterior 
cingulate cortex (BA 29; see Table 2.1b for a complete list). Figure 2.2b shows render-
ings displaying the activation for speaker-congruent sentences.
World knowledge and semantic anomalies
Region of Interest Analysis
A previous study on unification of world knowledge and semantic information showed 
that unification of both sorts of information involved the LIFG (BA 45/47) (Hagoort et 
al., 2004). To inspect whether our results were in line with these findings, we performed 
a small volume correction using the ROI that was also used for the speaker-inference 
sentences. For the world knowledge sentences, we found that the LIFG (BA 45/47) was 
activated significantly more strongly during listening to sentences with a world knowl-
edge anomaly compared to correct sentences (t(82) = 4.93, P = 0.001). Also for the 
semantic contrast, LIFG (BA 45/47) was significantly more activated during sentences 
containing a semantic anomaly than during correct sentences (t(82) = 7.40, P = 0.001). 
Thus, the effects found in the ROI analyses for sentences with semantic and world 
knowledge anomalies replicate earlier findings of the study by Hagoort et al. (2004) in 
which sentences were presented visually. 
Figure 2.3. Results of the whole brain analysis showing clusters activated in response to sentences 
with world knowledge anomalies relative to correct sentences.
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Table 2.2a. Results from the whole brain analysis for the contrast world knowledge anomaly 
> correct sentences*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
R. middle/superior temporal gyrus 21/22 1515 5.92 60 -28 -2
R. superior temporal gyrus 38 5.32 56 12 -10
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 4.79 58 22 4
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 1185 5.63 -58 20 8
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 4.75 -48 34 -4
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 4.72 -46 30 10
L. middle frontal gyrus 6 510 5.11 -40 16 42
L. middle frontal gyrus 6/9 4.92 -42 16 34
L. middle frontal gyrus 6 4.06 -44 8 40
L. middle temporal gyrus 21/22 747 4.31 -58 -46 2
L. middle temporal gyrus 21/22 4.30 -60 -32 0
L. inferior temporal gyrus 20 3.89 -54 -50 -16
Table 2.2b. Results from the whole brain analysis for the contrast correct sentences > world 
knowledge anomaly*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
R. cingulate gyrus 24 216 4.58 4 -10 28
R. cingulate gyrus 24 3.57 12 -8 40
L. posterior cingulate gyrus 31/23 358 4.29 10 -32 38
L. posterior cingulate gyrus 31 4.12 6 -38 42
L. posterior cingulate gyrus 31 4.00 14 -40 36
* Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
Significant activation peaks > 8 mm apart.
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Whole-Brain Analysis
In the whole-brain analysis, a comparison was made between sentences with a world 
knowledge anomaly and correct sentences. The contrast world knowledge anomaly > 
correct sentences revealed significantly stronger activation for sentences with a world 
knowledge anomaly in LIFG (BA 45/47), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6/9), left in-
ferior and middle temporal gyrus (BA 20/21/22; see Table 2.2a for the complete list). 
Furthermore, in the right hemisphere there was a significant cluster of activation in 
middle temporal gyrus (BA 21/22) extending into superior temporal gyrus (BA 38). The 
reversed contrast, correct sentences > world knowledge anomaly, showed significantly 
increased activation for correct sentences in right middle and left posterior cingulate 
cortex (BA 24/31; see Table 2.2b). Figure 2.3 displays renderings showing activation for 
sentences with world knowledge anomalies.
Moreover, relative to correct sentences, sentences with a semantic anomaly elic-
ited significantly increased activation in LIFG (BA 45/47), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 
Table 2.3a. Results from the whole brain analysis for the contrast world knowledge anomaly 
> correct sentences*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 2187 8.13 -56 20 10
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 6.98 -52 32 12
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 6.86 -46 26 14
L. middle temporal gyrus 21 2030 6.41 -52 -50 4
L. middle/superior temporal gyrus 21/22 6.14 -60 -40 6
L. middle/superior temporal gyrus 21/22 5.71 -58 -30 2
R. cerebellum 486 5.99 20 -74 -34
R. cerebellum 4.00 28 -62 -24
R. cerebellum 3.72 42 -68 -30
L. middle frontal gyrus 9 637 5.71 -50 16 32
L. frontal operculum 6/9 5.50 -48 8 28
L. middle frontal gyrus 6 5.18 -38 2 54
R. superior temporal gyrus 22 534 4.60 56 -20 -2
R. superior temporal gyrus 22 4.50 54 -28 -2
R. superior temporal gyrus 22 4.12 58 -2 -8
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6/9), left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21/22) and superior temporal gyrus bilaterally 
(BA 21/22; see Table 2.3a). The contrast correct sentences > sentences with a semantic 
anomaly showed significant clusters of activation in the inferior rostral gyrus bilaterally 
(BA 10/11/12), right posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31) and angular gyrus bilaterally 
(BA 39/19; Table 2.3b). Figure 2.4 shows renderings with the activation clusters for 
sentences with semantic anomalies.
Figure 2.4. Results of the whole brain analysis showing clusters activated in response to sentences 
with semantic anomalies relative to correct sentences.
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Table 2.3b. Results from the whole brain analysis for the contrast correct sentences > world 
knowledge anomaly*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
R. inferior rostral gyrus 11 1423 6.75 6 34 -16
Inferior rostral gyrus 10 5.11 0 56 -4
L. inferior rostral gyrus 12 4.88 -2 22 -20
R. posterior cingulate gyrus 31 977 6.67 4 -40 40
R. posterior cingulate gyrus 31 5.98 10 -46 38
L. angular gyrus 39/19 445 6.28 -38 -76 36
R. angular gyrus 39 656 5.93 46 -70 38
R. angular gyrus 39/19 3.55 34 -78 30
* Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
Significant activation peaks > 8 mm apart.
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Common brain regions for unification of speaker characteristics, semantic knowledge, 
and world knowledge
To test for common neural correlates for the unification of world knowledge, semantic 
knowledge, and speaker characteristics, we created a contrast showing regions involved 
in semantic and world knowledge anomalies relative to correct sentences. The result-
ing image of this contrast was then used to perform a small volume correction on the 
contrast speaker-incongruent > speaker-congruent sentences. The results of this analysis 
are displayed in Table 2.4. Brain regions involved in unification of world knowledge, 
semantic information and speaker characteristics were the LIFG (BA 45/47), the RIFG 
(BA 47) and the posterior part of the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21). These findings 
confirm the idea that there is an overlap in brain regions involved in the unification of 
linguistic and extra-linguistic information. Figure 2.5a shows the brain regions common 
to the unification of speaker characteristics, semantic information and world knowledge.
Figure 2.5a. Common regions of activation for unification of linguistic (world knowledge and 
semantic knowledge) and extra-linguistic information (speaker characteristics).
Figure 2.5b. Common regions of activation for processing congruent sentences (i.e., speaker-
congruent sentences and sentences without a semantic or world knowledge anomaly).
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For the opposite effect, we created a contrast image showing regions involved in 
correct sentences relative to semantic and world knowledge conditions and then used 
this image for a small volume correction on the contrast speaker-congruent > speaker-
incongruent sentences. This analysis revealed activation for congruent sentences (i.e., 
speaker-congruent sentences and sentences without a world knowledge or semantic 
anomaly) in right posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23/31; t(41) = 4.29, P = 0.029). Figure 
2.5b displays a section with the activation in right posterior cingulate cortex.
2
Table 2.4. Common regions for unification of speaker characteristics, semantic information 
and world knowledge**
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 334 4.50 -54 26 14
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis 
/ pars orbitalis) 45/47 4.22 -48 26 -2
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 45 4.07 -50 22 8
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 4.04 -48 24 -6
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 3.81 -46 26 -12
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 3.76 -46 34 -12
L. temporal pole 38 3.69 -52 16 -12
L. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 3.51 -38 22 -12
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 104 4.48 50 34 -12
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 4.40 50 40 -12
R. inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 47 4.30 54 28 -6
L. middle temporal gyrus 21 74 4.18 -58 -42 -4
L. middle temporal gyrus 21 3.95 -62 -36 -4
** Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
Significant activation peaks > 4 mm apart.
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Discussion
The aim of this fMRI study was to investigate the neural unification of voice-based infer-
ences about speaker characteristics and the lexical content of a spoken sentence. More 
in particular, we wanted to answer the question whether there is an overlap in neural 
recruitment for unification of core linguistic information and that of extra-linguistic, 
pragmatic, information. With respect to these issues, the two main findings of this study 
are as follows. Firstly, manipulating the congruency of voice-based inferences about the 
speaker’s age, gender, or social background and the semantic content of the spoken sen-
tence showed bilateral involvement of the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45/47) during uni-
fication of speaker characteristics and sentence meaning. Secondly, there was an overlap 
in brain regions involved in the unification of world knowledge, semantic information, 
and speaker characteristics, thus suggesting a common neural underpinning for the 
unification of core linguistic and extra-linguistic information. Common brain regions 
included the inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally (BA 45/47) and the posterior part of the 
left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21).
Inferior frontal gyrus and unification of speaker characteristics
As hypothesized, listening to speaker-incongruent sentences increased activation in the 
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45/47), suggesting that this region is involved in the unifica-
tion of speaker characteristics and sentence meaning. This result is in line with other 
findings that suggest a role for the inferior frontal cortex in sentence and discourse 
comprehension (Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999; Hagoort et al., 2004; Just, Carpen-
ter, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1996; Kuperberg, Lakshmanan, Caplan, & Holcomb, 
2006; Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007). The involvement of the LIFG in the 
unification of speaker characteristics inferred from the voice and sentence meaning is 
consistent with a view of language comprehension in which the inferior frontal cortex 
serves as a core area for unification operations in language (Hagoort, 2005). Owing to 
the unification contribution of inferior frontal cortex, incoming information is con-
tinuously integrated and combined into an unfolding representation of a multiword 
utterance, such as a sentence. If incoming information is conflicting, as in the case of a 
mismatch between voice-based speaker inferences and sentence content, the unification 
load is increased. In the current study, the strongest response to the increased unification 
load for speaker-incongruent sentences was found in the LIFG. Importantly, as previ-
ously reported (Hagoort et al., 2004; Willems et al., 2007) and present in our own data, 
the observed activation increase in LIFG for speaker-incongruent sentences does not 
reflect a response to a mismatch per se, since the region is also implicated in processing 
speaker-congruent sentences (see Figure 2.1). This provides support for the idea that left 
inferior frontal cortex plays an important role in semantic unification during language 
comprehension. 
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The left inferior frontal cortex is a relatively large and anatomically heterogeneous 
cortical region with numerous connections to other brain regions. Neuroimaging data 
suggest that the role of LIFG extends beyond the language domain and it has been put 
forward that the main function of LIFG is ‘controlled retrieval’ or ‘(semantic) selection’ 
(Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, 
Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). Accounts of inferior frontal cortex as playing a key role in the 
selection of competing semantic representations are not incompatible with the view of 
this region as a unification space for language, because selection often is an aspect of 
unification (Vosse & Kempen, 2000). However, it is not clear how the results of this 
study could be easily explained by selection accounts. 
Although speaker-incongruent sentences elicited the strongest BOLD response in 
the LIFG, they also evoked a significant increase in activation in the homotopic region 
(BA 47) in the right hemisphere. The observed bilateral activation pattern is compat-
ible with findings from other neuroimaging studies that looked at semantic ambiguity 
at the sentence level or in a discourse context (Robertson et al., 2000; St George, Kutas, 
Martinez, & Sereno, 1999; Zempleni et al., 2007). Recently, it has been suggested that 
bilateral IFG activation during discourse processing is possibly related to the construc-
tion of a situation model (Ferstl, Rinck, & von Cramon, 2005; Menenti et al., 2009). 
A situation model is a mental representation of the situation described by the utterance 
in connection to preceding or concurrent sources of information (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 
1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
When encountering information that is implausible or unexpected given the cur-
rent situation model and general world knowledge, a listener will attempt to revise 
the model by integrating the unexpected information into the ongoing representation 
of the situation described by the utterance - in - context (Ferstl et al., 2005; Van Dijk 
& Kintsch, 1983). An fMRI study by Ferstl and colleagues (2005) suggests that the 
integration of new or inconsistent information in the situation model involves the pre-
frontal cortex bilaterally (BA 47/11), with slightly more extended activation in the left 
than in the right IFG (Ferstl et al., 2005). Consequently, the bilateral activation pattern 
in IFG observed in our study is consistent with a scenario in which the listener unifies 
unexpected incoming information and updates the situation model (Ferstl et al., 2005; 
Nieuwland, Petersson, & Van Berkum, 2007). 
The differential contribution of left and right IFG to the unification of incoming 
information cannot be unraveled by the design of our study. An fMRI study by Menenti 
et al. (2009) investigated whether manipulating discourse context modulated the unifi-
cation of world knowledge. Results showed that LIFG and RIFG were both recruited in 
on-line semantic unification of incoming information with previously stored knowledge 
in long-term memory. Moreover, LIFG remained sensitive to semantic unification of 
incoming information with prior world knowledge, even if preceding discourse context 
overrides this knowledge. In contrast, RIFG was more sensitive to the local discourse 
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(Menenti et al., 2009). These findings suggest a division of labor between RIFG and 
LIFG when it comes to discourse comprehension that might also apply to unification of 
sentence content with knowledge about the speaker. Several other ideas have been put 
forward with respect to the precise and possibly different contribution of the two hemi-
spheres in language processing (Faust & Chiarello, 1998; Jung-Beeman, 2005; Mason 
& Just, 2007), but this issue needs further exploration.
Common neural correlates for unification of speaker characteristics, semantic 
information, and world knowledge
Next to examining the neural correlates of unification of speaker characteristics and 
sentence meaning, we wanted to identify brain regions that are involved in unifying 
both core linguistic information and extra-linguistic information. Common neural cor-
relates for unification of world knowledge, semantic information, and speaker charac-
teristics were the inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally (BA 45/47) and the posterior part of 
the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21). The observed overlap in cortical regions points 
to similarities in neural recruitment for the unification of linguistic and extra-linguistic 
information. Further evidence for the resemblance in unification comes from the find-
ing by Van Berkum et al. (2008) that semantic and world knowledge anomalies elicit 
an ERP effect, the so-called N400 effect, with the same temporal and spatial distribu-
tion as speaker-incongruent sentences. The importance of the inferior frontal gyrus for 
unification has been discussed above. The left middle temporal gyrus plays a key role in 
the storage and retrieval of semantic information (Hagoort, 2005; Hickok & Poeppel, 
2007; Indefrey & Cutler, 2005). Functional neuroimaging studies using semantically 
ambiguous sentences have shown that, in particular, posterior middle temporal regions 
are important for lexical-semantic processing (Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007).
According to our view, the left posterior middle temporal gyrus (LpMTG) can 
be considered as a component of the unification network that also involves left and 
right inferior frontal gyrus. Within the unification network, there possibly is a dynamic 
interplay between inferior frontal regions and the LpMTG that explains the observed 
activation pattern in our study (see also Snijders et al., 2006). Speculatively, this in-
teraction between frontal and posterior temporal cortex would serve to maintain the 
retrieved semantic information online so that unification can take place. Here, it is 
important to note that the anomalous sentences in our experiment did not contain 
a violation in a strict sense. As a consequence, unification is not precluded, but the 
processing of anomalous sentences is associated with an increased unification load that 
needs prolonged activation of semantic information. This is, for example, needed for 
our speaker-incongruent sentences, where it is harder to associate the critical word with 
the voice of the speaker and thereby the unification load is increased. For unification to 
be achieved then, it is required that the semantic information retrieved for the critical 
word remains activated. It is known that the frontal cortex exerts top-down control over 
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more posterior regions, such as LpMTG, where (semantic) representations are stored 
(Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001). These feedback signals from in-
ferior frontal cortex influence which information is maintained by posterior areas and 
might in our case make sure that relevant semantic representations remain active so that 
unification can take place. 
Support for such a left frontal-temporal interplay comes from a study by Kuper-
berg and colleagues (Kuperberg et al., 2003) in which pragmatically anomalous (compa-
rable to the world knowledge anomalies in our study), morphosyntactically anomalous 
and correct sentences were presented. fMRI results showed that the same regions within 
a left temporal-frontal network were modulated to different degrees by both pragmati-
cally and morphosyntactically anomalous sentences. Combining these fMRI results 
with reaction time (RT) data from plausibility ratings of the sentences revealed that the 
pattern of response within the left temporal–frontal network across the three sentence 
types mirrored the pattern of RTs, with most activity and the longest RTs in association 
with the pragmatically anomalous sentences, and least activity and the shortest RTs in 
association with the morphosyntactically anomalous sentences. Increased neural activ-
ity in the left temporal-frontal network together with longer RTs for the pragmatically 
anomalous sentences were interpreted as reflecting increased and more prolonged efforts 
to search and retrieve semantic knowledge about the likelihood of events occurring in 
the real world (Kuperberg et al., 2003; see also Kuperberg, Sitnikova, & Lakshmanan, 
2008). It was suggested that in the case of morphosyntactically anomalous sentences, 
RTs and neural activity were reduced, because plausibility decisions about these sen-
tences can be made on the basis of a finite set of syntactic rules. 
We also examined the reversed contrast to determine whether there was an over-
lap in brain regions recruited for congruent sentences (i.e., speaker-congruent sentences 
and sentences without a semantic or world knowledge anomaly) relative to speaker-
incongruent sentences and sentences with a world knowledge or semantic anomaly. This 
revealed a significant cluster of activation in right posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; BA 
23/31). A meta-analysis by Ferstl and colleagues (Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, & von Cra-
mon, 2008) has shown that the left hemisphere counterpart of this region is activated 
for comprehending coherent language compared with incoherent language, suggesting 
that this region is important for coherence building. Stronger activity in right PCC ob-
served for congruent sentences compared to sentences with an anomaly might be related 
to a role for this region in processing coherent language. More in general, the observed 
activation for congruent sentences might be related to PCC being part of the default 
mode network (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Raichle et al., 2001). Ac-
tivity in default mode brain regions (among which PCC) is attenuated as a function 
of task difficulty (Greicius & Menon, 2004; Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 
2001). In our study, congruent sentences are less attention demanding and engaging 
than sentences with a speaker, semantic or world knowledge anomaly, and will therefore 
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cause less suppression of activity in default mode regions (i.e., in PCC; see also Wilson, 
Molnar-Szakacs, & Iacoboni, 2008). So, it is plausible that stronger activation in right 
PCC for congruent sentences reflects less disrupted default activity for these sentences 
than for sentences with an anomaly.
Brain regions involved in processing speaker-congruent sentences
The contrast speaker-congruent versus speaker-incongruent sentences showed stronger 
activation for congruent sentences bilaterally in Heschl’s gyrus (HG) and superior tem-
poral gyrus (STG) with greater activation on the left extending to the planum temporale. 
In addition, there was increased activation in the right lingual gyrus that extended into 
the posterior cingulate cortex. The bilateral activation in superior temporal cortex (BA 
22/41/42) is consistent with findings from studies on speech perception and auditory 
sentence comprehension (Constable et al., 2004; Hickok & Poeppel, 2000) that show 
stronger involvement of this region during processing of semantically meaningful (co-
herent) and intelligible speech (Davis & Johnsrude, 2003; Humphries, Binder, Medler, 
& Liebenthal, 2006). The fit between voice-based inferences and sentence content is 
what makes speaker-congruent sentences easier to process than speaker-incongruent 
sentences. Given the selective sensitivity of superior temporal regions to coherence in 
linguistic information and their special role in voice processing (Belin et al., 2000), the 
activation in these regions for speaker-congruent sentences is possibly due to successful 
support of voice-based inferences in line with the whole sentence meaning. Importantly, 
the observed superior temporal cortex activation seems specific for the congruence be-
tween voice and message and is unlikely to be due to coherence in general. This follows 
from the fact that this region does not show up as significantly activated in the above-
mentioned contrast of correct sentences vs. sentences with a speaker, semantic or world 
knowledge anomaly.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the present study not only replicates earlier findings on the integrative 
role of the left inferior frontal cortex in language comprehension, but it also extends 
the existing knowledge about the nature of the information that is unified. From fMRI 
studies on unification during visual and auditory sentence comprehension, we know 
that, within the language domain, the involvement of left inferior frontal cortex in 
unification processes is independent of input modality (i.e., it operates during reading 
as well as during understanding speech; Hagoort et al., 2004; Willems et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, findings from an fMRI study by Willems et al. (2007) on unification of 
cospeech gestures have shown that unification space in LIFG is not domain specific: it 
integrates semantic information coming from the speech domain as well as from the ac-
tion domain (i.e., as extracted from gestures). In our study, the information that needed 
to be unified had yet a different nature. Both sources of information (sentence meaning 
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and speaker characteristics) came from the same modality since they were both extracted 
from the speech signal. However, they differed in another dimension. While sentence 
meaning per se is semantic in nature, voice-based inferences about characteristics of the 
speaker can be regarded as more pragmatic and also social in nature. Thus, our find-
ings suggest that the role of the LIFG is not exclusively limited to the unification of 
language information, but it also plays a significant role in the on-line unification of 
extra-linguistic information, including social information concerning speaker charac-
teristics carried by the speech signal. In short, the data suggest that the LIFG unifies 
multiple sources of information during language comprehension, linguistic as well as 
extra-linguistic. Finally, we identified an overlap in brain regions involved in unifying 
speaker characteristics, semantic information and world knowledge. This further con-
firms that unification processes for core linguistic and extra-linguistic information have 
shared underlying neural correlates and that during language comprehension not only 
information from a broad range of cognitive domains is incorporated, but information 
from the social domain is also taken into account.
2
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Abstract
Difficulties with pragmatic aspects of communication are universal across individuals 
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Here we focused on an aspect of pragmatic lan-
guage comprehension that is relevant to social interaction in daily life: the integration 
of speaker characteristics inferred from the voice with the content of a message. Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we examined the neural correlates of 
the integration of voice-based inferences about the speaker’s age, gender, or social back-
ground, and sentence content in adults with ASD and matched control participants. 
Relative to the control group, the ASD group showed increased activation in right infe-
rior frontal gyrus (RIFG; Brodmann area 47) for speaker-incongruent sentences com-
pared to speaker-congruent sentences. Given that both groups performed behaviourally 
at a similar level on a debriefing interview outside the scanner, the increased activation 
in RIFG for the ASD group was interpreted as being compensatory in nature. It pre-
sumably reflects spill over processing from the language dominant left hemisphere due 
to higher task demands faced by the participants with ASD when integrating speaker 
characteristics and the content of a spoken sentence. Furthermore, only the control 
group showed decreased activation for speaker-incongruent relative to speaker-congru-
ent sentences in right ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC; Brodmann area 10), in-
cluding right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Brodmann area 24/32). Since vMPFC is 
involved in self-referential processing related to judgments and inferences about self and 
others, the absence of such a modulation in vMPFC activation in the ASD group pos-
sibly points to atypical default self-referential mental activity in ASD. Our results show 
that in ASD compensatory mechanisms are necessary in implicit, low-level inferential 
processes in spoken language understanding. This indicates that pragmatic language 
problems in ASD are not restricted to high-level inferential processes, but encompass 
the most basic aspects of pragmatic language processing. 
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Introduction
Impairments in language and communication are among the defining characteristics of 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD; APA, 1994). Although evidence is mixed, semantic 
language processing (i.e., constructing the content of a sentence based on just the mean-
ing of the words) seems to be relatively spared in high-functioning individuals with 
ASD (Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2005; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2003). The 
most striking language difficulties concern pragmatic language aspects (i.e., the ability 
to use and comprehend language in context) and these are universal across individuals 
with ASD, irrespective of their level of functioning (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). Lan-
guage comprehension in (verbal) social communication calls upon pragmatic language 
skills, since the listener is often required to work out the non-literal meaning of the 
speaker’s message by using the context and his own knowledge of the world. One of 
the most salient features of the impaired pragmatic language comprehension in ASD 
is an overly literal interpretation of utterances which causes problems in understanding 
humour, irony and metaphors, as well as in making inferences, and comprehending 
indirect requests (Happé, 1993; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996).
In the past years, neuroimaging studies have sought to elucidate the neural under-
pinnings of language comprehension in healthy participants. This research has revealed 
that during language comprehension our brains integrate different sources of incoming 
information immediately and in parallel to interpret the ongoing sentence or discourse 
(Hagoort & van Berkum, 2007). The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) plays a key role 
in this integration process by unifying a broad range of information, such as knowledge 
about the context and the world, as well as co-speech gestures (Hagoort et al., 2004; 
Willems et al., 2007). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have 
shown that, next to the inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal cortex plays an important 
role in (spoken) language comprehension (see for a review Bookheimer, 2002). Within 
temporal cortex, there seems to exist a subdivision with inferior and middle temporal 
cortex being involved in storage and retrieval of lexical-semantic information and su-
perior temporal cortex supporting sound-based processes (Hickok & Poeppel, 2000, 
2007). Although the left hemisphere is seen as the language dominant one, an increasing 
number of fMRI studies, including our own (Tesink et al., 2009b), report additional ac-
tivation in right hemispheric brain regions during language comprehension. This seems 
especially to be the case when task demands are increased and higher-level language 
processing is needed, for example in the comprehension of semantically ambiguous 
sentences or discourse (Robertson et al., 2000; Rodd et al., 2005; St George et al., 1999; 
Xu, Kemeny, Park, Frattali, & Braun, 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007).
Given that the language difficulties observed in ASD can cause serious problems 
in social interaction and persist into adulthood, it is important to clarify their neural 
basis. These problems manifest themselves most prominently at the sentence and dis-
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course level, i.e. at the higher levels of language processing. An fMRI study on semantic 
processing at the sentence level (Just et al., 2004) revealed decreased activation in the 
LIFG (BA 45/47) for adults with ASD relative to control participants. Next to reduced 
activation in the LIFG, there was increased activation for the ASD group in the left 
middle/superior temporal gyrus (BA 21/22). Comparable results have been reported for 
semantic processing at the word level (Gaffrey et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2006). These 
findings are taken to imply that, during semantic processing, the brains of individuals 
with ASD engage less in integrative processing (as takes place in LIFG), but focus more 
on lower level lexical processing (Harris et al., 2006; Just et al., 2004).
Difficulties with language comprehension displayed in daily life by adults with 
ASD are more evident at the pragmatic than at the semantic level: they show impair-
ments in comprehending language in context, but not in constructing a context-inde-
pendent meaning of an utterance. Nevertheless, very few fMRI studies have examined 
neural correlates of pragmatic language comprehension. Two studies that did investigate 
pragmatics in children and adults with ASD found that making inferences from dis-
course and comprehending irony elicited increased activation in RIFG for the ASD 
group relative to the control group (Mason et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2006). In LIFG, 
there was no difference in activation between the two groups. In both studies on prag-
matics, increased activity in the ASD groups fell within networks that were activated for 
the control groups. Since making inferences and comprehending irony seem to be more 
difficult for individuals with ASD, increased activation in right hemispheric regions 
possibly reflects the higher task demands that the ASD group faces when interpreting 
discourse in context (Mason et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2006).
Given the pragmatic language impairments observed in adults with ASD, we tack-
led an aspect of pragmatic language comprehension that is relevant to social interaction 
in daily life: the integration of speaker characteristics (age, gender, social background) 
derived from the voice with the content of a message. During verbal communication the 
voice is an important source of pragmatic information as it implicitly reveals a lot about 
a speaker. To make sense of what a speaker is saying, we use this speaker information 
inferred from the voice and integrate it with the literal meaning of the utterance. For in-
stance, “Every evening I drink some wine before I go to sleep” sounds odd when spoken 
by a young child. To look into the integration of speaker and message, we presented a 
control and ASD group with spoken sentences whose meaning did (speaker-congruent) 
or did not (speaker-incongruent) match voice-based inferences about the speaker’s age, 
gender or social background. In contrast to the earlier studies on pragmatic language 
processing in individuals with ASD, in our study no explicit inferences were required 
during online language processing. Therefore, all effects are a consequence of an auto-
matic process of matching inferences about the speaker from low-level acoustic features 
with the content of the message. In line with earlier findings, we hypothesize that both 
groups recruit overlapping brain regions for processing speaker-incongruent and speak-
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er-congruent sentences. Our previous study in control participants showed significantly 
stronger bilateral activation in inferior frontal gyrus for speaker-incongruent sentences 
relative to speaker-congruent sentences (Tesink et al., 2009b). The integrative aspect of 
pragmatic language comprehension required by the speaker inference sentences is more 
difficult for adults with ASD than for control participants. Therefore, we expect to find 
compensatory activation in the ASD group in regions in inferior frontal gyrus that were 
found to be involved in processing speaker-incongruent sentences.
Materials and methods
Participants
The ASD group comprised 24 right-handed adults (eight females; mean age ± SD = 26.3 
± 6.3 years; age range 18-40 years) diagnosed with high-functioning autism (HFA) or 
Asperger syndrome (AS). The diagnosis of HFA or Asperger syndrome was established 
by expert clinical opinion following DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994) supplemented by 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994). 
Subjects were included in the ASD group if they fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for au-
tistic disorder or Asperger syndrome (10 participants with HFA, 14 with AS). Table 
3.1 displays the diagnosis and ADI-R scores per participant. Three participants did not 
meet one of the specified cut-off points of the ADI-R. This could be attributed to the 
fact that several participants only received a diagnosis in adolescence or adulthood and 
parents were consequently unable to report the relevant developmental information. 
For four participants no parents or caretakers were available and hence the ADI-R was 
not administered. In all cases, participants were only included if the clinical diagnosis 
of HFA or AS was undisputed. Participants had no reported history of neurological 
disorders, head trauma or psychiatric disorders other than autism. The control group 
included 24 medically healthy adults (mean age ± SD = 26.2 ± 6.0 years; age range 
18-39 years) recruited through advertisements in the local community. The control par-
ticipants were matched with the ASD participants for age, gender and verbal IQ (as-
sessed by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981); or 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, third edition, WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997)). Prior to 
inclusion, control subjects were screened to exclude those with psychiatric, neurological, 
or developmental disorders.
All participants were right-handed native speakers of Dutch and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Furthermore, all had full-scale IQ 
scores of 85 or above based on the WAIS-R or WAIS-III. The ASD and control groups 
did not differ significantly in chronological age, verbal IQ or full-scale IQ (for all com-
parisons P > 0.1), although the mean performance IQ was higher in the control group 
(P = 0.008). Participant characteristics, including age, sex, verbal, performance, and 
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full-scale IQ are presented in Table 3.2. The study was approved by the local Medical 
Ethical Committee. All participants gave written informed consent according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Diagnostic algorithm ADI-R
Participant Diagnosis Social interaction Communication Behavior
Cutoff = 10 
(max = 30)
Cutoff = 8 
(max = 26)
Cutoff = 3 
(max = 12)
p01 HFA 12 11 5
p02 AS 12 9 4
p03 AS 19 8 5
p04 HFA 20 16 8
p05 HFA 27 20 3
p06 HFA 16 13 2
p07 AS 6 11 3
p08 HFA 24 17 7
p09 HFA 23 17 5
p10 AS 20 10 6
p11 HFA 13 12 3
p12 HFA 22 13 3
p13 AS 20 18 7
p14 AS n.a. n.a. n.a.
p15 AS 11 10 4
p16 AS 16 18 4
p17 HFA n.a. n.a. n.a.
p18 HFA 22 14 2
p19 AS 12 12 5
p20 AS n.a. n.a. n.a.
p21 AS 12 16 5
p22 AS 12 10 3
p23 AS 10 12 7
p24 AS n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Stimulus material
The stimulus materials consisted of two sets of sentences: a set of speaker-inference sen-
tences and a set of sentences with lexical semantic or world knowledge anomalies (see 
Hagoort et al., 2004). The stimulus materials used in this study were identical to those 
of the fMRI study by Tesink et al. (2009b) and to the ERP study by Van Berkum et al. 
(2008). For the set of speaker-inference sentences, we constructed 160 sentences with a 
lexical content that was congruent with voice-based inferences about a particular speak-
er, but incongruent with inferences about another speaker. To increase variability and 
to cover a broad range of information captured in the voice, sentence meaning could be 
incongruent with three different dimensions: the speaker’s age, gender, or social back-
ground. The speaker-incongruity always emerged at a single critical word, which was 
never sentence-final. Furthermore, the fragment before the critical word was compatible 
with either speaker (“Yesterday I went to…”, “I have a large…”). An example of each 
sentence type is provided in Table 3.3.
Next to the speaker-inference sentences, we included sentences with a semantic 
anomaly, a world knowledge anomaly or without an anomaly (see Hagoort et al. 2004). 
This set of sentences is not relevant for the research question at hand and will therefore 
not be discussed here. Forty-two items consisting of reversed speech were used as a base-
line and inserted as filler sentences. These items were created by reversing a selection of 
the speaker-inference and world knowledge sentences (two sentences per speaker) and 
were matched on sentence length with the sentence duration in the other experimental 
conditions. Overall, the experimental sentences varied in length from 1638 to 5648 ms, 
with the average sentence length being 3247 ms (SD = 597 ms). The critical words had 
an average duration of 480 ms (SD = 136 ms).
To distribute all versions of speaker-inference and world knowledge items equally, 
we created six different stimulus lists. These pseudo-randomized trial lists all contained 
eighty exemplars for each of the two speaker-inference conditions, thirty-six sentences 
Left page: Table 3.1. Diagnosis and score on the domains social interaction, communication 
and behavior of the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) per participant of the ASD 
group. Note that the ADI-R is a semi-structured diagnostic interview that is administered to the 
parents or caregivers (Lord et al., 1994). The scores displayed here are from the diagnostic algo-
rithm and represent behaviour of the participant at the age of four/five years old. Scores above 
cut-off points on all domains are thought to be indicative for ASD. Three participants (p06, p07, 
and p18) did not meet one of specified cut-off points of the ADI-R (see scores printed in bold). 
This could be attributed to the fact that these participants received a diagnosis relatively late in 
life and consequently parents were unable to report the relevant developmental information. 
One subject participated in another study and the ADI-R was already administered then. Exact 
scores could not be recalled but scores were above cut-off on all domains. For four participants 
no parents or caretakers were available and hence the ADI-R was not administered (= n.a.; p14, 
p17, p20, p24). In all cases, the clinical diagnosis of HFA or AS was undisputed.
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for each of the three world knowledge conditions, forty-two reversed speech items and 
four neutral filler sentences. The lists were created in such a way that none of the partici-
pants heard more than one version of a sentence.
Experimental design and procedure
Each participant listened to a total of 314 sentences (i.e. 160 speaker-inference sentenc-
es, 108 world knowledge sentences, 42 reversed speech items, 4 neutral sentences that 
served as filler items) that were presented in an event-related design. During image ac-
quisition, subjects lay in a supine position in the MR scanner and head movements were 
minimized by an adjustable padded head holder. The spoken sentences were presented 
by headphones while a fixation cross was presented via an LCD projector standing out-
side the scanner room, projecting the computer display onto a semi-transparent screen 
Table 3.2. Demographic characteristics of participants
ASD group (mean ± SD) Control group (mean ± SD)
Sex (male : female)      16 : 8      16 : 8
Age (years)   26.3 ± 6.3   26.2 ± 6.0
Verbal IQ 113.2 ± 13.9 113.5 ± 12.1
Performance IQ 113.0 ± 15.2 124.8 ± 14.0
Full-scale IQ 114.3 ± 14.1 119.9 ± 11.7
Table 3.3. Speaker-inference dimensions
Age: child versus adult (40 sentences in total):
• I cannot sleep without my teddy bear in my arms (child congruent / adult incongruent)
• Every evening I drink a glass of wine before going to bed (adult congruent / child 
incongruent)
Gender: male versus female (80 sentences in total):
• Before I go out I always check my make up in the mirror (female congruent / male 
incongruent)
• I broke my ankle playing football with my friends (male congruent / female 
incongruent)
Social background: upper-class accent versus lower-class accent (40 sentences in total):
• In my free time, I prefer to listen to piano music of Chopin (upper-class accent congru-
ent / lower-class accent incongruent)
• I have a big tattoo on my back (lower-class accent congruent / upper-class accent 
incongruent)
Pragmatic language comprehension in autism: Unification of speaker and meaning | 57
that the subject viewed through a mirror device attached to the head coil. Stimulus pre-
sentation was controlled by a PC running the Presentation software (nbs.neuro-bs.com/
Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA).
Participants were instructed to process each sentence attentively for comprehen-
sion. To ensure attentive listening, they were told that afterwards questions would be 
asked about the presented sentences. Before the beginning of the experiment, each par-
ticipant received a practice block consisting of ten sentences. These items were also 
used to adjust the volume level for sentence presentation. The functional data acquired 
during the practice run were not used in the analysis. The experiment was divided into 
two blocks of 157 sentences each. Following the first block of sentences, there was a 
short break. At the start of each experimental block we inserted two filler items (neutral 
sentences) to minimize loss of data due to saturation transients at the beginning of each 
block.
At the end of the scanning session, participants were extensively debriefed to 
check whether they were capable of identifying speaker-incongruities. Participants were 
asked if they noted something strange about the sentences and, if so, to report speakers 
that pronounced sentences that did not match with voice-based inferences about their 
characteristics. There were six speaker-incongruities to be identified (adult-incongruent, 
child-incongruent, male-incongruent, female-incongruent, upper-class-incongruent, 
and lower-class-incongruent).
MRI data acquisition
During the listening task, we acquired whole head T2*-weighted EPI-BOLD fMRI data 
with a Siemens 1.5T MR-scanner using an ascending slice acquisition sequence (volume 
TR = 2440 ms, TE = 40 ms, 90° flip angle, 31 axial slices, slice-matrix size = 64 x 64, 
slice thickness = 3 mm, slice gap = 0.5 mm, field of view = 224 mm, isotropic voxel size 
= 3.5 x 3.5 x 3.5 mm3). Following the experimental session, a high-resolution structural 
MR image was acquired for each participant, using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence 
(volume TR = 2250 ms, TE = 3.93 ms, 15° flip angle, 176 sagittal slices, slice-matrix size 
= 256 x 256, slice thickness = 1 mm, no slice gap, field of view = 256 mm). 
MRI data analysis
Image pre-processing and statistical analysis were performed using SPM5 (www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five volumes of each participant’s data set were discarded to 
allow for T1 equilibration. The functional EPI-BOLD images were realigned, and the 
subject-mean functional MR images were coregistered with the corresponding struc-
tural MR images. These images were subsequently slice-time corrected, spatially nor-
malized (i.e., the normalized transformations were generated from the structural MR 
images and applied to the functional MR images), and transformed into a common 
space, as defined by the SPM Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 template. The 
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functional EPI-BOLD images were then spatially filtered by convolving the functional 
images with an isotropic 3D Gaussian kernel (10 mm FWHM).
The fMRI data were then statistically analyzed using the general linear model 
and statistical parametric mapping (Friston et al., 1995). At the first level, single-sub-
ject fixed effect analyses were conducted. A model with the experimental conditions 
(speaker-incongruent, speaker-congruent) was tested in each participant’s data sepa-
rately. In this linear model, mini-block regressors were included to model events as the 
duration of the sentence presentation from the onset of the critical word to the end of 
the trial. We then temporally convolved the explanatory variables with the canonical 
hemodynamic response function provided by SPM. To remove any artefactual signal 
changes due to head motion, we included six realignment parameters describing the 
head-movements as confounds in the model. The data were high-pass filtered to account 
for various low-frequency effects. Temporal autocorrelation was modelled as a first-order 
autoregressive AR(1) + noise process. For the second-level analysis, the generated single-
subject contrast images for the main effects (speaker-incongruent and speaker-congru-
ent) were entered in a random effects analysis. As we were interested in group x task 
interaction effects, between-group differences were examined using a full factorial model 
with group as between-subject factor and condition as within-subject factor (two levels: 
speaker-incongruent, speaker-congruent). In addition, effects for each group separately 
were assessed by conducting one-sample t-tests for the contrasts speaker-incongruent > 
speaker-congruent and speaker-congruent > speaker-incongruent. As in the previous 
study, the three speaker dimensions (i.e. gender, age, and social background) were col-
lapsed and combined into the more general categories speaker-incongruent and speaker-
congruent sentences to increase statistical power.
Region of Interest Analyses
In our previous fMRI study in control participants (Tesink et al., 2009b), we identified 
brain regions involved in integrating speaker characteristics and sentence meaning that 
were located in left and right inferior frontal gyrus. Given these results and our a priori 
hypothesis concerning the role of the inferior frontal cortex in language processing in 
ASD as derived from existing literature (see Introduction), we defined two regions of 
interest (ROI) for the present study in LIFG and RIFG. Accordingly, we applied small 
volume correction using two spherical ROIs with a radius of 15 mm around [-54, 26, 
14] in LIFG and [50, 34, -12] in RIFG, thresholded at P < 0.005 (uncorrected). Clus-
ters of activation were considered significant at a voxel- or cluster-level threshold of P 
< 0.05 (corrected for multiple comparisons). From the resulting clusters of activation, 
average beta-values were extracted with MarsBar (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 
2002) and these values were then used to perform repeated-measures GLM’s and post-
hoc paired t-tests in SPSS (version 14.0.0).
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Whole-Brain Analysis
In addition to testing condition effects in the ROIs, we also tested for the presence of 
other regions that were differentially activated by the experimental conditions. In this 
explorative whole brain search, the results of the random effects analyses were thresh-
olded at P < 0.005 (uncorrected). We employed cluster-size as the test-statistic for our 
whole-brain analysis and only considered activation clusters significant at a threshold of 
P < 0.05 (corrected for multiple non-independent comparisons). All local maxima are 
reported as MNI coordinates. Relevant anatomical landmarks and Brodmann areas were 
identified using the atlas of the human brain (Mai et al., 2004), the Anatomy Toolbox 
(Amunts et al., 2000; Eickhoff et al., 2005), and the Talairach Daemon (Lancaster et 
al., 2000).
Results
Behavioural results
At the end of the scanning session, all participants were extensively debriefed by means 
of a questionnaire. Both the ASD and control participants were able to describe the 
experimental manipulation in the stimulus material and could provide examples of spe-
cific trials. On average, the control group mentioned 4.1 out of 6 speaker-incongruities 
and the average for the ASD group was 3.7 speaker-incongruities. The two groups did 
not differ significantly in the number of identified speaker-incongruities (P > 0.17) 
and there were no speaker-incongruities that were more often identified by one of the 
groups (all P > 0.22). This confirms that, outside the scanner, the ASD group was able 
to perform the task at the same behavioural level as the control group and indicates that 
any observed group differences on the fMRI task cannot be attributed to between-group 
differences in detecting speaker-incongruities (Price & Friston, 2002).
fMRI results
ROI Analyses 
We had specific a priori hypotheses regarding the role of inferior frontal regions in pro-
cessing speaker-incongruent and speaker-congruent sentences in the ASD and the con-
trol group. Therefore, we first explored interaction effects of group (autism vs. control 
participants) x condition (speaker-incongruent vs. speaker-congruent) in our regions 
of interest (ROIs; see methods section) in LIFG and RIFG. While the ROI analysis 
revealed no significant clusters in the LIFG, the response of the ASD and control group 
to the speaker-inference conditions differed significantly in the RIFG (t(92) = 3.58; P 
< 0.05, FWE corrected). Post-hoc tests showed that this significant interaction was due 
to the effect displayed by the ASD group (see also Figure 3.1). In this group, RIFG 
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Figure 3.1. The left panel displays a sagittal slice showing the significant cluster of activation in 
RIFG for speaker-incongruent sentences in the ASD group as resulting from the ROI analysis. 
The right panel presents the mean response (mean ± s.e.m.) in the cluster of activation in RIFG 
to speaker-incongruent and speaker-congruent sentences for the ASD and the control group. As 
indicated by the asterisk, the difference in response to speaker-incongruent and speaker-congru-
ent sentences in RIFG was only significant for the ASD group.
Figure 3.2. Significant clusters of activation for speaker-incongruent sentences relative to
speaker-congruent sentences for the ASD group (top panel) and the control group (bottom 
panel).
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(BA 47) was significantly more activated for the speaker-incongruent sentences than for 
speaker-congruent sentences (t(23) = 2.843; P = 0.009), while the control group did 
not show this activation pattern (t(23) = -1.172; P > 0.25). As is also evident from Table 
3.4 and Figure 3.2, the within-group analyses showed that both groups activated LIFG 
significantly stronger for speaker-incongruent than for speaker-congruent sentences. In 
addition to activation of the RIFG and LIFG, the ASD group displayed significantly 
stronger activation for speaker-incongruent than for speaker-congruent sentences in the 
Table 3.4. Significant clusters of activation per group for the contrast speaker-incongruent > 
speaker-congruent sentences *
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
ASD group
R. medial transverse frontopolar gyrus 10 971 5.80 2 62 6
R. medial superior frontal gyrus 9 4.59 12 50 36
R. medial superior frontal gyrus 6 4.53 2 30 54
L. inferior frontal gyrus 47 605 5.61 -44 28 -14
L. planum polare 38 5.47 -34 22 -24
L. inferior frontal gyrus 47 5.35 -34 20 -16
R. inferior frontal gyrus 47 456 4.85 40 26 -18
R. inferior frontal gyrus 11/47 4.44 40 42 -16
R. inferior frontal gyrus 45 3.79 56 24 0
Control group
L. medial middle/superior frontal gyrus 10 1005 5.03 -4 62 18
L. medial superior frontal gyrus 8/9 4.42 -2 46 36
L. medial superior frontal gyrus 8 3.77 -6 38 52
L. inferior frontal gyrus 45 697 5.68 -54 26 14
L. inferior frontal gyrus 47 4.59 -50 22 -6
L. superior temporal gyrus 38 4.27 -52 16 -12
* Table shows all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.005 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
Significant activation peaks > 8 mm apart. BA = Brodmann area.
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right medial transverse frontopolar region (BA 10) extending into the medial part of 
right superior frontal regions (BA 6/9). The control group showed, next to activation in 
LIFG, significantly stronger activation for speaker-incongruent sentences in the medial 
part of left middle and superior frontal gyrus (BA 8, 9, 10). However, activation in mid-
dle and superior frontal regions found in the within-group analyses did not survive the 
statistical threshold when both groups were compared directly. These results are in line 
with our previous fMRI study (Tesink et al., 2009b) in which the inferior frontal gyrus 
was bilaterally involved in the integration of speaker characteristics and sentence mean-
ing. In the current study, the previously reported bilateral effect in inferior frontal gyrus 
was present in both groups, but the increased activation in RIFG was only significant 
in the ASD group.
Whole-brain analysis 
In addition, in the whole brain analysis we found a significant interaction effect of group 
x condition in right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 24/32; (t(92) = 3.91; P < 0.05, 
FWE corrected) that extended into the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; BA 10; Figure 
3.3). Post-hoc tests revealed that this interaction was driven by the effect for the control 
participants. In the control group, the activation in right ACC and ventral MPFC was 
Figure 3.3. The left panel displays a sagittal slice showing the significant cluster of activation 
in the whole-brain random effects analysis. The significant cluster is located in right vMPFC 
and right ACC and represents increased activation for speaker-congruent sentences relative to 
speaker-incongruent sentences in the control group. The right panel presents the mean response 
(mean ± s.e.m.) in the cluster of activation in vMPFC and ACC to speaker-incongruent and 
speaker-congruent sentences for the ASD and the control group. As indicated by the asterisk, the 
difference in response to speaker-incongruent and speaker-congruent sentences in right vMPFC 
and ACC was only significant for the control group.
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Table 3.5. Significant clusters of activation per group for the contrast speaker-congruent > 
speaker-incongruent sentences*
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
ASD group
L. superior temporal gyrus 22/42 981 5.48 -62 -24 8
L. posterior transverse temporal gyrus 42 5.12 -56 -32 20
L. anterior transverse temporal gyrus 41 4.07 -42 -28 14
L. precentral gyrus 4 438 4.44 -38 -18 54
L. postcentral gyrus 2 4.32 -46 -28 54
L. postcentral gyrus 2 4.05 -56 -26 48
R. superior temporal gyrus 41 394 4.15 56 -22 8
R. superior temporal gyrus 22 3.94 66 -12 4
R. superior temporal gyrus 22 3.67 66 -32 12
Control group
L. superior temporal gyrus 41 1735 4.89 -36 -38 10
L. precentral gyrus 6 4.80 -46 0 28
L. superior temporal gyrus 41 4.66 -42 -28 6
R. anterior transverse temporal gyrus 41 1553 5.16 34 -26 14
R. precentral gyrus 4/6 4.18 46 -14 26
R. postcentral gyrus 2 4.04 42 -22 30
R. precuneus 31 1548 5.42 8 -66 26
R. fusiform gyrus 37 4.89 36 -50 -10
R. inferior temporal gyrus 37 4.87 46 -42 -16
R. anterior cingulate gyrus 24/32 1165 4.75 2 26 4
R. medial orbital gyrus 24/32 4.47 16 28 -10
R. anterior cingulate gyrus 32 4.45 14 46 -2
R. brain stem 379 5.82 4 -30 -6
R. thalamus 3.87 6 -20 4
* Table shows all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.005 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
Significant activation peaks > 8 mm apart. BA = Brodmann area.
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significantly stronger for speaker-congruent sentences relative to speaker-incongruent 
sentences (t(23) = -3.873; P = 0.001). There was no such difference in activation for 
both conditions in the ASD participants (t(23) = 0.434; P = 0.669).
Finally, for completeness, we investigated for each group separately which regions 
were activated stronger for speaker-congruent than for speaker-incongruent sentences. 
This within-group contrast revealed that both groups significantly activated left supe-
rior temporal gyrus (BA 22/42/41). In addition, the ASD group showed significant 
activation for speaker-congruent sentences in right superior temporal gyrus (BA 22/41) 
as well as in left pre- and postcentral gyrus. For the control group, speaker-congruent 
sentences elicited significantly stronger activation than speaker-incongruent sentences 
in regions that were, except for the left superior temporal gyrus, all right hemispheric 
and included the anterior transverse temporal gyrus (BA 41), the pre- (BA 4/6) and 
postcentral gyrus (BA 2), the precuneus (BA 31), inferior temporal regions (BA 37), as 
well as anterior cingulate cortex and medial orbital gyrus (BA 24/32). An overview of 
the significant clusters for this contrast per group is given in Table 3.5. The clusters of 
activation for speaker-congruent relative to speaker-incongruent sentences in the cur-
rent study largely overlap with those in our previous study in healthy participants (see 
Tesink et al., 2009 for a more detailed overview).
As mentioned in the methods section, the ASD and control group differed sig-
nificantly on performance IQ (PIQ), with mean PIQ being higher in the control group 
(P = 0.008). To exclude the possibility that our results were influenced by this difference 
in PIQ, we conducted additional whole brain analyses with PIQ as covariate. Including 
PIQ as a covariate did not change our results.
Discussion
In this fMRI study, we elucidated the neural correlates of the integration of speaker 
characteristics inferred from the voice and the content of a spoken sentence in adults 
with ASD. This integration encompasses an aspect of pragmatic language comprehen-
sion that is crucial for social interaction in daily life and possibly partly accounts for the 
communication problems seen in ASD. Relative to the control group, the ASD group 
showed significantly stronger activation in RIFG (BA 47) for speaker-incongruent sen-
tences than for speaker-congruent sentences, while there were no significant differences 
in behavioural performance between the groups on a debriefing interview outside the 
scanner. Furthermore, manipulating the congruency of voice-based inferences about the 
speaker’s age, gender, or social background and sentence content modulated activity in 
right ventral MPFC (BA 10), including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 24/32), in 
the control group, but not in the ASD group.
Increased activation in RIFG for the ASD group during pragmatic language com-
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prehension is in line with previous findings on discourse and irony comprehension in 
adults and children with ASD (Mason et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2006). In these studies, 
increased right hemisphere activity for the ASD group was interpreted as reflecting more 
effortful processing. One crucial difference between previous studies and ours is that we 
examined fully automatic low-level inferential processes during language comprehen-
sion. Speaker characteristics captured in the voice are inherent to speech signal and are 
not part of the communicative intention (e.g., in contrast higher-level aspects as irony). 
Our study is the first to investigate the integration of very basic speaker information re-
vealed by the voice and sentence content in individuals with ASD. In the present study, 
a debriefing interview outside the scanner showed that there were no significant differ-
ences between the groups in detecting speaker-incongruities, suggesting that differences 
in neural activation patterns are unlikely to be explained by differences in behavioural 
performance. Hence, the increase in neural activation in the ASD group can be regarded 
as compensatory in nature and is possibly related to the following underlying language 
mechanisms. Firstly, although the left hemisphere is usually the primary site of language 
comprehension, processing may spill over to right homotopic regions if demands on 
the language processing system are increased and become too high to handle for the 
language-dominant left hemisphere regions. This effect has been observed in sentence 
and discourse comprehension in control subjects (Just et al., 1996; Rodd et al., 2005; 
Xu et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007) and might also account for the increased activ-
ity in RIFG present in the ASD group. Secondly, fMRI research in healthy participants 
has suggested that RIFG is involved in forming and updating a situation model, i.e. a 
mental representation of the situation described in the sentence or discourse that is con-
nected to incoming information and to general world knowledge (Ferstl et al., 2005; 
Menenti et al., 2009; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). When 
encountering information that is implausible or unexpected given the current situation 
model and general world knowledge, a listener will attempt to revise the situation mod-
el by integrating the unexpected information into the ongoing representation. In our 
speaker-incongruent sentences, the integration of inconsistent information and on-line 
revision of the situation model were needed to overcome unexpected inferences about 
the speaker and sentence content as represented in the situation model. The stronger 
activation in the ASD group in RIFG for speaker-incongruent sentences possibly points 
to greater effort in constructing and/or updating the situation model.
Although research on semantic language processing in ASD and control partici-
pants (Harris et al., 2006; Just et al., 2004) has reported decreased activation in LIFG 
for the ASD group, no such difference was present in our study. The suggestion has been 
put forward that the decreased activation in LIFG in ASD is related to a reduction in 
integrative processing. Our results, however, do not support this idea. In our study, both 
groups displayed stronger activation in LIFG for speaker-incongruent sentences than 
for speaker-congruent sentences. The increased activation for speaker-incongruent sen-
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tences in LIFG is in line with the suggested role for this region in sentence and discourse 
comprehension (Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999; Hagoort et al., 2004; Kuperberg et 
al., 2006; Robertson et al., 2000; Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007). It is also 
consistent with a view of language comprehension in which LIFG is a crucial region 
for unification (Hagoort, 2005) in which a wide range of incoming information is con-
tinuously integrated and combined into an unfolding representation of a multiword 
utterance, such as a sentence. When incoming information is conflicting, as in the case 
of a mismatch between voice-based inferences about the speaker and sentence content, 
unification load is increased and this is reflected in stronger activation in LIFG. A re-
cent fMRI study has shown that during discourse comprehension LIFG and RIFG are 
both recruited in on-line semantic unification of incoming information with previously 
stored knowledge in long-term memory (Menenti et al., 2009). However, RIFG was 
more sensitive to discourse anomalies and might be relatively more involved than LIFG 
in forming a general representation (a situation model) of ongoing discourse (Menenti 
et al., 2009). Applying these findings to our results suggests that the ASD and control 
group are equally able to recruit LIFG for unification purposes, since both groups acti-
vated LIFG to the same extent for speaker-incongruent sentences. The additional activa-
tion in RIFG for the ASD group might be related to increased difficulty with forming 
and revising a situation model.
Besides a difference between the groups in RIFG, we found a region in right ven-
tral MPFC (BA 10), including the ACC (BA 24/32), to be modulated by speaker-con-
gruity in the control group, but not in the ASD group. While the control group showed 
decreased activation in right ventral MPFC for speaker-incongruent sentences relative 
to speaker-congruent sentences, there was no such effect in the ASD group. In general, it 
has been suggested that the MPFC (including ACC) contributes to fundamental aspects 
of social cognitive functioning, such as mentalizing and theory of mind (ToM) reason-
ing, person perception, and self-referencing (see for a review Amodio & Frith, 2006; 
Buckner et al., 2008; Vogeley et al., 2001; Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Especially the ventral 
part of MPFC, including ACC, seems to be implicated in both self-referential judg-
ments and inferences about others that are perceived as similar to oneself (Kelley et al., 
2002; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001). This finding points to a 
tight link between thinking about oneself and thinking about other people. Moreover, 
it suggests that people automatically refer to their own mental states when considering 
those of similar others and use self-reflection as a strategy for understanding the minds 
of other people (Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005).
This self-referential mechanism might explain the activation in right ventral 
MPFC (vMPFC) and ACC observed in our study. The presented sentences always 
contained self-referential pronouns, such as ‘I’, ‘my’, ‘we’, or ‘our’, to assure that the 
voice-based inferences made by the listeners were related to the speaker at hand. This 
construction prompted the listener to make inferences about the speaker’s characteris-
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tics, (mental) state and beliefs, which might have triggered self-referential processing as 
mediated by vMPFC.
It is important to note that the response in vMPFC displayed by the control 
group was stronger for the speaker-congruent than for the speaker-incongruent sen-
tences. Given that the speaker-congruent condition can be seen as a baseline condition, 
it seems more appropriate to describe this modulation in vMPFC as a relative decrease. 
This interpretation seems to fit with reports from other neuroimaging studies suggesting 
that responses in vMPFC during self-referential processing frequently occur as decreases 
in activation (see Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 2005). Furthermore, the activation 
pattern in vMPFC is in line with its suggested role in the so-called default mode net-
work, which shows higher activity in more passive task conditions compared to more 
attention demanding cognitive tasks (Buckner et al., 2008; Greicius & Menon, 2004; 
Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). 
The decrease in activation in vMPFC for speaker-incongruent sentences was only 
present in the control group and not in the ASD group. This result is in line with an 
fMRI study using the Stroop task and reporting that, while both groups had a similar 
behavioural performance, the ASD group did not show a deactivation effect from rest-
ing baseline in MPFC as present in the control group (Kennedy, Redcay, & Courchesne, 
2006). The comparison between these and our findings must be treated with caution 
given the absence of a true deactivation and resting state baseline in our study. Although 
the exact functions supported by the default mode regions are far from clear, it has 
been suggested that self-referential mental activity is one aspect of MPFC’s contribution 
to the default network (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Gusnard & 
Raichle, 2001; Kennedy et al., 2006). Speculatively, the absence of a reduction in activ-
ity in vMPFC in the ASD group might point to a failure to engage in self-referential 
processes mediated by this default mode region during rest or baseline (i.e., speaker-
congruent sentences) (see Buckner et al., 2008; Iacoboni, 2006; Kennedy et al., 2006). 
We chose to investigate pragmatic language comprehension in the auditory do-
main, since this is the most common modality for communication in daily life. Howev-
er, little research has been done on auditory language processing in adults with ASD and 
findings are not unequivocal. Earlier studies on perception of speech and speech-like 
sounds in ASD have reported reversed asymmetry, i.e. more right than left hemisphere 
activation during auditory (language) processing (Boddaert et al., 2003; Muller et al., 
1999). Since we contrasted two conditions of sentence processing that differed only 
with respect to speaker-incongruity, it is unlikely that the increased activation in RIFG 
in our study can be attributed to a reversed hemispheric dominance for speech process-
ing. Another neuroimaging study on voice processing revealed that, relative to control 
participants, adults with ASD failed to activate voice-selective areas in superior tempo-
ral sulcus, whereas they displayed a normal activation pattern in response to nonvocal 
sounds (Gervais et al., 2004). According to the authors, these results indicated abnormal 
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cortical processing of socially relevant auditory information in ASD. Although voice 
processing plays an important role in our experiment, our results cannot be explained 
by such a difference since our study involved higher-level language processing and not 
perception of single sounds.
The intact behavioural performance of the ASD group on our pragmatic language 
task contrasts markedly with the obvious difficulties with pragmatic aspects of verbal 
communication displayed by adults with ASD in daily life. The behavioural perfor-
mance of the ASD group on its own is in accordance with earlier findings that adults and 
children with ASD have access to knowledge of social stereotypes and an intact ability to 
use them (Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White, & Frith, 2007; White, Hill, Winston, & Frith, 
2006). The discrepancy between the pragmatic difficulties of individuals with ASD in 
daily life and intact behavioural performance on our debriefing interview outside the 
scanner might be clarified by drawing a parallel to patients with a lesion in vMPFC (a 
brain region revealing between-group differences in activation in our study). In daily 
life, these patients often demonstrate social conduct problems that overlap with those in 
ASD, such as an inability to respond appropriately to social cues or to obey conventional 
social rules (e.g., Dimitrov, Phipps, Zahn, & Grafman, 1999). Milne and Grafman 
(2001) examined the intactness of social knowledge in patients with a lesion in vMPFC 
by asking them for implicit and explicit judgments of gender stereotypes. The patients 
showed impaired performance for the implicit condition only, suggesting intact (stereo-
typical) social knowledge, but a deficit in automatic access of this knowledge that can be 
compensated for if asked for an explicit conscious judgment (Milne & Grafman, 2001). 
Given our results and the existing literature, we suggest that, like patients with lesions 
in vMPFC, high-functioning individuals with ASD do possess and can access the social 
knowledge that they appear not to use in daily life. However, access to this knowledge 
might occur less automatically and requires more effort or explicit processing. While our 
task was designed to investigate implicit pragmatic language processes (related to social 
stereotypes), the experimental setting has possibly triggered a more explicit judgment 
or recognition of (stereotypical) social knowledge that might have resulted in the intact 
behavioural performance by the ASD group on our debriefing interview.
In conclusion, investigating pragmatic language comprehension in adults with 
ASD and a matched control group revealed an overlap in recruited brain regions, but 
also activation differences between the groups in RIFG and vMPFC. The ASD group 
was able to detect incongruities between voice-based inferences about speaker character-
istics and sentence meaning at a similar level as the control group, but showed increased 
activation in RIFG for sentences containing a speaker-incongruity. We suggest that the 
additional activation in RIFG for speaker-incongruent sentences is compensatory in 
nature. It possibly reflects spill over processing from the language dominant left hemi-
sphere due to higher task demands for the ASD group during pragmatic language com-
prehension. Speculatively, the increased RIFG activation might be due to greater effort 
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in constructing and revising a situation model. In addition, unlike the control group, 
the ASD group did not display a decrease in activation for speaker-incongruent relative 
to speaker-congruent sentences in vMPFC. Since vMPFC is involved in self-referential 
processing related to judgments and inferences about self and others, the absence of a de-
crease in activation in the ASD group possibly points to atypical self-referential mental 
activity in ASD. Our study is the first to show that in ASD compensatory mechanisms 
are necessary in implicit, low-level inferential processes in spoken language understand-
ing. In a way, this indicates that the language problems of individuals with ASD are 
not restricted to high-level inferential processes, relevant for the subtleties such as irony 
and bridging inferences in complex discourse, but are pervasive all the way down to the 
most basic aspects of pragmatic language processing. Further studies should unravel 
whether problems with pragmatic language comprehension in ASD can be attributed to 
atypical pragmatic language processing per se or to deviant self-referential and mental-
izing processes, since this will have consequences for training of communication skills 
in individuals with ASD.
3
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Abstract
In individuals with ASD, difficulties with language comprehension are most evident 
when higher-level semantic-pragmatic language processing is required, for instance 
when context has to be used to interpret the meaning of an utterance. Until now, it 
is unclear at what level of processing and for what type of context these difficulties 
in language comprehension occur. Therefore, in the current fMRI study, we investi-
gated the neural correlates of the integration of contextual information during auditory 
language comprehension in 24 adults with ASD and 24 matched control participants. 
Different levels of context processing were manipulated by using spoken sentences that 
were correct or contained either a semantic or world knowledge anomaly. Our findings 
demonstrated significant differences between the groups in inferior frontal cortex that 
were only present for sentences with a world knowledge anomaly. Relative to the ASD 
group, the control group showed significantly increased activation in left inferior fron-
tal gyrus (LIFG) for sentences with a world knowledge anomaly compared to correct 
sentences. This effect possibly indicates reduced integrative capacities of the ASD group. 
Furthermore, world knowledge anomalies elicited significantly stronger activation in 
right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG) in the control group compared to the ASD group. 
This additional RIFG activation probably reflects revision of the situation model after 
new, conflicting information. The lack of recruitment of RIFG is possibly related to dif-
ficulties with exception handling in the ASD group. 
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Buitelaar, J. K., Petersson, K. M., van der Gaag, R. J.,Teunisse, J. P., 
& Hagoort, P. (2011). Neural correlates of language comprehension in autism spectrum
disorders: when language conflicts with world knowledge. Neuropsychologia, 49, 1095-
1104.
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Introduction
Impairments in language and communication are among the defining characteristics of 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Language impairments observed in ASD are extremely 
variable and there are likely to be subgroups of individuals within the autism spectrum 
that have distinct language phenotypes, some of which have normal linguistic abilities 
(phonological skills, vocabulary, syntax, and morphology) and others with impaired lan-
guage (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2003). The most 
striking language difficulties concern pragmatic language aspects (i.e., the ability to use 
and comprehend language in context) and these are universal across individuals with 
ASD, irrespective of their level of functioning (Rapin & Dunn, 1997; Tager-Flusberg 
et al., 2005).  On the other hand, semantic language processing (i.e., constructing the 
content of a sentence based on just the meaning of the words) is often, but not univer-
sally, impaired in ASD (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 
2003; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). In high-functioning individuals with ASD, semantic 
language skills seem to be relatively spared and difficulties with semantics are most evi-
dent when higher-level language processing is required, for instance, when (sentence) 
context needs to be used for disambiguating word meaning (Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999b, 2000; Lopez & Leekam, 2003; Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 
2005; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). 
Impaired ability to use context in comprehension can be evident in ASD even if 
linguistic abilities are at a normal level (Loukusa et al., 2007; Norbury & Bishop, 2002). 
One plausible explanation for these difficulties with integrating language in context 
is that they arise due to a “weak central coherence”: a detail-focused processing style 
(often) displayed by individuals with ASD (Frith, 1989; for a review see Happé, 1999; 
Happé & Frith, 2006). This cognitive style entails a bias towards local processing, i.e. 
towards details, often at the expense of global processing. During language comprehen-
sion, such a cognitive processing style can lead to a stronger focus on individual word 
meanings instead of on the more global sentence context. Empirical evidence for this 
comes from studies on the reading of homographs (words with the same spelling, but 
with a different meaning and pronunciation) showing that high-functioning children 
and adults with autism failed to use preceding sentence-context to select the context-
appropriate reading of homographs (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999b; Lopez & Leekam, 2003; Snowling & Frith, 1986). Interestingly, 
the tendency to attend to details appears to be a bias towards features that can be over-
come by giving instructions that encourage more global processing (Happé, 1999; Hap-
pé & Frith, 2006). This effect has for instance been demonstrated for the homograph 
task (Snowling & Frith, 1986). When children with ASD were explicitly instructed to 
read for meaning, the earlier reported failure to disambiguate meaning by using the con-
text disappeared. The detail-focused processing style often present in individuals with 
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ASD is not exclusively limited to language processing, but has been observed across a 
wide range of tasks and domains, such as face or object recognition, and in the visual as 
well as in the auditory domain (for an overview see Happé & Frith, 2006). 
Another cognitive ability that is important for a correct interpretation of the 
context during language comprehension concerns mental flexibility, this is the ability 
to shift to a different thought or action according to changes in a situation or context 
(Hill, 2004b). Although cognitive inflexibility is more consistently exhibited during 
daily life than demonstrated by clinical and experimental measures (Geurts et al., 2009), 
it is known that individuals with ASD often display reduced mental flexibility (see Hill, 
2004b for an overview). Consequently, this possibly influences the way in which context 
is handled during language comprehension. Supporting evidence for this comes from a 
reasoning study by Pijnacker and colleagues (2009) investigating defeasible inferences in 
an ASD and control group. Defeasible inferences are inferences that can be revised when 
new information becomes available and changes the context. If this new information 
provides evidence for exceptions, i.e., evidence against inferences that were previously 
considered to be “true”, this might lead to the rejection of an inference or conclusion. 
Following from this, defeasible inferences require a form of reasoning that demands 
mental flexibility, because one has to adjust one’s conclusion depending on (changes in) 
the context. Furthermore, this sort of inference implies flexible thinking: when drawing 
a conclusion, one should discern when extra information (or an exception) that is added 
in a particular context is relevant or irrelevant and should, accordingly, be taken into ac-
count or be disregarded. The results of Pijnacker and colleagues showed that during rea-
soning it is specifically such dealing with exceptions (so called exception-handling) that 
is difficult for people with ASD (Pijnacker et al., 2009). It was argued that these difficul-
ties arise because individuals with ASD have reduced mental flexibility and are therefore 
less able to adjust to changes (or exceptions) in the context. Exception-handling is not 
only applied during defeasible reasoning, but is also needed during a wide range of situ-
ations in daily life that require a flexible adjustment to the ever changing environment. 
A detail-focused cognitive style or reduced mental flexibility as illustrated above 
might hinder the online integration of incoming lexical information into a more global, 
context-based interpretation of an utterance, a process that is crucial for language com-
prehension (Hagoort, 2005). In the past years, neuroimaging studies in healthy partici-
pants have elucidated the neural underpinnings of integrative processes during language 
comprehension. This research has revealed that during language comprehension our 
brains integrate different sources of incoming information immediately and in parallel 
to interpret the ongoing sentence or discourse (Hagoort & van Berkum, 2007). The left 
inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) plays a key role in this integration process by unifying a 
broad range of information, such as knowledge about the context and the world, as well 
as co-speech gestures(Hagoort et al., 2004; Willems et al., 2007). Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that, in addition to the inferior frontal 
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gyrus, the temporal cortex plays an important role in (spoken) language comprehen-
sion (see for a review Bookheimer, 2002). Within temporal cortex, there seems to ex-
ist a subdivision with inferior and middle temporal cortex being involved in storage 
and retrieval of lexical-semantic information and superior temporal cortex supporting 
sound-based processes (Hickok & Poeppel, 2000, 2007). Although the left hemisphere 
is seen as the language dominant one, an increasing number of fMRI studies, including 
our own (Tesink et al., 2009b) report additional activation in right hemispheric brain 
regions during language comprehension. This seems especially to be the case when task 
demands are increased and higher-level language processing is needed, for example in 
the comprehension of semantically ambiguous sentences or discourse (Menenti et al., 
2009; Robertson et al., 2000; Rodd et al., 2005; St George et al., 1999; Xu et al., 2005; 
Zempleni et al., 2007).  
The language difficulties observed in ASD can cause serious problems in 
communication and social interaction and persist into adulthood. A better un-
derstanding of the (neural) mechanisms underlying these problems might help 
to focus treatment programs aimed at reducing them. As mentioned above, dif-
ficulties in the domain of semantics manifest themselves most prominently at 
the sentence and discourse level, that is, at the higher levels of language process-
ing. This is not to deny that there might be lower level impairments as well. How-
ever, the impairments are especially prominent at the level of sentence processing 
and beyond. Processing at these levels requires the integration of lexical information 
retrieved from memory (Hagoort, 2005). An fMRI study on semantic processing at the 
sentence level (Just et al., 2004) revealed decreased activation in LIFG (BA 45/47) for 
adults with ASD relative to control participants. Next to reduced activation in LIFG, 
there was increased activation for the ASD group in left middle/superior temporal gyrus 
(BA 21/22). Comparable results are reported for semantic processing at the word level 
(Gaffrey et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2006). These findings are taken to imply that, during 
semantic processing, the brains of individuals with ASD engage less in integrative pro-
cessing (as takes place in LIFG), but focus more on lower level lexical processing (Harris 
et al., 2006; Just et al., 2004). However, given the diverse nature of language tasks and 
lack of focus on semantic processing at the sentence level, more research is needed to 
lend support to this interpretation. 
Taken together, behavioural and neuroimaging results suggest a possible link be-
tween problems with higher-level language comprehension and deviant integrative pro-
cesses in ASD. A study on bridging inferences during text comprehension (Saldana & 
Frith, 2007) provides some insight into this. Results from this experiment demonstrated 
that adolescents with autism were able to make implicit inferences during reading and 
also activated the physical or social world knowledge necessary for bridging inferences. 
These findings were taken to imply that difficulties with drawing inferences from text 
cannot be attributed to difficulties at an automatic level of inferencing or to difficulties 
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in accessing relevant world knowledge. Rather speculatively, the authors suggest then 
that readers with autism are able to construct implicit inferences at the surface level 
of text representation, but have problems with integrating them with the context into 
higher-level representations of information presented in the sentences. 
Although there is behavioural evidence for difficulties with integrative processing 
during higher-level language comprehension in ASD, the underlying neural processes 
have not been investigated. Therefore, using fMRI, we investigated the neural integra-
tion of different sorts of contextual information during auditory language comprehen-
sion in ASD by presenting a control and ASD group with spoken sentences with a 
semantic or world knowledge anomaly (see Hagoort et al., 2004). Utilization of prior 
context and world knowledge plays a central role in the interpretation of utterances. 
Manipulating the context by using semantic as well as world knowledge anomalies pro-
vides an opportunity to look into different levels of context processing and the neural 
underpinnings of integrative processes during language comprehension in ASD. For 
this purpose, we created sentences that were semantically coherent (correct condition: 
“Dutch trains are yellow and blue”), sentences containing a semantic anomaly (“Dutch 
trains are sour and blue”), and sentences with a world knowledge anomaly (“Dutch 
trains are white and blue”) (see Hagoort et al., 2004 for details). We would like to em-
phasise that we do not think a true dichotomy exists between ‘‘correct’’ sentences and 
sentences with ‘‘anomalies.’’ Rather, there is a continuum from sentences that fit very 
well with our knowledge about the world and about our language to sentences that are 
not compatible with what we know. However, for the sake of simplicity the terms “cor-
rect” and “anomaly” will be used. Since cognitive processing style seems to be influenced 
by giving explicit instructions to individuals with ASD (see Happé & Frith, 2006) and 
we wanted listening conditions to resemble those in daily life, we choose a listening task 
without requiring additional judgements.
As mentioned above, using sentences with two types of anomalies creates the pos-
sibility to look into different gradations of language processing in context. Within the 
anomalous sentences, we expect differential activation patterns for the ASD and con-
trol group for world knowledge anomalies, but not for semantic anomalies. Semantic 
anomalies involve more basic language processing and we hypothesize that the groups 
will not differ in recruited brain regions for such core language processes. On the other 
hand, sentences with a world knowledge anomaly demand higher-level language pro-
cessing and require such abilities as mental flexibility and exception handling. The situ-
ation presented in sentences with a world knowledge anomaly is in contradiction to our 
knowledge of the world and therefore requires an update of existing scenarios regarding 
world knowledge. This updating requires the ability to handle conflicting situations, i.e., 
exception handling, and for this mental flexibility is needed. This flexibility resembles 
the ability to shift, which is needed in daily life, where we are often confronted with 
conflicting information and accordingly update our knowledge of the world. Given the 
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difficulties with flexibility observed in daily life in individuals with ASD, we expect that 
this group will need more effort to process sentences with a world knowledge anomaly 
compared to the control group. This will be reflected in differential neural activation 
patterns. 
Our previous studies in control participants showed involvement of the inferior 
frontal gyrus for sentences with semantic or world knowledge anomalies (Hagoort et 
al., 2004; Tesink et al., 2009b). In line with these findings, we hypothesize that both 
groups will mainly recruit LIFG during listening to sentences with a world knowledge 
or semantic anomaly. For RIFG, multiple scenarios might apply. One possibility is that, 
compared to the control group, the ASD group will show stronger activation of RIFG 
for the world knowledge sentences. Such additional recruitment of RIFG for the ASD 
group was also observed in our previous study on the integration of speaker character-
istics and sentence content (Tesink et al., 2009a). The increased RIFG activation was 
interpreted as being compensatory in nature and possibly reflected greater effort in con-
structing and revising a situation model.
An alternative hypothesis is that participants with ASD are less flexible in han-
dling exceptions, and, therefore, do not update the situation model according to the 
conflicting world knowledge information presented in the sentences. Consequently, this 
will not result in additional recruitment of RIFG during listening to these anomalous 
sentences, but LIFG will still be activated in order to unify different sources of informa-
tion and to create an interpretation of the sentence. 
Material and Methods
Participants
The ASD group comprised 24 right-handed adults (eight females; mean age ± SD = 
26.3 ± 6.3 years; age range 18-40 years) diagnosed with high-functioning autism (HFA) 
or Asperger syndrome (AS). The diagnosis of HFA or AS was established by expert 
clinical opinion following DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
supplemented by a structured diagnostic interview, the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al., 1994). Subjects were included in the ASD group if they 
fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger syndrome (10 participants 
with HFA, 14 with AS). Table 3.1 (page 54) displays diagnosis and ADI-R scores per 
participant. Three participants did not meet one of the specified cut-off points of the 
ADI-R. This could be attributed to the fact that several participants only received a 
diagnosis in adolescence or adulthood and parents were consequently unable to report 
the relevant developmental information. For four participants no parents or caretakers 
were available and hence the ADI-R was not administered. In all cases, participants 
were only included if the clinical diagnosis of HFA or AS was undisputed. Participants 
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had no reported history of neurological disorders, head trauma or psychiatric disorders 
other than ASD. The control group included 24 medically healthy adults (mean age ± 
SD = 26.2 ± 6.0 years; age range 18-39 years) recruited through advertisements in the 
local community. The control participants were matched with the ASD participants for 
age, gender and verbal IQ (assessed by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, 
WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981); or Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, third edition, WAIS-III 
(Wechsler, 1997)). Prior to inclusion, control subjects were screened to exclude those 
with psychiatric, neurological, or developmental disorders. 
All participants were right-handed native speakers of Dutch and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Handedness was determined using an 
inventory derived from the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Fur-
thermore, all participants had full-scale IQ scores of 85 or above based on the WAIS-R 
or WAIS-III. The ASD and control groups did not differ significantly in chronological 
age, verbal IQ or full scale IQ (for all comparisons P > 0.1), although the mean perfor-
mance IQ was higher in the control group (P = .008). Participant characteristics, includ-
ing age, sex, verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ are presented in Table 3.2 (page 56). 
The study was approved by the local Medical Ethical Committee. All participants gave 
written informed consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimulus material
The stimulus materials used in this study were identical to those of the fMRI study by 
Tesink et al. (2009a; 2009b). We included triplets of sentences consisting of sentences 
with semantic or world knowledge anomalies and correct sentences. Within a sentence 
triplet, sentences were identical with the exception of one critical word. Each triplet 
comprised a sentence that was semantically coherent (correct condition: “Dutch trains 
are yellow and blue”), a sentence that contained a semantic anomaly (“Dutch trains are 
sour and blue”), and a sentence with a world knowledge anomaly (“Dutch trains are 
white and blue”; see also Hagoort et al., 2004). These sentences were recorded with four 
female speakers and one male speaker. The three items of a sentence triplet (“Dutch 
trains are yellow/sour/white and blue”) were always pronounced by the same speaker 
and their critical words were matched across conditions on acoustic duration, word 
frequency, duration of the preceding sentence fragment, and sentence length (for details 
see Tesink et al., 2009b; Van Berkum et al., 2008). 
In addition to these sentence triplets, another set of sentences was included in the 
experiment. In these so-called speaker-inference sentences, sentence meaning was either 
congruent or incongruent with voice-based inferences about the speaker. The speaker-
inference part of the experiment is not relevant for the research question at hand and 
is discussed elsewhere (see Tesink et al., 2009a). Forty-two items consisting of reversed 
speech were used as a baseline condition. These items were created by reversing a selec-
tion of the world knowledge and speaker-inference sentences and were matched on 
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sentence length with the sentence duration in the other experimental conditions. 
Overall, the experimental sentences varied in length from 1638 to 5648 ms, with 
the average sentence length being 3247 ms (SD = 597 ms). The critical words had an 
average duration of 480 ms (SD = 136 ms). To distribute all versions of world knowl-
edge and speaker-inference items equally, we created six different stimulus lists. These 
pseudo-randomized trial lists all contained thirty-six sentences for each of the three 
world knowledge conditions, eighty exemplars for each of the two speaker-inference 
conditions, forty-two reversed speech items, and four neutral filler sentences. The lists 
were created in such a way that none of the participants heard more than one version 
of a sentence.
Experimental design and procedure
Each participant listened to a total of 314 sentences (i.e., 36 sentence triplets (=108 
sentences), 160 speaker-inference sentences, 42 reversed speech items, and 4 neutral 
sentences that served as filler items) that were presented in an event-related design. Dur-
ing image acquisition, subjects lay in a supine position in the MR scanner and head 
movements were minimized by an adjustable padded head holder. The spoken sentences 
were presented by headphones while a fixation cross was presented via an LCD projec-
tor standing outside the scanner room, projecting the computer display onto a semi-
transparent screen that the subject viewed through a mirror device attached to the head 
coil. Stimulus presentation was controlled by a PC running the Presentation software 
(nbs.neuro-bs.com/Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA). 
Participants were instructed to process each sentence attentively for comprehen-
sion. To ensure attentive listening, they were told that afterwards questions would be 
asked about the presented sentences. Before the beginning of the experiment, each par-
ticipant received a practice block consisting of ten sentences. These items were also used 
to adjust the volume level for sentence presentation. The functional data acquired dur-
ing the practice run were not used in the analysis. The experiment was divided into two 
blocks of 157 sentences each. After the first block of sentences, there was a short break. 
At the start of each experimental block we inserted two filler items (neutral sentences) to 
minimize loss of data due to saturation transients at the beginning of each block.
At the end of the scanning session, participants were extensively debriefed to 
check whether they were capable of identifying the world knowledge and semantic 
anomalies. Participants were asked if they noticed something peculiar about the sen-
tences. If they answered they had noticed strange sentences, participants were asked to 
describe in which way the sentences were anomalous, and to give explicit examples of 
these sentences. Furthermore, participants were asked whether they experienced any dif-
ficulties attending to the stimuli and whether they were able to understand the content 
of the sentences. In addition to the debriefing, a behavioural language test was adminis-
tered to assess auditory discrimination and basic semantic language processing.
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MRI data acquisition
During the listening task, we acquired whole head T2*-weighted EPI-BOLD fMRI data 
with a Siemens 1.5T MR-scanner using an ascending slice acquisition sequence (volume 
TR = 2440 ms, TE = 40 ms, 90° flip angle, 31 axial slices, slice-matrix size = 64 x 64, 
slice thickness = 3 mm, slice gap = 0.5 mm, field of view = 224 mm, isotropic voxel size 
= 3.5 x 3.5 x 3.5 mm3). Following the experimental session, a high-resolution structural 
MR image was acquired for each participant, using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence 
(volume TR = 2250 ms, TE = 3.93 ms, 15° flip angle, 176 sagittal slices, slice-matrix size 
= 256 x 256, slice thickness = 1 mm, no slice gap, field of view = 256 mm). 
MRI data analysis
Image pre-processing and statistical analysis were performed using SPM5 (www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/software). The first five volumes of each participant’s data set were dis-
carded to allow for T1 equilibration. The functional EPI-BOLD images were realigned, 
and the subject-mean functional MR images were coregistered with the corresponding 
structural MR images. These images were subsequently slice-time corrected, spatially 
normalized (i.e., the normalized transformations were generated from the structural 
MR images and applied to the functional MR images), and transformed into a common 
anatomical space defined by the SPM Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 tem-
plate. The functional EPI-BOLD images were then spatially filtered by convolving the 
functional images with an isotropic 3D Gaussian kernel (10 mm FWHM). 
The fMRI data were then statistically analyzed within the general linear model 
framework and statistical parametric mapping (Friston et al., 1995). At the first level, 
single-subject fixed effect analyses were conducted. A model with the experimental con-
ditions (world knowledge anomaly, semantic anomaly, correct) was tested in each par-
ticipant’s data separately. In this linear model, mini-block regressors were included to 
model events as the duration of the sentence presentation from the onset of the critical 
word to the end of the trial. We temporally convolved the explanatory variables with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function provided by SPM. To remove any artifactual 
signal changes due to head motion, we included six realignment parameters describing 
the head-movements as confounds in the model. The data were high-pass filtered to 
account for various low-frequency effects (cycle-time cut-off at 128s). Temporal auto-
correlation was modelled as a first-order autoregressive AR(1) + noise process. For the 
second-level analysis, the generated single-subject contrast images for the main effects 
(world knowledge anomaly, semantic anomaly, correct) were entered in a random effects 
analysis. As we were interested in group x task interaction effects, between-group dif-
ferences were examined using a flexible factorial model with group as between-subject 
factor and condition as within-subject factor. We designed two of these models: one 
with the conditions world knowledge anomaly, semantic anomaly and correct sentences 
and another one with the conditions reversed speech and correct sentences. In addition, 
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effects for each group separately were assessed using flexible factorial models with condi-
tion as within-subjects factor. In these within-group analyses, we were mainly interested 
in the contrasts world knowledge anomaly > correct sentences, semantic anomaly > cor-
rect sentences, and correct sentences > reversed speech. 
Region of Interest Analyses 
Given our a priori hypothesis regarding the role of the inferior frontal gyrus as the pri-
mary focus of interest, a region of interest analysis (ROI) was performed. A meta-analy-
sis (Bookheimer, 2002) has shown that semantic processing is centred at the Talairach-
Tournoux coordinates [-42, 25, 4], (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) with a mean distance 
to the local maxima to this centre coordinate of 15 mm (Petersson et al., 2004). Based 
on these results and our a priori hypothesis concerning the role of the inferior frontal 
cortex in language processing in ASD as derived from existing literature, we defined two 
regions of interest (ROI) for the present study. We converted the Talairach coordinates 
reported by Bookheimer (2002) to MNI coordinates and applied small volume cor-
rection using a spherical ROI with a radius of 15 mm around [-42, 26, 6] in the left 
inferior frontal gyrus and [42, 26, 6] in the right inferior frontal gyrus, thresholded at P 
< .001 (uncorrected). Clusters of activation were considered significant at a cluster-level 
threshold of P < .05 (corrected for multiple comparisons). 
Whole-Brain Analysis
In addition to testing condition effects in the ROIs, we also tested for the presence of 
other regions that were differentially activated by the experimental conditions. In this 
whole brain search, the results of the random effects analyses were thresholded at P < 
.001 (uncorrected). We employed cluster-size as the test-statistic and only considered 
activation clusters significant at a threshold of P < .05 (corrected for multiple non-
independent comparisons). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. Relevant 
anatomical landmarks and Brodmann areas were identified using the atlas of the human 
brain (Mai et al., 2004) and the Anatomy Toolbox (Amunts et al., 2000; Eickhoff et al., 
2005). 
Results
Post-session interview and behavioural language test
At the end of the scanning session, all participants were extensively debriefed by means 
of a questionnaire on which they had to indicate whether they noticed something pe-
culiar about the sentences they heard. Both the ASD and control participants were able 
to describe the experimental manipulation in the stimulus material and could provide 
examples of specific trials. An equal number of participants in the control and ASD 
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group did explicitly mention semantic or world knowledge anomalies (22 out of 24 in 
each group). This confirms that, outside the scanner, the ASD group was able to detect 
semantic and world knowledge anomalies to the same degree as the control group and 
suggests that any observed group differences on the fMRI task cannot be attributed to 
between-group differences in detecting language-related anomalies.
On a behavioural language test that was administered to assess basic auditory 
language comprehension, no significant differences in performance were found between 
the two groups. This suggests that the fMRI results were not influenced by differences 
in basic language processing between the groups. 
fMRI results
World knowledge anomalies
We had specific a priori hypotheses regarding the role of inferior frontal regions in pro-
cessing sentences with world knowledge anomalies in the ASD and the control group. 
Therefore, we first explored interaction effects of group (ASD vs. control participants) x 
Figure 4.1. The significant effect between the ASD and control group is shown for LIFG in 
the top left panel and for RIFG in the bottom left panel. The mean response (mean ± s.e.m.) to 
world knowledge anomaly and correct sentences is plotted for LIFG in the top right panel and 
for RIFG in the bottom right panel. As indicated by the asterisk, the difference in response to 
world knowledge anomalies and correct sentences in LIFG was significant for both the ASD and 
the control group. In RIFG, this difference was only significant for the control group.
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condition (world knowledge anomaly vs. correct) in our regions of interest (ROIs; see 
methods section) in LIFG and RIFG. The ROI analysis revealed significant clusters in 
LIFG (t(92) = 3.82; P < .05, FWE corrected) and RIFG (t(92) = 3.52; P < .05., FWE 
corrected). Further inspection of the interaction effect in LIFG revealed that the control 
group displayed stronger activation in LIFG (BA 45/47) for sentences with a world 
knowledge anomaly relative to correct sentences (t(92) = 4.87; P < .001) than the ASD 
group (t(92) = 3.70; P = .025). The ASD group displayed a similar activation pattern 
in LIFG, but the effect was reduced compared to that in the control group. Figure 4.1 
(top panel) shows the interaction effect in LIFG and the activated clusters in this region 
for world knowledge sentences relative to correct sentences for both groups. The sig-
nificant interaction in RIFG (BA 45/47) was driven by the effect for the control group. 
This group showed significantly stronger activation in RIFG for sentences with a world 
knowledge anomaly compared to correct sentences (t(92) = 4.02; P = .008), while this 
effect was not present in the ASD group (see bottom panel Figure 4.1). The whole brain 
analysis did not reveal any additional significant clusters of activation for the group x 
4
Table 4.1a. Significant clusters of activation per group for the contrast world knowledge 
anomaly > correct sentences *
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
ASD group
L. Inferior frontal gyrus ** 47 77 4.02 -50 30 -6
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 3.77 -52 36 4
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45/47 3.77 -54 22 -2
Control group
R. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 257 4.93 58 22 4
R. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 4.12 38 22 -10
R. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 3.97 54 34 -6
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 303 4.78 -40 30 4
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 4.43 -44 28 14
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 3.69 -34 30 -8
* Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
** This cluster of activation was significant in the ROI analysis.
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condition interaction.
In line with previous findings from studies using these sentence materials, within-
group analyses showed that both groups activated LIFG (BA 45/47) more strongly for 
sentences with a world knowledge anomaly than for correct sentences. In addition to 
LIFG, the control group displayed significantly stronger activation for sentences with 
world knowledge anomaly in RIFG (BA 45/47) relative to correct sentences (see Table 
4.1a for a complete list of activated clusters for the contrast world knowledge sentences 
> correct sentences per group).
Semantic anomalies
The whole brain and ROI analyses did not show significant differences in the response 
of the ASD and control group to sentences with semantic anomalies and correct sen-
tences. This suggests that both groups recruited similar brain regions during processing 
sentences with a semantic anomaly and correct sentences. 
Within-group analyses showed that both groups activated LIFG (BA 45/47) sig-
nificantly more strongly for sentences with a semantic anomaly than for correct sentenc-
es. In addition to activation of the LIFG, the ASD group displayed significantly stronger 
activation for sentences with a semantic anomaly in the left superior and middle tempo-
Figure 4.2. Significant clusters of activation for sentences with a semantic anomaly relative to 
correct sentences for the ASD group (top panel) and the control group (bottom panel).
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Table 4.1b. Significant clusters of activation per group for the contrast semantic anomaly > 
correct sentences *
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
ASD group
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 937 6.02 -48 32 -6
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.97 -54 22 20
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.76 -52 32 4
L. Superior temporal gyrus 22 1196 5.53 -54 -44 8
L. Middle temporal gyrus 21/22 5.21 -58 -50 4
L. Middle temporal gyrus 21 4.84 -54 -30 0
L. Middle occipital gyrus 18/19 314 4.74 -36 -84 2
L. Middle occipital gyrus 18 3.84 -28 -96 8
L. Striate area 17 3.80 -20 -80 6
R. Inferior/middle occipital gyrus 18/19 262 4.38 42 -84 0
R. Middle occipital gyrus 18 4.19 30 -88 6
R. Inferior occipital gyrus 18 3.64 46 -80 -8
Control group
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 2091 7.47 -56 20 10
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 44/45 5.96 -42 24 14
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 44/9 5.72 -46 12 22
L. Middle/Superior temporal gyrus 21/22 1431 5.77 -50 -44 4
L. Middle/Superior temporal gyrus 22 5.38 -62 -46 10
R. Cerebellum 349 5.30 20 -74 -38
R. Cerebellum 4.96 18 -74 -46
* Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates.
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ral gyrus (BA 21/22), the left middle occipital gyrus (BA 18/19), and the right inferior 
and middle occipital gyrus (BA 18/19). In addition to activation in LIFG, the control 
group showed significantly stronger activation for sentences with a semantic anomaly 
in the left middle and superior temporal gyrus (BA 21/22) and in the right cerebellum. 
An overview of the significant clusters for the contrast semantic anomalies > correct 
sentences per group is given in Table 4.1b. Figure 4.2 displays renderings with the clus-
ters of activation for sentences with a semantic anomaly relative to correct sentences 
in both groups. The within-group results for semantic as well as for world knowledge 
anomalies are in line with previous fMRI studies (Hagoort et al., 2004; Tesink et al., 
2009b) reporting stronger involvement of LIFG for sentences with a semantic or world 
knowledge anomaly than for correct sentences. 
Reversed speech
The whole brain analysis did not reveal a significant interaction effect of group (ASD 
vs. control participants) x condition (reversed speech vs. correct sentences), indicating 
that there were no differences in the processing of reversed speech and correct sentences 
between the ASD and the control group. 
For the ASD group, within-group analyses revealed stronger activation for cor-
rect sentences than for reversed speech in left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45/47), left 
superior and middle temporal gyrus (BA 21/22) and in left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6). 
The control group activated left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45/47), left middle temporal 
gyrus (BA 38/21) and bilateral superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) significantly stronger for 
correct sentences compared to reversed speech. The two groups showed considerable 
overlap in activated brain regions for this contrast. The results of the contrast correct 
sentences > reversed speech per group are listed in Table 4.1c.
Sex differences in language processing
Although the most important comparison in the current study was that between the 
ASD and control group and both groups were carefully matched on sex, we wanted to 
exclude the possibility that sex differences in language processing influenced our results. 
Therefore, additional analyses were conducted for males and females separately within 
each group. The results did not reveal any differences between males and females in 
processing of correct sentences, nor of sentences with a world knowledge or semantic 
anomaly, both in the ASD and control group. This finding is in line with results from 
our previous study (Tesink et al., 2009b) in which no sex differences were found using 
the same language task in a group of 42 control participants. Hence, for the language 
comprehension task used in this study, activation patterns of males and females do not 
differ, and the reported results are not influenced by sex, but reflect true differences in 
language processing between individuals with ASD and control participants.
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Table 4.1c. Significant clusters of activation per group for the contrast correct sentences > 
reversed speech *
MNI coordinates
Anatomical region BA Cluster size
Voxel T 
value x y z
ASD group
L. Middle temporal gyrus 21 5363 8.83 -54 -8 -12
L. Middle temporal gyrus 21 8.51 -54 -40 0
L. Superior/middle temporal gyrus 21/22 7.68 -52 -48 8
L. Middle frontal gyrus 6 240 5.40 -46 -2 54
L. Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.13 -32 2 48
L. Middle frontal gyrus 6 3.89 -54 -8 44
L. Inferior frontal gyrus ** 45 656 7.00 -48 22 14
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 6.65 -50 22 10
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 4.80 -42 24 4
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 4.31 -42 32 -6
Control group
L. Temporal pole 38 6099 11.57 -50 14 -18
L. Middle temporal gyrus 21/38 11.21 -58 0 -12
L. Superior frontal gyrus 6 165 5.60 -6 6 54
R. Superior frontal gyrus 6 4.58 2 16 52
L. Inferior frontal gyrus ** 45 694 6.13 -50 22 12
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.81 -50 28 6
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 5.62 -44 34 -6
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 47 4.85 -52 32 0
* Tables show all clusters at a significance level of P < 0.05 corrected at cluster-level (first 
thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected). All local maxima are reported as MNI coordinates. 
** This cluster of activation was significant in the ROI analysis.
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Discussion
In this event-related fMRI study, we investigated the neural correlates of the integration 
of contextual information during auditory sentence comprehension in adults with ASD. 
We manipulated sentence context using spoken sentences that were correct or contained 
either a semantic or world knowledge anomaly. This manipulation provided the op-
portunity to look into different levels of context processing and the associated neural 
underpinnings of integrative processes during language comprehension in ASD. The 
current results are in line with findings from studies using the same sentence materials 
(Hagoort et al., 2004; Tesink et al., 2009b). Different results with this paradigm were 
reported by Groen et al. (2010) who did not find differences for world knowledge and 
semantic anomalies for adolescents with ASD (Groen et al., 2010). This could be caused 
by the age difference or the smaller size and larger heterogeneity of the adolescent ASD 
group. As in earlier fMRI studies in healthy participants, the present findings revealed 
increased activation for sentences with either a semantic or world knowledge anomaly 
that was mainly located in left inferior frontal cortex. Comparing results from the ASD 
and control group indicated that the nature of the context or anomaly (i.e., semantic or 
world knowledge) had a differential effect on integrative processes during language com-
prehension in these groups. For semantic anomalies, there were no differences between 
the groups in recruited brain regions. However, for world knowledge anomalies, differ-
ences in activation were, as hypothesized, located in inferior frontal regions. Relative to 
the ASD group, the control group showed significantly stronger activation in LIFG and 
RIFG for sentences with world knowledge anomalies compared to correct sentences. To 
exclude the possibility that differences in processing core aspects of language (e.g., pho-
nology, syntax) influenced the effects for sentences with anomalies, we included reversed 
speech sentences and contrasted these with correct control sentences. This contrast did 
not reveal clear differences between the ASD and control group. It is therefore highly 
unlikely that the observed differences between the groups for the world knowledge sen-
tences are due to differences in language processing per se. 
Whereas differences in neural activation between the groups were present for lis-
tening to sentences with world knowledge anomalies, no such effects were found for 
sentences containing semantic anomalies. From this it follows that the nature of contex-
tual information that needs to be taken into account is an important factor in explain-
ing differences in language comprehension in ASD. The main difference between world 
knowledge and semantic anomalies concerns the level of semantic unification that takes 
place during sentence comprehension. Semantic unification refers to the on-line inte-
gration of word meaning into an unfolding representation of the sentence content. If we 
take, for example, a sentence with a semantic anomaly, such as “Dutch trains are sour”, 
the integration of the (critical) word “sour” into the sentence context requires more ef-
fort, since sour is not applicable to trains. On the other hand, if the sentence contains a 
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world knowledge anomaly like in “Dutch trains are white”, then integration of the word 
“white” into the sentence context is well possible, except that, if you are Dutch, sentence 
content is in contradiction with your knowledge of the world. Integration therefore 
requires the on-line recruitment of world knowledge from long-term memory. Further-
more, it requires the (Dutch) listener to entertain an alternative interpretation of the 
situation described in the sentence, one that is at odds with world knowledge. Such an 
alternative interpretation is not possible when a sentence contains a semantic anomaly. 
The presence of an effect exclusively for world knowledge anomalies implies a difference 
in the way that both groups handle exceptions to world knowledge. 
It is unlikely that the differential activation between the groups for world knowl-
edge sentences can be explained by a difference in access to world knowledge. This is 
supported by the effect observed in our study: the ASD group showed increased acti-
vation in LIFG for sentences with a world knowledge anomaly relative to correct sen-
tences. Given the key role of LIFG in integrating a broad range of information (such as 
world knowledge) during language comprehension, stronger LIFG activation for world 
knowledge sentences indicates that the ASD group was sensitive to the world knowledge 
anomalies. Further support for intact world knowledge in ASD comes from a study by 
Saldana and Frith (2007) revealing that adolescents with ASD had no difficulties with 
(automatically) accessing relevant world knowledge when drawing inferences. Taken to-
gether, we argue that the difference between the groups cannot be ascribed to world 
knowledge per se, but is more likely related to handling exceptions to world knowledge. 
As pointed out above, while an acceptable alternative interpretation of sentence content 
can be constructed when a sentence contains a world knowledge anomaly, this is impos-
sible in the case of a semantic anomaly. 
Recently, difficulties with exception handling in ASD were reported by Pijnacker 
and colleagues (2009) who investigated defeasible reasoning in adults with ASD and a 
matched control group. Here, the ASD group did not have problems with integrating 
new information, but rather with taking into account exceptions (which required them 
to revise their mental model of the situation). Also, in our previous fMRI experiment 
(Tesink et al., 2009a), compared to the control group, the ASD group showed stron-
ger activation for sentences in which the content was incongruent with voice-based 
inferences about a speaker’s characteristics. The increased neural activation in the ASD 
group was possibly related to difficulties dealing with the exception to stereotypical 
(voice-based) ideas about a speaker. Handling exceptions and adapting interpretations 
during language comprehension requires mental flexibility. This ability is needed since a 
correct interpretation of an utterance requires incoming information to be continuously 
updated according to changes in a context or situation. The utterances in the current 
fMRI experiment also required this kind of cognitive flexibility. Given the prominent 
cognitive flexibility deficits exhibited by individuals with ASD in daily life, we suggest 
that the reduced flexibility in ASD probably influences the way in which context is 
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taken into account during everyday language comprehension. 
Comparing brain regions involved in processing sentences with world knowl-
edge anomalies across the ASD and control group revealed a significant difference in 
activation in LIFG and RIFG. In the left hemisphere, we observed stronger activation 
in LIFG during listening to sentences with a world knowledge anomaly for the control 
group than the ASD group. This activation pattern is in line with the study by Just et al. 
(2004) comparing semantic sentence processing in individuals with ASD and control 
participants. It has been proposed that decreased activation in LIFG in ASD is related 
to a reduction in integrative processing (Just et al., 2004). An explanation in terms of re-
duced integrative processing in ASD fits with the idea that individuals with ASD have a 
weak central coherence, or a detail-focussed processing style (Frith, 1989; Happé, 1999; 
Happé & Frith, 2006). As explained before, such a cognitive processing style might lead 
to a stronger focus on individual word meanings instead of on the more global sentence 
context and hinder integrating language in context, which is important for sentence 
comprehension requiring integration of world knowledge. 
Although the difference in activation in LIFG between the groups might be re-
lated to the capacity to integrate information during sentence comprehension, our find-
ings suggest that the ASD group is able to integrate information at least to a certain ex-
tent. This follows from the result that both groups displayed stronger activation in LIFG 
for sentences with world knowledge or semantic anomalies than for correct sentences. 
This enhanced activation in LIFG is in agreement with earlier findings in healthy partici-
pants, where LIFG activation is increased when incoming information during language 
comprehension is conflicting with the context or knowledge from long-term memory 
(Hagoort, 2005; Hagoort et al., 2004; Menenti et al., 2009; Tesink et al., 2009b; Wil-
lems et al., 2007). In our sentences, the mismatch between general world knowledge 
and sentence content leads to an increase in unification load, reflected by stronger ac-
tivation in LIFG. Taken together, our results imply that decreased LIFG activation in 
the ASD group points to reduced unification capacities in ASD, but that both groups 
are able to recruit LIFG for unification purposes. The exact nature of the unification or 
integrative differences remains to be explored. 
Activation for sentences with a world knowledge anomaly was also significantly 
different between the groups in RIFG. While the control group displayed significantly 
increased activation in RIFG for sentences with a world knowledge anomaly relative to 
correct sentences, no such effect was present in the ASD group. As pointed out earlier, 
in healthy participants, LIFG is considered to be a crucial brain region for integration 
of incoming information during language comprehension and is usually able to handle 
such processes as integration of semantic or world knowledge (Hagoort, 2005). Addi-
tional recruitment of right hemisphere regions (such as RIFG) has mainly been reported 
for more complicated language processing, such as discourse comprehension (see Mason 
& Just, 2006; Menenti et al., 2009; Robertson et al., 2000). In particular, RIFG seems 
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to be involved when language comprehension requires alternative scenarios to be con-
sidered (Menenti et al., 2009). 
Further insight into the contribution of RIFG in language comprehension comes 
from fMRI research on discourse processing in healthy participants. Neuroimaging 
findings suggest that RIFG is involved in forming and updating a situation model, i.e. 
a mental representation of the situation described in the sentence or discourse that is 
connected to incoming information and to general world knowledge (Ferstl et al., 2005; 
Mason & Just, 2004; Menenti et al., 2009; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Rad-
vansky, 1998). When encountering information that is implausible or unexpected given 
the current situation model and general world knowledge, a listener will attempt to 
revise the situation model by integrating the unexpected information into the ongoing 
representation. The stronger activation in the control group in RIFG for sentences with 
a world knowledge anomaly possibly reflects updating of the situation model. 
The absence of (additional) RIFG activation for sentences with a world knowl-
edge anomaly in the ASD group can possibly be explained by underlying difficulties in 
exception handling and cognitive flexibility. Upon hearing a world knowledge anomaly, 
the control group will probably consider the alternative scenario presented in the sen-
tence and will accordingly generate a new representation, albeit a scenario conflicting 
with world knowledge. On the other hand, assuming participants with ASD lack the 
flexibility to handle the exception in world knowledge sentences, they might therefore 
regard the conflicting information as “wrong” or “impossible”. Consequently, subjects 
with ASD will not generate an alternative scenario or mental representation and RIFG 
will not be recruited for revising the situation model. This explanation is in line with 
the difficulties in exception handling described above. It also ties in with the idea that 
individuals with autism have problems integrating generated inferences into higher-level 
representations of information presented in the sentences, that is, into a situation model 
(Saldana & Frith, 2007).
In our previous fMRI experiment on integration of sentence content and voice-
based inferences about a speaker’s age, gender, or social background (Tesink et al., 
2009a), it was not the control group, but the ASD group that displayed increased RIFG 
activation. There, RIFG was recruited when speaker characteristics inferred from the 
voice were incongruent with sentence content. In line with earlier studies, this RIFG 
activation in the ASD group was interpreted as reflecting more effortful processing and 
as being compensatory in nature, possibly related to more effort needed to update the 
situation model. Speculatively, the difference in recruitment of RIFG by the ASD group 
might be related to the nature of the anomaly. World knowledge anomalies conflict with 
certain “facts” that we know about the world and may therefore be regarded as “wrong” 
or “incorrect”. On the other hand, when a speaker says something that is incongruent 
with voice-based ideas about him/her, this can be considered as an exception to a certain 
(social) stereotype that is implausible rather than incorrect. The distinction between 
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incorrect world knowledge facts and less plausible stereotypical ideas might be of im-
portance for whether or not the ASD group will make an effort to adapt or update the 
situation model. Only in the latter case we see RIFG involvement.
There are certain research questions that cannot be addressed by our experiment. 
First, all participants with ASD included in our study had a normal intelligence, i.e., 
an IQ above 85, and no significant speech and language problems. However, a large 
percentage of individuals with ASD has an IQ below 85, and serious speech or language 
difficulties are not uncommon. Given the make-up of our sample, the results cannot 
easily be generalised to language processing in the larger ASD population This should 
be taken into consideration when comparing our results to those from other studies that 
have shown differences in brain activation in participants with ASD on passive auditory 
processing of language and language-like stimuli (e.g., Boddaert et al., 2003; Muller et 
al., 1998). Second, our choice for a listening task without requiring additional judge-
ments from the subjects allowed us to investigate language comprehension in listening 
conditions that resemble those in daily life. Moreover, this paradigm ensured that in-
terpretation of our results was not biased by the differential activation caused by extra 
(cognitive) task components or explicit instructions. Using such an implicit or passive 
listening task does mean, however, that no behavioural measure is available that moni-
tors participants’ attention or sentence comprehension. Since the activation patterns 
were in line with previous studies and robust activation in frontal (language) regions was 
found, we have no reason to doubt the comprehension of experimental sentences. The 
interview after scanning provided further confirmation for this. Given that several fMRI 
experiments (Gaffrey et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2006; Knaus, Silver, Lindgren, Hadjik-
hani, & Tager-Flusberg, 2008) reporting activation differences for language processing 
in ASD added an additional task component next to language processing (such as lexical 
decision, perceptual discrimination or response-naming), the comparison of our results 
to those from earlier studies should be made with caution.
In conclusion, this fMRI study sheds new light on the neural correlates of context 
processing in language comprehension in ASD. The results revealed activation differenc-
es between the groups in inferior frontal cortex depending on the nature of the sentence 
context, that is, on whether the sentence contained a semantic or world knowledge 
anomaly. The differences for world knowledge anomalies are possibly related to dif-
ficulties of the ASD group with updating the situation model and exception handling, 
as well as to reduced capacities to integrate conflicting contextual information during 
language comprehension. More in general, difficulties with mental flexibility and excep-
tion handling will affect communication in daily life, in which we often encounter new 
and alternative scenarios that require adapting to the context and updating our world 
knowledge. More research is needed to further unravel the mechanisms of cognitive flex-
ibility and exception handling that are compromised in people with ASD.
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Abstract
DTI studies in children and adolescents with ASD have reported compromised white 
matter microstructure compared to control participants. However, DTI findings in 
adults with ASD are scarce. In the current DTI study, we investigated white matter 
microstructure in adults with ASD (N = 24) and matched control participants (N = 
24). We performed our analysis at whole-brain level using both a voxel-wise comparison 
of fractional anisotropy (FA) and mean diffusivity (MD) values and their distribution 
by means of histogram analysis. We found no significant differences in FA and MD 
between the ASD and control group, pointing to a corresponding absence of differences 
in white matter integrity. This finding is not in line with earlier findings in children and 
adolescents. The lack of a significant difference might be explained by the whole-brain 
approach that we exploited. Furthermore, it might be due to the developmental trajec-
tory of white matter in ASD, resulting in an absence of differences in adulthood. In ad-
dition, speculatively, publication bias might play a role with under-publication of null 
findings regarding white matter microstructure in adults with ASD.
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are characterized by qualitative impairments in so-
cial interaction, language and communication, as well as by restricted, repetitive and/
or stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). While the diagnosis ASD is based on characteristics at 
the behavioural level, there is general agreement for an underlying neurobiological basis 
and a strong genetic component (Amaral et al., 2008; Geschwind, 2009; Minshew & 
Williams, 2007). As implicated by the term autism spectrum disorder, there exists a large 
heterogeneity in the presentation of behavioural characteristics displayed by individu-
als with ASD, as well as in the course and outcome of the disorder (e.g. Geschwind & 
Levitt, 2007). 
Since the emergence of neuroimaging, our understanding of the neural basis of 
ASD is expanding rapidly. Many studies using anatomical or functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) techniques have demonstrated differences in the brains of indi-
viduals with ASD compared to control participants. These studies provide converging 
evidence that deficits in ASD cannot be attributed to a localized defect, but emerge 
from disruptions in brain connectivity (see Stigler et al., 2011; Vissers et al., 2012; Wass, 
2011). For instance, studies using fMRI have found decreased functional connectivity 
between brain regions involved in language (Just et al., 2004; Kana et al., 2006), work-
ing memory (Koshino et al., 2005), theory of mind (Kana et al., 2009), and visuospatial 
processing (Damarla et al., 2010). 
Reduced structural connectivity between ASD and control participants, assessed 
by looking at white matter structure by means of diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), has 
been reported for the corpus callosum (Alexander et al., 2007; Bloemen et al., 2010; 
Keller, Kana, & Just, 2007; Kleinhans et al., 2012; Noriuchi et al., 2010; Shukla, Keehn, 
& Muller, 2011), (pre)frontal regions (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2004; Bloemen et al., 2010; 
Cheng et al., 2010; Ke et al., 2009; Noriuchi et al., 2010), anterior cingulate cortex 
(Noriuchi et al., 2010; Thakkar et al., 2008) as well as in temporal (Barnea-Goraly et al., 
2004; Bloemen et al., 2010; Ke et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2007; Noriuchi et al., 2010) and 
parietal regions (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2004; Bloemen et al., 2010). By and large, there 
has been support for disrupted connectivity in ASD pointing to local over-connectivity 
and long-distance under-connectivity especially between frontal cortex and other corti-
cal regions (see Schipul et al., 2011; Wass, 2011). However, this frequently suggested 
pattern of long range under-connectivity and local over-connectivity is very complex 
and requires both a firmer experimental basis and further refinement (Vissers et al., 
2012).
DTI is one of the most powerful non-invasive methods currently available for 
analysing structural connectivity. The technique provides a measure for white matter 
microstructure by mapping the self-diffusion properties of tissue water (Basser, Mat-
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tiello, & LeBihan, 1994; Basser & Pierpaoli, 1996). The property of water molecules 
diffusing freely, unrestricted in any direction, is termed isotropic diffusion. However, 
when the diffusion of water molecules is limited in one or more directions, diffusion 
becomes anisotropic. As white matter consists of highly organized fibre bundles, diffu-
sion of water is much stronger parallel to a white matter tract than perpendicular to it 
(Beaulieu, 2002). Hence, diffusion-sensitized MR images can provide information on 
the local tissue structure.  
Different measures can be derived from DTI data. The two most commonly used 
parameters are fractional anisotropy (FA), which reflects the directionality of water dif-
fusion, and mean diffusivity (MD), a measure of the magnitude of diffusion. Most 
DTI studies report FA values, which have been shown to be sensitive to developmen-
tal and pathological changes in axonal density size, myelination and fibre organisation 
(e.g., Cascio, Gerig, & Piven, 2007; Thomason & Thompson, 2011). FA and MD thus 
provide an index of the structural integrity of white matter, with a reduction in FA or 
increase in MD reflecting a possible disruption in the organisation of white matter fibre 
tracts. 
Generally, DTI studies in children and adolescents with ASD have shown reduced 
FA in (pre)frontal (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2004; Barnea-Goraly et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 
2009; Ke et al., 2009; Noriuchi et al., 2010; Sundaram et al., 2008), temporal (Barnea-
Goraly et al., 2004; Barnea-Goraly et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2009; Ke et al., 2009; Lee 
et al., 2007) and parietal regions (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2010), as well as in the corpus 
callosum (Alexander et al., 2007; Keller et al., 2007; Shukla et al., 2011), compared to 
typically developing participants. There are a few reports of increased FA in children 
and adolescents with ASD (Cheng et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2009; Sahyoun, Bel-
liveau, & Mody, 2010). Increased FA has primarily been found in very young children 
with autism (6 months to 3.5 years old) in the corpus callosum (Ben Bashat et al., 2007; 
Weinstein et al., 2011; Wolff et al., 2012), posterior limbs of the internal capsule (Ben 
Bashat et al., 2007; Wolff et al., 2012), forceps minor (Ben Bashat et al., 2007), fornix, 
inferior longitudinal fasciculus, and uncinate (Wolff et al., 2012). Although evidently 
more research is needed, there appears to be a pattern of increased FA very early in life 
with a reversal towards reduced FA around the age of 3 or 4 (see Wolff et al., 2012). 
In adults with ASD, DTI findings are relatively scarce and often difficult to com-
pare due to heterogeneity of the study samples with respect to size, age and diagnostic 
criteria, and methodological differences, among others. In mixed samples composed 
of children, adolescents and adults with ASD reduced FA has been reported in corpus 
callosum, superior temporal gyrus and temporal stem (Alexander et al., 2007; Lange et 
al., 2010; Lee et al., 2007). In adults with Asperger’s syndrome, Bloemen and colleagues 
(2011) found widespread white matter differences compared to control participants 
with decreased FA, mostly bilateral, in the internal capsule, frontal, temporal, parietal 
and occipital lobes, cingulum and corpus callosum (Bloemen et al., 2010). Employing 
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region of interest (ROI) or tract-based approaches, reduced FA in adults with ASD has 
been reported in anterior cingulate cortex (Thakkar et al., 2008), in white matter tracts 
connecting putamen to frontal cortical areas (Langen et al., 2012), in white matter 
tracts connecting orbitofrontal cortex to other brain regions (Pardini et al., 2009), and 
in many other white matter areas throughout the brain (Kleinhans et al., 2012).
In our study, we focused on white matter microstructure in the adult brain by 
comparing DTI measures of adults with ASD and control participants. We expected 
white matter differences to be diffuse and therefore, in contrast to previous studies, ex-
plored them at whole-brain level. We hypothesized that white matter integrity would be 
compromised in the ASD group and therefore FA would be reduced and MD increased 
compared to the control group.
Methods
Participants
The ASD group comprised 24 right-handed adults (eight females; mean age ± SD = 26.3 
± 6.3 years; age range 18-40 years) diagnosed with high-functioning autism (HFA) or 
Asperger syndrome (AS). The diagnosis of HFA or AS was established by expert clini-
cal opinion following DSM-IV-TR criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
supplemented by a structured diagnostic interview, the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (Cheung et al.; Lord et al., 1994). Subjects were included in the ASD group if 
they fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger syndrome (10 par-
ticipants with HFA, 14 with AS). Table 3.1 (page 54) lists diagnosis and ADI-R scores 
per participant. Three participants did not meet one of the specified cut-off points of 
the ADI-R. This could be attributed to the fact that several participants only received a 
diagnosis in adolescence or adulthood and parents were consequently unable to report 
the relevant developmental information. For four participants no parents or caretakers 
were available and hence the ADI-R was not administered. In all cases, participants 
were only included if the clinical diagnosis of HFA or AS was undisputed. Participants 
had no reported history of neurological disorders, head trauma or psychiatric disorders 
other than ASD. The control group included 24 medically healthy adults (mean age ± 
SD = 26.2 ± 6.0 years; age range 18-39 years) recruited through advertisements in the 
local community. The control participants were matched with the ASD participants for 
age, gender, and verbal IQ (assessed by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, 
WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981); or Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, third edition, WAIS-III 
(Wechsler, 1997)). Prior to inclusion, control subjects were screened to exclude those 
with psychiatric, neurological, or developmental disorders. 
All participants were right-handed native speakers of Dutch and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Handedness was determined using an 
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inventory derived from the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Fur-
thermore, all participants had full-scale IQ scores of 85 or above based on the WAIS-R 
or WAIS-III. The ASD and control groups did not differ significantly in chronological 
age, verbal IQ or full scale IQ (for all comparisons P > 0.1), although the mean perfor-
mance IQ was higher in the control group (P = .008). Participant characteristics, includ-
ing age, sex, verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ are presented in Table 3.2 (page 56). 
The study was approved by the local Medical Ethical Committee. All participants gave 
written informed consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
MRI acquisition
Magnetic resonance (MR) data was acquired on a Siemens Sonata 1.5 T scanner. For each 
participant, a high-resolution structural MR image was acquired, using a T1-weighted 
MP-RAGE sequence (volume TR = 2250 ms, TE = 3.93 ms, 15° flip angle, 176 sagittal 
slices, slice-matrix size = 256 x 256, slice thickness = 1 mm, no slice gap, field of view = 
256 mm). The diffusion tensor images were acquired using a twice-refocused spin-echo 
echo-planar imaging sequence (64 slices, interleaved acquisition mode, repetition time 
= 8600 ms, echo time = 89 ms, voxel size = 2.2 x 2.2 x 2.2 mm, field of view = 220 mm). 
For each slice, four images without diffusion weighting (b=0), and 30 images with dif-
fusion weighting (b=900 s/mm2) applied along non-collinear directions were assembled. 
DTI analysis 
Raw DTI data were preprocessed using in house software (Zwiers, 2010). The DTI 
images were realigned and eddy-current corrected by residual error minimization of 
the diffusion tensor model (Andersson and Skare, 2002). Diffusion tensors were then 
robustly estimated using our artefact-insensitive algorithm (Zwiers, 2010). Mean diffu-
sivity (MD) and fractional anisotropy (FA) measures were computed from the diffusion 
tensor eigenvalues. FA and MD maps were normalized to the T1 ICBM-template (MNI 
space) using the unified segmentation parameters of the structural image, and spatially 
smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8mm full width at half maximum. MD and FA re-
sults were masked by a brain mask and FA results by a threshold mask of FA > 0.2. Non-
sphericity correction was applied to account for unequal variance between the groups. 
To assess differences between FA and MD values of the ASD and 
control group, we conducted whole-brain two-sample t-tests in SPM5 (http://www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/) with age, performance IQ and total IQ included 
as covariates. Cluster-size was employed as the test-statistic and clusters were only con-
sidered significant at a threshold of P < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons using 
family-wise error correction. The FA analyses were restricted to the computed white 
matter mask.
To characterize the FA and MD probability distributions in each participant for 
white and grey matter, we computed the raw and first central moments (i.e., the sample 
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mean, the sample standard deviation [SD], the sample skewness and the sample kurto-
sis). We compared these moments at the group level using two-sided two-sample t-tests. 
Results were considered significant at a threshold of P < 0.05.
Results
No differences were found in white matter FA and MD values between participants with 
ASD and control subjects. Including age and IQ values as a covariate did not change this 
result. We also compared the histograms of FA and MD values in the ASD and control 
group, as presented in Figure 5.1, but these did not reveal significant differences in the 
spreading of these DTI parameters in both groups.
Figure 5.1. Histograms showing the frequencies of (a) FA and (b) MD values across grey mat-
ter (GM) and white matter (WM). The shape of the distributions are not significantly different 
between the ASD and control groups.
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Discussion
In this DTI study, we investigated white matter microstructure in adults with ASD and 
matched control participants. Since we expected white matter differences between the 
groups to be diffuse, we performed our analysis at whole-brain level. We hypothesized 
that white matter integrity would be compromised in the ASD group, and therefore 
FA and MD values would be reduced compared to the control group. We tested this 
hypothesis using both a voxel-wise comparison of FA and MD values between groups 
and their distribution by means of histogram analysis. The lack of significant differences 
in FA and MD between ASD and control groups points to a corresponding absence 
of differences in white matter integrity. The relative scarcity of DTI studies in adults 
with ASD complicates the comparison of our results to relevant other findings. We will 
therefore discuss our findings in the context of DTI studies in children and adolescents. 
Based on existing DTI findings in children and adolescents, we expected to find 
significant differences in white matter integrity between adults with ASD and control 
participants. One possible explanation for the lack of such a difference in our data is that 
we chose a whole-brain analysis rather than restrict the analysis to a particular region 
of the brain. A majority of DTI studies in adults that reports differences uses a certain 
ROI or more tract-based approach and focuses on regions that have been reported be-
fore, such as frontal and temporal cortex or the corpus callosum (e.g. Alexander et al., 
2007; Kleinhans et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2007; Thakkar et al., 2008). Using such a more 
selective approach increases the probability of finding a statistically significant result. 
As a consequence, these analyses might result in white matter differences in ASD to be 
‘over-reported’ (see Ioannidis, 2011). 
A second possibility that might account for the absence of significant findings in 
this study is that differences in white matter structure are present in children, but disap-
pear during development. A recent DTI study (Kleinhans et al., 2012) investigated age-
related changes in white matter integrity in adolescents and adults with ASD compared 
to typically developing participants. While during adolescence white matter differences 
between the ASD and control group were robust, during early adulthood, FA and MD 
values of the ASD group were similar to and heading in the direction to those of the 
control group. In other words, from adolescence to adulthood, white matter values ap-
peared to normalize to levels in the range of typical developing participants. Such an 
effect might especially be the case in our sample, consisting of normal intelligent adults 
with Asperger’s syndrome or high-functioning autism. Although in all our participants 
the diagnosis ASD was undisputed, comparatively many were diagnosed with ASD later 
in life, i.e. after the age of twelve. This indicates that in some of these subjects, at least 
in childhood, ASD only mildly influenced the level of functioning in daily life. It is not 
unlikely that factors such as the level of severity of ASD and intelligence level play a 
role in detecting white matter differences and the occurrence of white matter deficits in 
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adults with ASD (Alexander et al., 2007; Pardini et al., 2009). 
Since our study was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, we cannot make any 
inferences about the developmental trajectory of white matter microstructure in ASD, 
nor can we draw any conclusions on whether white matter differences in adults with 
ASD disappear during development or were never there. It is worth noting, however, 
that the amount of DTI findings in adults with ASD in the literature is scarce. To our 
knowledge, only one other DTI study that explored white matter integrity in adults 
with Asperger’s syndrome used a whole-brain approach (Bloemen et al., 2010). Specula-
tively, this lack of reports might be related to a publication bias in which non-statistically 
significant results, i.e., null findings are not being published (Ioannidis, 2011). This 
would result in an under-publication of findings in adults compared to a relative over-
publication of significant results in children. Such a bias would suggest that DTI studies 
in adults with ASD have thus far received little attention, and in the extreme case lead 
to the unwarranted conclusion that white matter alterations in ASD are real. 
Besides the aforementioned explanations, the inconsistency between our results 
and previous findings in children might be attributed to methodological differences, 
such as differences in sample size or heterogeneity in and composition of the studied 
group regarding, for example, age and diagnostic criteria. In addition, diversity in results 
might be caused by the large variety of techniques that can be applied to DTI data, such 
as voxel-based analysis or fibre tracking techniques.
Our sample consisted of high-functioning participants with either Asperger’s syn-
drome or autism. Mixing Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism in principle 
increases the generality of findings but also makes our analysis insensitive to possible 
differences in white matter between these groups. However, given the size of our sample, 
a differentiation would not have produced reliable results. Furthermore, the partici-
pants had an average or above average intelligence and no comorbidity. Although this 
increased the homogeneity of our sample, this factor limits the generalisation of our 
results to the general ASD population, in which a large variation in intelligence and 
comorbidity exists.
In this DTI study, we tried to detect biological markers of ASD by investigating 
differences in white matter microstructure. The diagnostic symptoms of ASD, however, 
are defined at the behavioural level. Given the large variation in the autism phenotype, 
a one-to-one mapping between behavioural symptoms and (neuro)biological markers 
is unlikely to exist (Walsh, Elsabbagh, Bolton, & Singh, 2011). Future DTI studies in 
individuals with ASD might establish a firmer link between behaviour and cognitive 
functioning and the underlying neurobiology. A few studies have already looked into 
this issue by relating behavioural (diagnostic) measures, such as scores on diagnostic 
rating scales or cognitive tasks, to MRI measures of white matter integrity. For example, 
Thakkar and colleagues (2008) investigated anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activation 
during response monitoring in adults with ASD and control participants and linked this 
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brain activation to underlying white matter integrity and ADI-R scores of restricted and 
repetitive behaviour. Their results showed a relation between increased ACC activation, 
reduced FA in underlying white matter and higher ratings of restricted and repetitive 
behaviour in the ASD group. Consequently, it was suggested that in ASD structural 
and functional abnormalities of the ACC compromise response monitoring, thereby 
contributing to restricted and repetitive behaviour. Noriuchi and colleagues (2010) also 
explored the brain-behaviour relationship in children with ASD by correlating voxel-
based whole-brain DTI measures and social functioning, assessed by a rating scale. Their 
results showed reduced FA values for children with ASD in brain regions (dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) associated with social cognition and information integration which 
negatively correlated with the degree of social impairment. Another study (Cheung et 
al., 2009) in children with ASD reported significant correlations between reduced FA 
values in the ASD group and higher diagnostic algorithm scores in different domains of 
the ADI-R. Communication and social reciprocity impairments correlated with lower 
FA throughout fronto-striato-temporal pathways, and repetitive behaviours in more 
posterior brain pathways, including splenium of the corpus callosum and cerebellum. 
Finally, Langen and colleagues (2009) described changes in corticostriatal white matter 
development in children and adolescents with ASD that were related to the repetitive 
behaviour characterising ASD as assessed by subscales of the ADI-R.
In conclusion, this DTI study contributes to the gap in the literature on white 
matter microstructure in adults with ASD. Our results did not reveal significant differ-
ences in FA and MD between the ASD and control group, which is not in line with 
earlier findings in children with ASD. The lack of a significant difference might be 
explained by the whole-brain approach that we exploited. Furthermore, it might be 
due to the developmental trajectory of white matter in ASD, resulting in an absence of 
differences in adulthood. In addition, speculatively, publication bias might play a role 
with under-publication of null findings regarding white matter microstructure in adults 
with ASD. More research is needed to unravel the exact nature of possible white matter 
differences in adulthood in individuals with ASD and to link the behavioural diagnostic 
symptoms to underlying neurobiological measures.
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Summary of the studies presented in this thesis
In high-functioning individuals with autism, difficulties with pragmatic and semantic 
language are most prominent when language comprehension requires the use of con-
text and the integration of different sources of information. However, at what level of 
language processing and which types of context the language difficulties arise is un-
clear. This thesis addressed the integration of contextual information during spoken 
language comprehension in the brains of adults with ASD. Using fMRI, we investigated 
the neural correlates of different types of context information during auditory sentence 
comprehension in adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s disorder compared 
to control participants. Here I will present an overview of the different chapters and 
summarize our findings. 
Chapter 2 presented an fMRI experiment in control participants, in which we 
examined the brain regions involved in the integration of sentence meaning and voice-
based inferences about a speaker’s age, gender, or social background. Participants lis-
tened to spoken sentences in which sentence content did or did not match speaker 
characteristics as inferred from the voice (“speaker-identity sentences”). Furthermore, 
we included sentences containing either a semantic or world knowledge violation, as 
well as correct sentences. Contrasting these sentences allowed us to explore the role of 
left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) as a unification space for linguistic and extra-linguistic 
information. 
Previous research has shown that sentences with an anomaly or incongruity have 
a higher unification load and therefore recruit LIFG stronger than congruent or correct 
sentences (see Hagoort et al., 2004). In line with this, we found stronger LIFG activa-
tion for speaker-incongruent sentences relative to speaker-congruent sentences. In ad-
dition to activation in LIFG, speaker-incongruent sentences elicited activation in right 
inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG). Furthermore, as expected, LIFG responded more strongly 
to sentences with a world knowledge or semantic violation relative to correct sentences. 
Activation common for speaker-incongruent sentences and sentences with a semantic or 
world knowledge violation was detected in LIFG, RIFG, and the posterior part of left 
middle temporal gyrus. These findings confirm that there is an overlap in brain regions 
involved in the unification of both core linguistic and extra-linguistic information, and 
demonstrate that the key role of LIFG in unification processes is not limited to linguis-
tic information. These results in control participants served as a basis for investigating 
the neural correlates of spoken language comprehension in adults with ASD.
In Chapter 3 we used the speaker-identity sentences to investigate the neural 
correlates of the integration of speaker characteristics and sentence content in autism. 
It is known that difficulties with pragmatic language are universal across individuals 
with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). The integration of voice-inferred speaker char-
acteristics and sentence content can be considered an aspect of pragmatic language 
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comprehension relevant to social interaction in daily life. We compared 24 adults with 
high-functioning autism or Asperger’s disorder and 24 control participants (matched 
on age, sex, and IQ). As in the previous fMRI study, passive listening was used to study 
automatic language processing and to emulate conditions resembling those in daily life.
Relative to the control group, the ASD group showed increased activation in 
RIFG for speaker-incongruent sentences compared to speaker-congruent sentences. A 
debriefing interview was used to assess whether participants had detected the speaker-
incongruities. As both groups performed behaviourally at a similar level on this inter-
view, the increased activation in RIFG was interpreted as being compensatory in nature. 
It presumably reflects spill-over processing from the language dominant left hemisphere 
due to higher task demands faced by the participants with ASD when integrating speak-
er characteristics and sentence content. In the speaker-incongruent sentences, the in-
tegration of inconsistent information and on-line revision of the situation model were 
required to overcome unexpected inferences about the speaker and sentence content. 
Therefore, we suggested that the increased RIFG activation in the ASD group possibly 
points to more effort in constructing and/or updating a situation model. 
The second main difference between the groups was that only the control group 
showed decreased activation for speaker-incongruent relative to speaker-congruent sen-
tences in right ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC). Since vMPFC is involved in 
self-referential processing related to judgments and inferences about self and others, the 
absence of such a modulation in vMPFC activation in the ASD group possibly points to 
atypical self-referential mental activity in ASD. Taken together, our results demonstrate 
that in ASD compensatory mechanisms are at work in automatic inferential processes 
in spoken language understanding. 
In the fMRI study in Chapter 4 an ASD and control group were presented with 
spoken sentences that were correct or contained a semantic or world knowledge anom-
aly. Since it is unclear at what level of contextual integration the language problems 
in ASD occur, the aim of this study was to explore this issue. Manipulating sentence 
context by using different types of anomalies provided an opportunity to look into dif-
ferent levels of integrative processes during language comprehension and their neural 
underpinnings in ASD. Again, to let listening conditions resemble those in daily life, 
no explicit task was imposed. Furthermore, to exclude the possibility that differences in 
processing core aspects of language (i.e., phonology, syntax) influenced the effects for 
sentences with anomalies, we included reversed speech sentences and compared them to 
correct sentences; this contrast showed no differences between the two groups.
Comparing results from the ASD and control group indicated that the type of 
anomaly had a differential effect on integrative processes during language comprehen-
sion. For semantic anomalies, there were no differences between the groups in recruited 
brain regions. However, for world knowledge anomalies, our findings demonstrated 
significant differences between the groups in left and right inferior frontal cortex. In 
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LIFG, the control group showed increased activation relative to the ASD group for 
sentences with a world knowledge anomaly. This effect possibly implies reduced inte-
grative capacities of the ASD group. The ASD participants did show sensitivity to the 
world knowledge context as reflected by increased within-group activation in LIFG for 
world knowledge sentences compared to correct sentences. In RIFG, world knowledge 
anomalies elicited stronger activation in the control group compared to the ASD group. 
This additional RIFG activation probably reflects revision of the situation model after 
new, conflicting information. The lack of recruitment of RIFG in the ASD group is 
possibly related to difficulties with exception handling required to deal with the world 
knowledge anomalies. 
From these results it follows that the nature of contextual information that needs 
to be taken into account is an important factor in explaining differences in language 
comprehension in ASD. In addition, difficulties with cognitive flexibility and exception 
handling as observed in individuals with ASD will affect language processing. 
In Chapter 5 we investigated white matter microstructure in adults with ASD 
and matched control participants by means of an exploratory diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI) study. Compared to DTI studies in children and adolescents with ASD, which 
have reported compromised white matter microstructure compared to control partici-
pants, DTI findings in adults with ASD are relatively scarce. Since we expected white 
matter differences between the ASD and control group to be diffuse, we performed our 
analysis at whole-brain level using both a voxel-wise comparison of fractional anisotropy 
(FA) and mean diffusivity (MD) values, and looked at their distribution by means of 
histogram analysis. We found no significant differences in FA and MD between the 
groups, pointing to a corresponding absence of differences in white matter integrity. 
This finding is not in line with earlier findings in children and adolescents. The lack of 
a difference might be explained by the hypothesis-free whole-brain rather than region-
based approach. Furthermore, it might be due to the developmental trajectory of white 
matter in ASD that leads to deviant white matter integrity at younger ages and the reso-
lution of the abnormalities in adulthood (Kleinhans et al., 2012). Speculatively, publica-
tion bias might also play a role with under-publication of null findings regarding white 
matter microstructure in adults with ASD (see Ioannidis, 2011).
Conclusions and considerations
Our fMRI experiments on language comprehension in adults with ASD are new in 
several ways. First of all, fMRI studies on pragmatic language comprehension in adults 
with ASD, while increasing in number, are still scarce. Also, the experiments are usually 
designed to investigate language comprehension through the visual modality, while in 
daily life, communication mostly concerns spoken language. Furthermore, most, if not 
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all, studies on language processing include an explicit instruction and behavioral task. 
Such a setup conflicts with communication in everyday life, in which language com-
prehension mostly involves ‘reading between the lines’ and follows implicit rather than 
explicit rules. Also, as already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, it has been 
shown that individuals with autism are in fact capable of using context during language 
processing when explicitly instructed to do so (Snowling & Frith, 1986).
A key result of our experiments concerned the effect of context type on the re-
cruitment of LIFG and RIFG during spoken sentence comprehension across the ASD 
and control groups. We found differential involvement of these regions between the 
groups for speaker-identity sentences as well as those with a world knowledge anomaly. 
No differences were present for semantic anomalies. These results indicate that whether 
or not the neural processes subserving language comprehension in ASD differ from 
those in controls depends on the nature of the context. Semantic anomalies are rela-
tively linguistic, whereas speaker-identity and world knowledge sentences require more 
pragmatic language abilities. When context difficulty increases or is more pragmatic in 
nature, differences in neural correlates of language processing in ASD become more ap-
parent. The speaker-identity results demonstrate that deviant language comprehension 
in ASD is not restricted to high-level inferential processes, relevant for subtleties such as 
irony comprehension and bridging inferences in complex discourse. Difficulties also oc-
cur during automatic low-level inferential processes, when relevant context information 
is captured in the voice rather than part of the communicative intention. On the other 
hand, when the context is more semantic in nature and requires more basic linguistic 
processing, neural correlates of sentence comprehension in ASD and control partici-
pants do not differ. The idea that there are no differences in language processing per se 
is supported further by the absence of differences between the groups when comparing 
reversed speech and correct sentences.  
Partially overlapping results were reported with this language paradigm by Groen 
et al. (2010) in adolescents with ASD. For the speaker-identity sentences, the control 
group showed increased LIFG activation compared to the ASD group, while for the 
world knowledge sentences there was stronger activation in RIFG for the ASD partici-
pants. As in our study, there were no between-group differences for the semantic anoma-
lies. The difference in activation patterns between the two studies could be attributed 
to the age difference or the smaller size and larger heterogeneity of the adolescent ASD 
group.
Activation differences in right inferior frontal gyrus
In our experiments, the most intriguing differences between the ASD and control group 
across context types were located in RIFG. We have attributed these activation differ-
ences to the construction and updating of the situation model. In both the speaker-in-
congruent sentences and those with a world knowledge anomaly, incoming information 
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conflicted with the mental representation that the listener has of the speaker as well as 
with general world knowledge. To properly account for this, the listener has to integrate 
this information into the situation model. We suggest that the observed activation dif-
ferences in RIFG can be linked to the more general difficulties with exception handling 
and cognitive flexibility of the ASD group that are likely to affect the construction and 
revision of the situation model. Supporting evidence for this comes from a behavioural 
study showing that, during reasoning, individuals with autism have difficulties dealing 
with exceptions (Pijnacker et al., 2009). 
We did not interpret differential activation patterns in RIFG to result from re-
duced or reversed lateralization for language in ASD. Based on structural and functional 
neuroimaging studies on language, lateralization differences between ASD and control 
participants have been argued to underlie language difficulties observed in autism (e.g., 
Bigler et al., 2007; Boddaert et al., 2003; Herbert et al., 2002; Herbert et al., 2005; 
Kleinhans, Muller, Cohen, & Courchesne, 2008) and are present very early in life (Ey-
ler, Pierce, & Courchesne, 2012; Redcay & Courchesne, 2008). However, functional 
neuroimaging studies in children and adults with ASD show no consistent pattern with 
regard to reversed hemispheric dominance. Several studies on perception of speech and 
speech-like sounds in ASD have reported atypical or reversed asymmetry, i.e. reduced 
left hemisphere activation or more right than left hemisphere activation (Boddaert et al., 
2003; Eyler et al., 2012; Gervais et al., 2004; Muller et al., 1999; Redcay & Courchesne, 
2008). Two recent studies on word production, using category and letter fluency (Klein-
hans et al., 2008) and response naming (Knaus et al., 2010) as language measures, found 
conflicting results. Several fMRI studies investigating semantic comprehension at word, 
sentence or discourse level reported reduced activation in LIFG in ASD (Gaffrey et al., 
2007; Harris et al., 2006; Just et al., 2004), while others have demonstrated increased 
RIFG activation (Mason & Just, 2004; Wang et al., 2006). However, these last few 
studies did not directly address left-right differences and produced inconsistent activa-
tion patterns, rendering inferences about lateralization unreliable. An important factor 
in explaining potential lateralization differences in autism seems to be the severity of 
language impairment. Studies using varying techniques, ranging from structural and 
functional neuroimaging to handedness and language questionnaires, suggest that atypi-
cal language lateralization in autism is related to a history of early language impairment, 
rather than specific to autism (De Fossé et al., 2004; Escalante-Mead, Minshew, & 
Sweeney, 2003; Herbert et al., 2005; Kleinhans et al., 2008; Wan, Marchina, Norton, 
& Schlaug, 2012). 
The design of our experiments and observed activation patterns in the ASD and 
control groups render it unlikely that between-group differences in left and right hemi-
sphere activation can be attributed to atypical lateralization for language in autism. 
However, we included both adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s 
syndrome, which differ in early language development (as this is a key criterion differen-
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tiating the respective diagnoses). Our HFA group had language abilities well within the 
normal range, suggesting that atypical lateralization is of minor influence. Nevertheless, 
we cannot rule out that subdividing the group according to diagnostic category would 
not yield different results. Since our sample size precluded analysing HFA and Asperger’s 
syndrome reliably as separate groups, investigating potential differences in organiza-
tion of language functions between these groups related to early language development 
was not possible. It is worth pointing out that grouping subjects based on diagnostic 
category is not necessarily more valid than using, for instance, a subdivision based on 
language or cognitive abilities. 
Link to cognitive theories
In interpreting our fMRI results we did not focus solely on linguistic explanations, but 
also linked our findings to the three cognitive theories on autism. As pointed out in the 
introduction of this thesis, these accounts are best regarded as complimentary, since 
none of them explains all symptoms of autism. Likewise, for our experiments, which 
pertain just to the diagnostic domain of communication (see Box 1), only the three 
accounts together provided a satisfactory cognitive explanation for all aspects of our 
findings. 
First, a correct interpretation of the sentences in our experiments required that 
the listener unified or integrated the different sources of incoming information, and 
combined these into an overall representation of the sentence. As apparent from our 
results, whether or not the neural underpinnings of these integrative processes differ be-
tween adults with ASD and control participants depends on the context. This implicates 
a role for weak central coherence in autism in causing deviant integrative processes during 
language comprehension for certain types of context information. Second, unification 
is an ongoing process since the current representation has to be updated continuously 
as new information comes in. If this incoming information is conflicting, exception 
handling and cognitive flexibility are required from the listener. Our results suggest the 
autism and control group differed with respect to these abilities, which fits the executive 
functioning account that predicts such deficits. Third, the ToM account offers an explana-
tion for the lack of modulation in activation in vMPFC observed for the ASD group in 
the speaker-identity experiment by proposing that individuals with autism are impaired 
in judgments and inferences about self and others. 
Future directions
In this thesis, pragmatic language comprehension in autism was addressed by exploring 
the integration of voice characteristics, semantic and world knowledge. These aspects 
are inherent to speech comprehension and are automatically taken into account by the 
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listener. One interesting area of future research would be interesting to investigate the 
integration of contextual information from the visual modality during speech compre-
hension. Co-speech gestures would be a very natural option, since they are visual, au-
tomatically accompany spoken language, and provide a source of semantic information. 
Such gestures are of specific interest since the developmental trajectories of gesture and 
language parallel each other, but seem to be delayed or deviant in children with autism 
(Capone & McGregor, 2004). Furthermore, co-speech gestures are often included in 
diagnostic measures for autism and have been shown predictive of receptive and expres-
sive language in toddlers with ASD (Bopp & Mirenda, 2010; Luyster, Kadlec, Carter, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2008). Deviant speech-gesture integration in autism is supported by the 
finding that simultaneous presentation of gestures and speech facilitated comprehension 
in control participants but hindered comprehension in adolescents with autism (Silver-
man, Bennetto, Campana, & Tanenhaus, 2010). Activations associated with integration 
of semantic information of speech and gestures and of voice characteristics and world 
knowledge overlap in control subjects (Willems et al., 2007). Elucidating their neural 
correlates in individuals with autism would expand our knowledge on contextual inte-
gration during language comprehension.
Another source of context intrinsic to most speech is the emotional valence of 
the message. Difficulties in (correctly) expressing or interpreting emotion are common 
in autism, and previous research has provided evidence for aberrant processing of emo-
tional information present in speech (Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson, 2011; 
Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002; Stewart, McAdam, Ota, Peppe, & 
Cleland, 2012). In addition to the combination of speech and gestures, an interesting 
extension of the work described here would therefore be to use fMRI to investigate 
whether the integration of emotional information in speech differs between autism and 
control groups. This could be done using a similar design in which the emotional tone 
of a sentence is either congruent or incongruent with the message.
In our experiments we included a mixed group of individuals with Asperger’s syn-
drome and high-functioning autism (HFA). Studying such a diagnostically mixed group 
has strengths and weaknesses. An advantage is that covering a wider range of the autism 
spectrum increases the generalizability of our findings to the broader population of 
high-functioning individuals with autism. However, including two diagnostic subtypes 
that differ with respect to early language development might also obscure differences 
that might be of importance when studying language comprehension and its neural un-
derpinnings. This is illustrated by an ERP study on sentence processing and solving rea-
soning problems (Pijnacker et al., 2010). Future studies that take early language history 
and current language functioning into account may help determine their exact role in 
the functional organization of language in the brains of individuals with autism. Given 
that language abilities are highly related to other cognitive skills, it might be useful for 
future studies to include a detailed profile of cognitive functioning in general.
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Our data on language comprehension in autism are cross-sectional, which lim-
its inferences on developmental changes in language organization in ASD. Brain de-
velopment and the organization of cognitive functions are dynamic, hence differences 
between the ASD and control group reported here may not be observed at all ages. 
There is converging evidence that brain growth in autism follows a different trajectory, 
starting with early overgrowth at the beginning of life, followed by a slowing or arrest 
during early childhood and degeneration may be present in some brain regions by (pre)
adolescence (Amaral et al., 2008; Courchesne, Campbell, & Solso, 2011; Courchesne 
et al., 2001; Courchesne et al., 2007). The early brain growth abnormalities precede 
and overlap with the onset of symptoms in autism and are most pronounced in frontal, 
cerebellar and temporal structures that mediate the development of higher-order social, 
emotional, speech, language, attentional, and cognitive functions that are characteristi-
cally impaired in autism (Carper & Courchesne, 2005; Carper, Moses, Tigue, & Cour-
chesne, 2002; Courchesne, Redcay, Morgan, & Kennedy, 2005; Hazlett et al., 2011). 
Excess neuron numbers have been hypothesized to be one possible cause of ear-
ly brain overgrowth in autism, resulting in both short-distance over-connectivity and 
reduced long-distance connectivity between brain regions (Courchesne et al., 2007). 
Since the largest brain growth abnormalities have been reported in frontal cortex (see 
Amaral et al., 2008; Stigler et al., 2011), subsequent connectivity problems early in life 
may affect the functional organization of language and other higher-order cognitive 
functions mediated by frontal brain regions (Courchesne et al., 2007; Courchesne et al., 
2005; Eyler et al., 2012). We explored language comprehension and white matter integ-
rity in a sample of adults with ASD. Therefore, our findings only allow inferences on the 
final result of the functional organization of language as related to structural connectiv-
ity. Future studies investigating language comprehension in ASD in a developmental 
context would preferably employ a longitudinal design encompassing functional as well 
as structural MRI measures.
In this thesis, structural connectivity, or white matter integrity, was explored us-
ing DTI. We used a voxel-wise whole-brain approach to compare white matter micro-
structure in adults with and without ASD. Future studies might benefit from hypothe-
sis-driven approaches exploring specific white matter fiber tracts. While DTI allows for 
inferences about the structural integrity in connecting white matter tracts, it does not 
permit conclusions on the functional organization of brain networks. To gain insight 
into the intriguing issue whether and how differences in white matter structure in au-
tism influence functional networks for higher-order cognitive functions, it will be essen-
tial to combine measures of functional and structural connectivity in the same design.
Despite major advances in the understand ing of the genetic, neurobiological and 
developmental underpinnings of autism, comparatively little has been achieved in the 
search for biological markers for autism. Such biomarkers could be clinically useful in 
com plementing or improving the behavioural diagnosis, and in enabling earlier detec-
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tion of autism (Walsh et al., 2011). One of the most influential advances in under-
standing autism probably involves the support for a significant genetic contribution to 
the aetiology of autism coming from twin and family studies (see Geschwind, 2011). 
Although the different subtypes of the autism spectrum appear highly heritable and 
research has discovered many genes involved in autism, it has additionally revealed sig-
nificant heterogeneity and not identified a gene specifically causing autism (Abrahams 
& Geschwind, 2008; Geschwind, 2008, 2011). Twin studies have shown only a mod-
est genetic overlap between the three diagnostic domains of autism (social interaction, 
communication, rigid and repetitive behaviour), together with substantial genetic speci-
ficity with separate genes influencing distinct brain circuits associated with the different 
core impairments in autism (Geschwind, 2008, 2011; Happé et al., 2006; Ronald et 
al., 2006a; Ronald, Happé, Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin, 2006b). It therefore seems 
more fruitful to fractionate the broad autism phenotype into several ‘intermediate phe-
notypes’ or endophenotypes (e.g., Geschwind, 2011; Happé et al., 2006; Walsh et al., 
2011).
Substantial progress in the understanding of brain anatomy and functioning in 
autism notwithstanding, structural and functional imaging studies have not yet yielded 
reliable biomarkers for autism (see for a review Walsh et al., 2011). Recently, machine 
learning algorithms have been evaluated as a screening tool with a number of white and 
grey matter tissue-derived metrics being the potential biomarkers submitted to these 
classification analyses (Ecker et al., 2010a; Ecker et al., 2010b; Lange et al., 2010). Al-
though with accuracies of up to 90% (Ecker et al., 2010a) these methods show great 
promise, thus far classification is based on a previously established clinical diagnosis and 
many scientific and practical limitations have yet to be overcome before they can be of 
clinical utility (Lord & Jones, 2012; Walsh et al., 2011; Yerys & Pennington, 2011).
The heterogeneity of autism and its overlap with other disorders further compli-
cate the search for autism biomarkers (e.g., Geschwind, 2011; Walsh et al., 2011). Thus 
far, research has primarily focused on mapping biomarkers onto diagnostic categories 
defined on the basis of behavioural criteria which do not necessarily capture the multi-
dimensional and complex clinical, cognitive and behavioural phenotype associated with 
autism and its overlap with other disorders (Insel et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2011). The 
promise of predictive biomarkers is more likely to be fulfilled if genetic findings, neu-
roimaging results, clinical information, and behavioural  and cognitive elements are all 
combined, thereby recognizing autism as a complex and heterogeneous condition (e.g. 
Geschwind, 2011). In addition, given that autism is a lifelong condition and that its 
symptoms are relatively plastic in nature and change with age, when defining biomark-
ers it is important to also take developmental pathways into account (see Lord & Jones, 
2012; Walsh et al., 2011). While it is currently still premature to include neurobiologi-
cal findings in the formal classification of mental disorders that will form the core of 
the DSM-5, a classification system for mental disorders should ultimately be based not 
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only on clinical symptoms but also the aetiology and pathophysiology of the disorders 
(see Hyman, 2007).
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Autisme
Autisme is een psychiatrische ontwikkelingsstoornis die gekenmerkt wordt door kwali-
tatieve tekortkomingen in de sociale interactie, in de (verbale en non-verbale) commu-
nicatie, alsmede door beperkte, repetitieve en stereotiepe gedragspatronen, interesses en 
activiteiten. Autisme behoort samen met de stoornis van Asperger en PDD-NOS tot 
de overkoepelende diagnostische categorie autismespectrumstoornissen. De prevalentie 
van autisme en aanverwante stoornissen wordt geschat op 1 op de 150 mensen en is 
ongeveer drie keer hoger bij mannen dan bij vrouwen. 
Al in de eerste beschrijvingen van Leo Kanner (1943) en Hans Asperger (1944) 
werd autisme beschouwd als een aangeboren aandoening. Tegenwoordig is algemeen ge-
accepteerd dat autisme een psychiatrische aandoening is met een neurobiologische oor-
sprong en een sterke erfelijke component. Dit wil zeggen dat autisme aanwezig is vanaf 
de geboorte en gedurende het hele leven, in wisselende verschijningsvorm, blijft bestaan.
Het bestuderen van de neurobiologische basis van autisme kan inzicht verschaffen 
in de onderliggende hersenprocessen en bijdragen aan het begrijpen en diagnosticeren 
van de stoornis, alsook aan het ontwikkelen en verbeteren van behandelingen. De af-
gelopen jaren is op het gebied van genetica en functionele en structurele beeldvorming 
van de hersenen (o.a. met behulp van MRI) veel vooruitgang geboekt met het in kaart 
brengen van de neurobiologie van autisme. Desondanks zijn er nog geen duidelijke 
biologische ‘markers’ ontdekt, zoals bijvoorbeeld specifieke genen of hersengebieden en 
-circuits, die gelinkt kunnen worden aan de voor autisme typerende gedragskenmerken. 
Omdat beperkingen in taal en communicatie tot de diagnostische criteria voor 
autisme behoren en deze vaardigheden cruciaal zijn in het dagelijks leven, richt het 
onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift zich op taalverwerking in de hersenen bij au-
tisme. Aan de experimenten beschreven in dit proefschrift hebben volwassenen met 
autisme of de stoornis van Asperger deelgenomen. De termen autisme en autismespec-
trumstoornissen (ASS) worden door elkaar gebruikt.
Taal en autisme
Spraak- en taalproblemen bij mensen met autisme zijn zeer heterogeen en variëren van 
afwezigheid van spraak tot (nagenoeg) normale taalvaardigheden. De meest opmerke-
lijke problemen met taal bij autisme betreffen pragmatische taalvaardigheden, het ver-
mogen om taal in context te begrijpen en gebruiken. Deze lijken universeel aangedaan 
bij mensen met autisme, ongeacht hun niveau van (cognitief ) functioneren. Een van 
de meest opvallende kenmerken van problemen met pragmatisch taalbegrip betreft het 
letterlijk nemen van uitingen wat leidt tot problemen bij het begrijpen van bijvoorbeeld 
humor, ironie, metaforen en spreekwoorden. Semantische aspecten van taal, zoals het 
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opbouwen van de betekenis van een zin gebaseerd op de betekenis van de afzonderlijke 
woorden, zijn geregeld maar niet universeel aangedaan in autisme. Bij hoog-functio-
nerende mensen met autisme lijken semantische taalvaardigheden relatief gespaard en 
komen problemen vaak pas naar voren bij hogere niveaus van taalgebruik, bijvoorbeeld 
wanneer de context gebruikt moet worden om de precieze betekenis van woorden vast 
te stellen. Dit verminderd vermogen om context te gebruiken bij het begrijpen van taal 
komt bij ASS voor, ook als taalvaardigheden verder intact zijn.
De neurobiologische basis van taalproblemen bij autisme is nog onvoldoende 
onderzocht om  de precieze oorzaak van bovengenoemde problemen te kunnen bepalen. 
Studies die door middel van functionele beeldvorming (functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, fMRI) taalverwerking in de hersenen van mensen met autisme onderzocht 
hebben laten zien dat er bij mensen met en zonder autisme overlap is in betrokken 
hersengebieden, en dat er tussen de groepen met name verschillen zijn in de inferieure 
frontale cortex, zowel in de linker- als rechterhersenhelft. Hoewel gesuggereerd is dat 
verschillen in hersenactivatie in de frontale cortex te maken hebben met een vermin-
derd vermogen van mensen met autisme om binnenkomende (talige) informatie te in-
tegreren, of met extra moeite die mensen met autisme hebben met taalverwerking, moet 
de precieze rol van frontale gebieden bij de verschillende semantische en pragmatische 
aspecten van taalbegrip nog nader bepaald worden.
FMRI studies suggereren verder dat er bij mensen met ASS sprake is van ver-
minderde functionele connectiviteit, dat wil zeggen verminderde communicatie of 
coördinatie tussen hersengebieden die betrokken zijn bij het uitvoeren van een taak. 
Deze bevinding is gerapporteerd voor uiteenlopende cognitieve domeinen waaronder 
taal, werkgeheugen, executief functioneren en sociale cognitie. Het lijkt aannemelijk dat 
de verminderde connectiviteit die bij mensen met ASS is gerapporteerd ook taalbegrip 
beïnvloedt, aangezien ook hiervoor hersengebieden in een netwerk gecoördineerd sa-
men moeten werken om informatie te integreren. 
Naast verminderde functionele connectiviteit is ook zwakkere structurele connec-
tiviteit tussen hersengebieden gemeten bij autisme met diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). 
Zowel de functionele als structurele onder-connectiviteit lijken gerelateerd aan de ernst 
van de autistische symptomen. Autisme wordt daarom tegenwoordig door velen bes-
chouwd als een “netwerkstoornis”. Er is echter meer onderzoek nodig om het precieze 
verband tussen verminderde connectiviteit en de gedragskenmerken van autisme te du-
iden. 
Samenvatting van de studies in dit proefschrift
Problemen met semantische en pragmatische aspecten van taal zijn bij mensen met 
autisme het meest prominent aanwezig als het gebruik van context en de integratie van 
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verschillende informatiebronnen vereist zijn. We hebben met behulp van fMRI gekeken 
naar de integratie van verschillende typen contextinformatie tijdens het begrijpen van 
gesproken taal in het brein van volwassenen met autisme of de stoornis van Asperger. Ik 
zal hieronder een overzicht geven van de belangrijkste bevindingen uit dit proefschrift. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten we met fMRI welke hersengebieden bij controle-
proefpersonen betrokken zijn bij de integratie van enerzijds de betekenis van een gespro-
ken zin en anderzijds de verwachtingen gebaseerd op de stem van de spreker. De stem 
vormt een belangrijke bron van contextinformatie over een spreker die door luisteraars 
snel en automatisch meegenomen wordt in hun interpretatie van een gesproken bood-
schap. Om de integratie van dit type contextinformatie te onderzoeken gebruikten we 
gesproken zinnen waarvan de inhoud al dan niet overeen kwam met verwachtingen 
die de luisteraar op basis van de stem van de spreker heeft ontwikkeld over de leeftijd, 
het geslacht of de sociale status van de betreffende spreker (“spreker-identiteitszinnen”). 
Daarnaast bekeken we de rol van de linker inferieure frontale cortex (LIFG) in het vere-
nigen van linguïstische (talige) en extra-linguïstische informatie door zinnen te laten ho-
ren die correct waren of die een wereldkennis dan wel semantische schending bevatten. 
Zie voor voorbeelden van deze zinnen de Appendix van dit proefschrift. In het vervolg 
zal ik “unificeren” of “unificatie” gebruiken om te verwijzen naar dit verenigen. Om 
de luisteromstandigheden zoveel mogelijk te laten lijken op die in het dagelijks leven 
en om automatische taalverwerking te bestuderen werden proefpersonen geïnstrueerd 
aandachtig naar de zinnen te luisteren zonder dat zij hierbij nog een extra taak moesten 
uitvoeren.
In eerder onderzoek is aangetoond dat zinnen die een schending of incongruentie 
bevatten sterkere activatie in LIFG tot gevolg hebben dan correcte of congruente zinnen 
doordat de (binnenkomende) informatie moeilijker te unificeren is. Overeenkomstig 
hiermee vonden wij sterkere hersenactivatie in LIFG voor spreker-incongruente zinnen, 
waarvan zinsinhoud en verwachtingen omtrent de spreker gebaseerd op de stem niet 
overeen kwamen, dan voor spreker-congruente zinnen. Naast activatie in LIFG was er 
voor spreker-incongruente zinnen ook activatie in de rechter inferieure frontale cortex 
(RIFG). Verder vonden we, zoals verwacht, sterkere activatie in LIFG voor zinnen met 
een semantische of wereldkennisschending in vergelijking met correcte zinnen. Zoals 
hierboven vermeld wilden we eveneens bekijken of er overlap bestaat in hersengebie-
den betrokken bij de unificatie van linguïstische informatie, zoals aanwezig in zinnen 
met wereldkennis- of semantische schending, en extra-linguïstische informatie, zoals 
in spreker-incongruente zinnen. We vonden gemeenschappelijke activatie voor spre-
ker-incongruente zinnen en zinnen met een semantische of wereldkennisschending in 
LIFG, RIFG en de linker middelste temporale gyrus. Deze resultaten bevestigen dat 
er een overlap is in hersengebieden betrokken bij het unificeren van linguïstische en 
extra-linguïstische informatie, en dat de rol van LIFG in dit proces niet beperkt is tot 
de unificatie van talige informatie. De resultaten van dit fMRI experiment bij controle-
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proefpersonen dienden als uitgangspunt voor het onderzoeken van de neurale basis van 
gesproken taalbegrip bij volwassenen met autisme. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikten we de spreker-identiteitszinnen om de neurale ba-
sis van de integratie van eigenschappen van de spreker en de inhoud van een zin te 
onderzoeken in autisme. Zoals hierboven reeds beschreven zijn problemen met prag-
matische aspecten van taal universeel in mensen met autisme. De unificatie van uit de 
stem afgeleide verwachtingen van een spreker en de inhoud van een zin kan beschouwd 
worden als een aspect van pragmatisch taalbegrip relevant voor sociale interactie in het 
dagelijks leven. We vergeleken hersenactivatie bij 24 mensen met hoog-functionerend 
autisme of de stoornis van Asperger en 24 controleproefpersonen (gematched op leeftijd, 
geslacht en intelligentie). 
De autismegroep vertoonde in vergelijking met de controlegroep sterkere acti-
vatie in RIFG voor spreker-incongruente zinnen dan voor congruente zinnen. Na het 
fMRI-experiment werd door middel van een vragenlijst vastgesteld of proefpersonen de 
spreker-incongruenties hadden opgemerkt. Aangezien beide groepen op gedragsniveau 
vergelijkbaar presteerden werd de sterkere RIFG activatie van de autismegroep geïnter-
preteerd als compenserend voor de hogere taakeisen die aan de deelnemers met autisme 
gesteld worden bij het integreren van eigenschappen van de spreker en inhoud van de 
zin. Tijdens het luisteren naar een zin bouwt een luisteraar een zogenaamd situation 
model op, een mentale representatie van hetgeen in de zin wordt beschreven. Als bin-
nenkomende informatie niet past binnen de reeds opgebouwde representatie, zoals bij 
spreker-incongruente zinnen, dan dient dit model herzien te worden. Onderzoek heeft 
uitgewezen dat RIFG betrokken is bij dit proces. Het herzien van het situation model 
vraagt flexibiliteit en kost de autismegroep wellicht meer moeite dan de controlegroep. 
De sterkere RIFG activatie bij de autismegroep wijst daarom mogelijk op meer moeite 
met het opbouwen of herzien van dit model.
Het tweede belangrijke verschil tussen de twee groepen werd gevonden in de 
rechter ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex (vMPFC). In dit hersengebied liet alleen de 
controlegroep verminderde activatie zien voor spreker-incongruente zinnen ten opzich-
te van spreker-congruente zinnen. vMPFC speelt een rol bij de beoordeling van zelf en 
anderen; de afwezigheid van een verschil in activiteit in dit gebied in de autismegroep 
wijst daarom mogelijk op een atypische verwerking van informatie over zelf en anderen. 
Samengevat laten onze resultaten zien dat in autisme compensatoire mechanismen op-
treden bij automatische processen tijdens het begrijpen van gesproken taal.
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 4 was om de verwerking van verschillende soorten 
context tijdens het begrijpen van gesproken taal te onderzoeken in de hersenen van 
volwassenen met autisme. Om het niveau waarop bij mensen met autisme de proble-
men met integratie van contextinformatie naar voren komen te onderzoeken, boden 
we een controle- en autismegroep zinnen aan die correct waren of een semantische dan 
wel wereldkennisschending bevatten. Verder wilden we uitsluiten dat verschillen tus-
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sen de autisme- en controlegroep in de verwerking van andere aspecten van taal, zo-
als fonologie en syntaxis, de effecten voor de semantische en wereldkennisschendingen 
zouden beïnvloeden. Hiertoe werden zinnen met “omgekeerde spraak” toegevoegd, dat 
wil zeggen, zinnen die achterwaarts afgespeeld werden, en werd de hersenactivatie be-
horend bij deze zinnen vergeleken met die voor correcte zinnen. Een gebrek aan verschil 
tussen de groepen suggereert dat er geen verschillen waren in basale taalverwerkings- 
processen die de resultaten voor wereldkennis en semantische schendingen beïnvloed 
konden hebben.
Het vergelijken van de hersenactivatie van de autisme- en controlegroep wees uit 
dat het type schending een effect had op integratie van de context tijdens taalbegrip. 
Voor de semantische schendingen lieten de resultaten geen verschillen tussen de groepen 
zien in betrokken hersengebieden. Voor wereldkennisschendingen echter vonden we sig-
nificante verschillen tussen de groepen in LIFG en RIFG. In LIFG liet de controlegroep 
voor zinnen met een wereldkennisschending sterkere activatie zien dan de autismegroep. 
Dit effect weerspiegelt mogelijk een verminderd vermogen van de autismegroep om 
context te integreren. De autismegroep was wel gevoelig voor de wereldkennisschend-
ingen, zo bleek uit sterkere LIFG activatie voor de zinnen met wereldkennisschending 
ten opzichte van de correcte zinnen. In RIFG zorgden de wereldkennisschendingen voor 
sterkere activatie in de controlegroep dan in de autismegroep. Deze extra activatie in 
RIFG weerspiegelt mogelijk het herzien van het situation model na het binnenkomen 
van tegenstrijdige informatie. Het gebrek aan RIFG activatie in de autismegroep is mo-
gelijk gerelateerd aan moeite die deze groep heeft met het omgaan met uitzonderingen, 
waartoe ook wereldkennisschendingen gerekend kunnen worden.
Uit de hierboven beschreven fMRI resultaten blijkt dat de aard van de context- 
informatie een belangrijke factor is bij het verklaren van verschillen in het begrijpen 
en interpreteren van taal in autisme. Daarnaast lijken ook problemen met cognitieve 
flexibiliteit en het omgaan met uitzonderingen invloed uit te oefenen op taalverwerking 
in het brein.
In Hoofdstuk 5 gebruikten we de methode diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) om 
de structuur van de witte stof te onderzoeken bij volwassenen met autisme en con-
troleproefpersonen. DTI bevindingen bij volwassenen met autisme zijn relatief schaars. 
DTI studies bij kinderen en adolescenten met ASS hebben afwijkingen in witte stof 
gevonden. Omdat we verwachtten dat de verschillen in de witte stof tussen de autisme- 
en controlegroep diffuus zouden zijn, bekeken we in de analyses het hele brein. We 
vergeleken de groepen op twee DTI maten, te weten ”fractional anisotropy” (FA) en 
”mean diffusivity” (MD). De resultaten lieten geen significante verschillen in FA en MD 
zien tussen de autisme- en controlegroep, wat wijst op de afwezigheid van verschillen 
in witte stof. Deze bevinding komt niet overeen met eerdere resultaten bij kinderen en 
adolescenten. Het ontbreken van een verschil zou verklaard kunnen worden doordat we 
onze analyses op het hele brein uitgevoerd hebben en niet toegespitst hebben op bepaal-
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de hersengebieden, waardoor de effecten groter moeten zijn om significant te worden. 
Daarnaast kan het zijn dat de ontwikkeling van witte stof in autisme zo verloopt dat er 
op jongere leeftijd wel sprake is van afwijkingen, maar dat deze bij het bereiken van de 
volwassenheid niet meer aanwezig zijn. Een speculatieve verklaring voor de verschillen 
is dat, door onderrepresentatie van nulbevindingen in de literatuur, resultaten van af-
wezige witte stofafwijkingen in volwassenen met autisme minder gepubliceerd worden. 
Conclusies
Een belangrijk resultaat uit onze experimenten betreft het effect van het type context 
op de rol van LIFG en RIFG bij het begrijpen van gesproken taal in autisme. We von-
den verschillen in activiteit in deze hersengebieden tussen de controle- en autismegroep 
voor de spreker-identiteitszinnen en de zinnen met een wereldkennisschending. Voor de 
zinnen met semantische schendingen werden geen verschillen in hersenactiviteit gevon-
den tussen de groepen. Deze resultaten laten zien dat het type context dat meegenomen 
moet worden tijdens het begrijpen van taal bepalend is voor het al dan niet optreden van 
verschillen in hersenactiviteit tijdens taalverwerking in autisme. Semantische schendin-
gen zijn relatief linguïstisch van aard, terwijl spreker-identiteits-en wereldkenniszinnen 
meer pragmatische vaardigheden vereisen. Wanneer de complexiteit van de context toe-
neemt of deze meer pragmatisch van aard wordt, dan worden verschillen in onderliggen-
de hersenprocessen van taalbegrip in autisme prominenter. Als de context daarentegen 
meer semantisch van aard is en meer basale taalverwerking vereist, dan verschillen de 
onderliggende hersenprocessen voor zinsbegrip niet tussen de controle- en autismegroep. 
Het idee dat er bij autisme geen verschillen zijn in betrokken hersengebieden voor taal-
begrip op zich wordt verder ondersteund door het ontbreken van verschillen tussen de 
groepen wanneer correcte zinnen en achterwaarts afgespeelde spraak vergeleken worden. 
De meest opmerkelijke verschillen in hersenactivatie tussen de autisme- en con-
trolegroep vonden we in RIFG. We hebben deze bevindingen toegeschreven aan ver-
schillen tussen de groepen in het opbouwen en herzien van verwachtingen over het 
verloop van een zin. In zowel de spreker-incongruente zinnen als de zinnen met een 
wereldkennisschending was binnenkomende informatie tegenstrijdig met de mentale 
representatie die de luisteraar van de spreker of de wereld had. Om goed om te gaan 
met dit conflict moest de luisteraar de representatie aanpassen en de nieuwe tegenstrij-
dige informatie integreren. We stellen dat de geobserveerde verschillen in hersenactivatie 
in RIFG gerelateerd zijn aan meer algemene problemen die mensen met ASS hebben 
met het omgaan met uitzonderingen en met cognitieve flexibiliteit, en die hoogstwaar- 
schijnlijk invloed uitoefenen op het opbouwen en herzien van het situation model. Dit 
idee wordt ondersteund door een studie die laat zien dat mensen met autisme moeite 
hebben met omgaan met uitzonderingen.
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Toekomstige ontwikkelingen
Ondanks dat afgelopen jaren enorme vooruitgang is geboekt in het begrijpen van de 
genetische en neurobiologische basis en ontwikkelingsaspecten van autisme, is er relatief 
weinig bereikt in de zoektocht naar zogenaamde biologische markers, of biomarkers, 
voor autisme. Biomarkers kunnen mogelijk een belangrijke rol spelen bij het aanvul-
len of verbeteren van de op gedragsniveau gestelde diagnose en bij de vroege opsporing 
van autisme. Een van de meest invloedrijke ontwikkelingen bij het begrijpen van au-
tisme is de ontdekking van een sterke genetische component voor autisme geweest die 
voortkwam uit studies bij tweelingen en families. Hoewel onderzoek veel genen heeft 
opgespoord die betrokken zijn bij autisme, is er nog geen specifiek gen geïdentificeerd 
dat autisme veroorzaakt. 
De heterogeniteit van autisme en de overlap met andere stoornissen bemoeilijken 
het vaststellen van biomarkers. Tot dusver heeft onderzoek zich voornamelijk gericht 
op het vinden van biomarkers voor diagnostische categorieën, die gedefinieerd zijn op 
gedragsniveau. Dergelijke criteria gebaseerd op gedrag komen niet noodzakelijk over-
een met de heterogene en complexe oorzaken die aan autisme ten grondslag liggen. De 
meest veelbelovende aanpak voor het vinden van biomarkers ligt dan ook in het com-
bineren van genetische bevindingen, neuroimaging resultaten, klinische informatie en 
gedrags- en cognitieve elementen. Daarnaast moet rekening worden gehouden met het 
feit dat autisme de hele levensloop aanwezig blijft en dat de symptomen ervan verand-
eren met de leeftijd. Bij het definiëren van biomarkers dient dus ook het ontwikkelings-
verloop van de symptomen van autisme meegenomen te worden. Momenteel is het nog 
te vroeg om neurobiologische bevindindingen op te nemen in het classificatie-systeem 
van psychiatrische aandoeningen zoals dat zal verschijnen in de DSM-5. Het is echter 
wenselijk en noodzakelijk dat een dergelijk classificatiesysteem uiteindelijk niet alleen 
gebaseerd is op klinische symptomen, maar ook op de onderliggende mechanismen van 
de stoornissen.
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n 
bi
j d
e 
m
ar
in
e 
be
va
lt 
m
e 
ui
tst
ek
en
d.
14
3
Ik
 m
oe
st 
na
ar
 d
e 
dr
og
ist
 o
m
da
t m
ijn
 m
as
ca
ra
 o
p 
w
as
.
10
4
N
at
uu
rli
jk
 b
en
 ik
 a
ls 
ho
og
le
ra
ar
 o
ok
 v
er
an
tw
oo
rd
el
ijk
 v
oo
r h
et
 b
el
ei
d.
14
4
El
ke
 w
oe
ns
da
g 
ga
 ik
 n
aa
r a
er
ob
ic
s i
n 
de
 sp
or
th
al
.
10
5
Ik
 h
eb
 v
rij
w
el
 a
lti
jd
 e
en
 g
ro
ot
 z
ak
m
es
 in
 m
ijn
 za
k.
14
5
Ik
 h
eb
 a
lti
jd
 w
at
 k
le
in
ge
ld
 in
 m
ijn
 h
an
dt
as
 b
ij 
m
e 
vo
or
 d
e 
bu
s.
10
6
To
en
 ik
 w
er
d 
ge
ro
ep
en
 ze
tte
 ik
 m
ijn
 so
ld
ee
rb
ou
t m
et
ee
n 
ui
t.
14
6
Ik
 w
as
 b
eh
oo
rli
jk
 u
itg
ep
ut
 n
a 
m
ijn
 d
er
de
 b
ev
al
lin
g 
in
 h
et
 zi
ek
en
hu
is.
10
7
D
e 
da
g 
be
gi
nt
 h
et
 m
oo
ist
 a
ls 
ik
 o
p 
m
ijn
 tr
ek
ke
r ’
t l
an
d 
op
 ri
jd
t.
14
7
Ik
 g
a 
al
tij
d 
gr
aa
g 
m
et
 m
ijn
 v
rie
nd
in
 w
in
ke
le
n 
in
 d
e 
sta
d.
10
8
Vr
oe
ge
r w
as
 ik
 e
en
 b
er
oe
m
d 
ha
ck
er
, m
aa
r d
at
 is
 v
er
le
de
n 
tij
d.
14
8
M
ijn
 w
er
k 
bi
j d
e 
cr
èc
he
 b
ev
al
t m
e 
he
el
 g
oe
d.
10
9
Al
s i
k 
in
 d
e V
S 
be
n 
ga
 ik
 a
lti
jd
 n
aa
r h
on
kb
al
 k
ijk
en
.
14
9
Ik
 k
ijk
 e
lk
e 
da
g 
na
ar
 m
ijn
 fa
vo
rie
te
 so
ap
 o
p 
tv
.
11
0
Ik
 w
as
 n
et
 b
ez
ig
 d
e 
vl
oe
r t
e 
le
gg
en
 to
en
 d
e 
be
l g
in
g.
15
0
M
ijn
 li
ev
el
in
gs
pr
og
ra
m
m
a’s
 g
aa
n 
al
tij
d 
ov
er
 m
od
e 
of
 in
te
rie
ur
in
ric
ht
in
g.
11
1
O
p 
sc
ho
ol
 zo
rg
 ik
 a
lti
jd
 v
oo
r d
e 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 e
n 
in
te
rn
et
ve
rb
in
di
ng
en
.
15
1
Ik
 m
oe
st 
na
ar
 d
e 
w
in
ke
l v
oo
r e
en
 d
oo
sje
 ta
m
po
ns
 e
n 
ee
n 
za
k 
ka
tte
ng
rit
.
11
2
O
p 
zo
ld
er
 h
eb
 ik
 e
en
 h
el
e 
ve
rz
am
el
in
g 
tr
ei
ne
n 
sta
an
 in
 g
ro
te
 d
oz
en
.
15
2
Ik
 k
an
 e
ch
t u
re
n 
aa
n 
de
 te
le
fo
on
 zi
tte
n 
m
et
 v
rie
nd
in
ne
n.
11
3
Al
s i
k 
ui
t e
te
n 
ga
, n
ee
m
 ik
 a
lti
jd
 sp
ar
e 
ri
bs
 e
n 
he
t l
ie
fst
 zo
ve
el
 m
og
el
ijk
.
15
3
To
t m
ijn
 o
ng
en
oe
ge
n 
za
t e
r i
n 
m
ijn
 p
an
ty
 e
en
 e
no
rm
e 
la
dd
er
.
11
4
Ik
 k
om
 d
oo
r m
ijn
 w
er
k 
al
s p
ilo
ot
 in
 v
ee
l v
er
sc
hi
lle
nd
e 
la
nd
en
.
15
4
Za
g 
ik
 e
r m
aa
r z
o 
ui
t a
ls 
B
ri
tn
ey
 S
pe
ar
s i
n 
ha
ar
 la
at
ste
 v
id
eo
cl
ip
.
11
5
Al
s i
k 
vr
ij 
be
n,
 g
a 
ik
 v
aa
k 
na
ar
 m
ot
or
cr
os
s i
n 
Za
nd
vo
or
t k
ijk
en
.
15
5
Al
s i
k 
na
ar
 h
et
 st
ra
nd
 g
a 
on
th
aa
r i
k 
m
ijn
 b
en
en
 a
lti
jd
 zo
rg
vu
ld
ig
.
11
6
Ik
 h
eb
 e
en
 g
ro
te
 p
os
te
r v
an
 e
en
 fo
to
m
od
el
 b
ov
en
 m
ijn
 b
ur
ea
u 
ha
ng
en
.
15
6
N
a 
he
t d
ou
ch
en
 p
ak
te
 ik
 m
ijn
 k
ru
lt
an
g 
en
 d
e 
fö
hn
.
11
7
V
la
k 
vo
or
 d
e 
ka
ss
a 
lie
t i
k 
m
ijn
 a
ft
er
sh
av
e 
op
 d
e 
gr
on
d 
va
lle
n.
15
7
Ik
 b
en
 a
l d
rie
 w
ek
en
 a
an
 h
et
 li
jn
en
, m
aa
r h
et
 h
el
pt
 n
ie
t.
11
8
O
m
 m
e 
te
 o
nt
sp
an
ne
n 
ga
 ik
 o
p 
za
te
rd
ag
 re
ge
lm
at
ig
 v
is
se
n 
aa
n 
he
t k
an
aa
l.
15
8
O
p 
m
ijn
 w
er
k 
dr
in
k 
ik
 h
ee
l v
ee
l t
he
e 
m
et
 v
er
sc
hi
lle
nd
e 
sm
aa
kj
es
. 
11
9
Ik
 k
ijk
 h
et
 li
ef
st 
na
ar
 sp
or
t o
p 
tv
.
15
9
O
p 
va
ka
nt
ie
 v
in
d 
ik
 h
et
 v
er
ve
le
nd
 o
m
 o
ng
es
te
ld
 te
 zi
jn
.
12
0
Al
s i
k 
de
 lo
te
rij
 w
in
, k
oo
p 
ik
 m
et
ee
n 
ee
n 
he
le
 d
ur
e 
au
to
 m
et
 a
lle
s e
ro
p 
en
 
er
aa
n.
16
0
Al
s i
k 
na
ar
 h
et
 zw
em
ba
d 
ga
, n
ee
m
 ik
 a
lti
jd
 m
ijn
 b
ad
pa
k 
en
 ‘n
 zw
em
br
ill
et
je
 
m
ee
.
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W
or
ld
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
se
nt
en
ce
s. 
C
rit
ic
al
 w
or
ds
 a
re
 in
di
ca
te
d 
in
 b
ol
d 
an
d 
co
rr
es
po
nd
 to
1
D
e 
sta
d 
Am
ste
rd
am
 is
 h
ee
l g
ro
ot
 / 
kl
ei
n 
/ d
un
 e
n 
m
oo
i.
2
Ee
n 
D
el
fts
 te
ge
ltj
e 
is 
aa
rd
ew
er
k 
da
t b
la
uw
 / 
ro
od
 / 
sn
el
 e
n 
w
it 
is.
3
D
e 
sta
d 
Ve
ne
tië
 h
ee
ft 
he
el
 v
ee
l g
ra
ch
te
n 
/ r
ot
on
de
s /
 c
on
cl
us
ie
s e
n 
m
oo
ie
 
ge
bo
uw
en
.
4
Va
ni
lle
vl
a 
is 
ee
n 
de
ss
er
t d
at
 g
ee
l /
 b
ru
in
 / 
sl
im
 e
n 
zo
et
 is
.
5
Sa
oe
di
-A
ra
bi
ë 
is 
ee
n 
la
nd
 m
et
 v
ee
l s
je
ik
s /
 k
ap
pe
rs
 / 
sp
ie
re
n 
di
e 
aa
n 
de
 o
lie
 
ve
rd
ie
ne
n.
6
Ze
el
an
d 
is 
ee
n 
pr
ov
in
ci
e 
m
et
 v
ee
l s
tr
an
de
n 
/ b
er
ge
n 
/ l
ev
en
s e
n 
w
at
er
.
7
St
am
pp
ot
 is
 e
en
 m
aa
lti
jd
 d
ie
 b
es
ta
at
 u
it 
aa
rd
ap
pe
ls
 / 
ri
js
t /
 c
em
en
t e
n 
gr
oe
nt
en
.
8
H
et
 b
ed
rij
f P
hi
lip
s m
aa
kt
 v
ee
l l
am
pe
n 
/ b
ro
od
je
s /
 a
nt
w
oo
rd
en
 e
n 
tv
’s.
9
Lo
ng
ka
nk
er
 is
 e
en
 k
w
aa
l d
ie
 v
aa
k 
fa
ta
al
 / 
on
sc
hu
ld
ig
 / 
kr
om
 is
.
10
Se
sa
m
str
aa
t i
s e
en
 p
ro
gr
am
m
a 
vo
or
 p
eu
te
rs
 / 
do
kt
er
s /
 b
lo
em
en
 e
n 
 k
le
ut
er
s.
11
D
e 
N
oo
rd
po
ol
 is
 e
en
 g
eb
ie
d 
da
t h
ee
l k
ou
d 
/ w
ar
m
 / 
so
ep
el
 is
.
12
D
e 
Eg
yp
tis
ch
e 
pi
ra
m
id
es
 zi
jn
 b
ou
w
w
er
ke
n 
di
e 
ou
d 
/ n
ie
uw
 / 
sm
ak
el
ijk
 zi
jn
.
13
Tr
ad
iti
on
el
e 
sp
ag
he
tti
 B
ol
og
ne
se
 b
es
ta
at
 u
it 
sp
ag
he
tti
 m
et
 g
eh
ak
t /
 to
ni
jn
 / 
be
ha
ng
 e
n 
to
m
at
en
sa
us
.
14
D
e 
N
ed
er
la
nd
se
 tr
ei
ne
n 
zij
n 
ge
el
 / 
w
it
 / 
zu
ur
 e
n 
bl
au
w.
15
H
ag
el
sla
g 
str
oo
i j
e 
op
 b
es
ch
ui
t /
 sp
ag
he
tt
i /
 la
w
aa
i o
f b
ro
od
.
16
M
az
el
en
 is
 e
en
 zi
ek
te
 d
ie
 v
oo
ra
l k
le
ut
er
s /
 o
ud
er
en
 / 
w
eg
en
 tr
ef
t.
17
N
ed
er
la
nd
 is
 e
en
 la
nd
 m
et
 h
ee
l v
ee
l k
oe
ie
n 
/ t
ijg
er
s /
 m
et
af
or
en
 e
n 
sc
ha
pe
n.
18
Zo
'n
 tw
ee
du
ize
nd
 ja
ar
 g
el
ed
en
 w
er
d 
C
ae
sa
r b
en
oe
m
d 
to
t k
ei
ze
r 
/ b
is
sc
ho
p 
/ 
pi
ng
uï
n 
va
n 
he
t r
om
ei
ns
e 
rij
k.
19
Pi
no
cc
io
 w
as
 e
en
 jo
ng
en
 d
ie
 e
en
 h
el
e 
la
ng
e 
ne
us
 / 
du
im
 / 
m
en
in
g 
ha
d.
20
Si
nt
er
kl
aa
s i
s e
en
 m
an
 d
ie
 h
ee
l g
ul
 / 
ch
ag
ri
jn
ig
 / 
ho
bb
el
ig
 is
.
21
Lu
xe
m
bu
rg
 is
 e
en
 la
nd
 d
at
 h
ee
l k
le
in
 / 
gr
oo
t /
 h
ar
ig
 is
.
22
N
ijn
tje
 is
 e
en
 w
it 
ko
ni
jn
 / 
sc
ha
ap
 / 
id
ee
 m
et
 la
ng
e 
or
en
.
23
In
 d
e 
H
em
a 
ko
op
 je
 v
oo
ra
l o
nd
er
go
ed
 / 
gr
oe
nt
e 
/ d
ro
m
en
 e
n 
be
dd
en
go
ed
.
24
D
e 
R
ijn
 lo
op
t d
oo
r N
ed
er
la
nd
 e
n 
ko
m
t i
n 
de
 N
oo
rd
ze
e 
/ W
ad
de
nz
ee
 / 
be
ro
er
te
 u
it.
25
Pi
no
 h
ee
ft 
ve
re
n 
di
e 
bl
au
w
 / 
gr
oe
n 
/ d
oo
f z
ijn
 e
n 
ee
n 
sn
av
el
 d
ie
 o
ra
nj
e 
is.
26
Ro
od
ka
pj
e 
w
or
dt
 o
pg
eg
et
en
 d
oo
r e
en
 w
ol
f /
 a
ap
 / 
zo
n 
en
 g
er
ed
 d
oo
r d
e 
ja
ge
r.
27
M
et
 S
in
te
rk
la
as
 sn
oe
pe
n 
ve
el
 k
in
de
re
n 
va
n 
hu
n 
le
tte
r v
an
 c
ho
co
la
 / 
ko
ek
je
s /
 
m
is
t e
n 
pe
pe
rn
ot
en
.
28
D
e 
M
ar
lb
or
o 
co
w
bo
y 
ro
ok
t a
lti
jd
 e
en
 si
ga
re
t /
 p
ijp
 / 
ta
fe
l o
p 
zij
n 
pa
ar
d.
29
O
m
o 
is 
ee
n 
be
ke
nd
 w
as
m
id
de
l v
oo
r k
le
re
n 
/ a
ut
o’
s /
 ta
le
n 
en
 la
ke
ns
.
30
In
 d
e 
sp
or
tw
er
el
d 
is 
Jo
ha
n 
C
ru
ijf
 e
en
 b
ek
en
de
 v
oe
tb
al
le
r 
/ t
en
ni
ss
er
 / 
st
ilt
e 
en
 
tr
ai
ne
r.
31
D
e 
se
rie
 B
ay
w
at
ch
 sp
ee
lt 
op
 e
en
 st
ra
nd
 / 
pl
ei
n 
/ r
aa
m
 in
 A
m
er
ik
a.
32
An
dr
é 
H
az
es
 is
 b
er
oe
m
d 
ge
w
or
de
n 
do
or
 zi
jn
 li
ed
je
s /
 re
ce
pt
en
 / 
da
ge
n 
en
 zi
jn
 
op
tre
de
ns
.
33
Aj
ax
 is
 e
en
 la
nd
el
ijk
e 
cl
ub
 / 
kr
an
t /
 w
ra
t d
ie
 in
 A
m
ste
rd
am
 sp
ee
lt.
co
rr
ec
t s
en
te
nc
es
, w
or
ld
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 se
m
an
tic
 v
io
la
tio
ns
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
34
Po
pe
ye
 w
or
dt
 h
ee
l s
te
rk
 v
an
 h
et
 e
te
n 
va
n 
sp
in
az
ie
 / 
ap
pe
lm
oe
s /
 b
en
zi
ne
 u
it 
bl
ik
.
35
In
 h
et
 sp
ro
ok
je
 m
oe
t D
oo
rn
ro
os
je
 h
on
de
rd
 ja
ar
 sl
ap
en
 / 
re
iz
en
 / 
ro
es
te
n 
na
 
ee
n 
to
ve
rs
pr
eu
k.
36
As
se
po
es
te
r v
er
lie
st 
ha
ar
 g
la
ze
n 
m
ui
lt
je
 / 
ke
tt
in
g 
/ g
el
ui
d 
op
 w
eg
 n
aa
r h
ui
s.
37
Ja
n-
Pe
te
r B
al
ke
ne
nd
e 
is 
ee
n 
po
lit
ic
us
 e
n 
hi
j i
s d
e 
pr
em
ie
r 
/ k
on
in
g 
/ v
is
 v
an
 
N
ed
er
la
nd
.
38
Be
et
ho
ve
n 
co
m
po
ne
er
de
 o
oi
t m
uz
ie
k 
vo
or
 p
ia
no
 / 
tr
om
pe
t /
 b
ri
ev
en
 e
n 
vi
oo
l.
39
D
e 
w
er
el
da
tla
s b
ev
at
 v
an
 ie
de
r l
an
d 
ee
n 
ka
ar
t /
 sc
hi
ld
er
ij 
/ b
oe
te
 e
n 
w
at
 
in
fo
rm
at
ie
.
40
W
in
ni
e 
de
 P
oe
h 
sn
oe
pt
 h
et
 li
ef
st 
ho
ni
ng
 / 
ka
as
 / 
be
to
n 
ui
t e
en
 p
ot
.
41
In
 1
96
9 
ze
tte
 e
en
 A
m
er
ik
aa
ns
e 
as
tr
on
au
t /
 sl
ag
er
 / 
th
ee
po
t a
ls 
ee
rs
te
 v
oe
t o
p 
de
 m
aa
n.
42
D
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 k
eu
ke
n 
ge
br
ui
kt
 in
 b
ijn
a 
al
le
 g
er
ec
ht
en
 ri
js
t /
 z
uu
rk
oo
l /
 g
el
uk
 o
f 
no
ed
el
s.
43
In
 F
ra
nk
rij
k 
dr
in
kt
 m
en
 b
ij 
he
t e
te
n 
al
tij
d 
w
ijn
 / 
co
la
 / 
vr
ed
e 
en
 w
at
er
.
44
Vo
or
 d
e 
op
er
at
ie
 w
as
te
 d
e 
do
kt
er
 zi
jn
 h
an
de
n 
/ v
oe
te
n 
/ l
on
ge
n 
m
et
 ze
ep
.
45
M
ou
nt
 E
ve
re
st 
is 
ee
n 
be
rg
 d
ie
 h
ee
l h
oo
g 
/ k
le
in
 / 
de
m
en
t i
s.
46
D
e 
Sa
ha
ra
 is
 e
en
 p
la
at
s d
ie
 h
ee
l d
ro
og
 / 
na
t /
 a
ai
ba
ar
 e
n 
he
et
 is
.
47
In
 N
ed
er
la
nd
 b
et
aa
lt 
m
en
 si
nd
s 2
00
1 
m
et
 d
e 
eu
ro
 / 
do
lla
r 
/ s
ne
eu
w
 v
oo
r z
ijn
 
bo
od
sc
ha
pp
en
.
48
D
e 
G
ou
de
n 
G
id
s i
s h
an
di
g 
vo
or
 h
et
 v
in
de
n 
va
n 
ad
re
ss
en
 / 
bu
st
ijd
en
 / 
bu
ie
n 
en
 n
am
en
.
49
Ve
el
 m
en
se
n 
ko
pe
n 
bi
ol
og
isc
he
 g
ro
en
te
n 
om
da
t d
ie
 g
ez
on
d 
/ o
ud
 / 
bo
os
 zi
jn
 
en
 le
kk
er
 sm
ak
en
.
50
Ik
ea
 is
 e
en
 w
ar
en
hu
is 
m
et
 v
ee
l m
eu
be
ls
 / 
kl
ed
in
g 
/ s
ec
on
de
n 
en
 a
nd
er
e 
di
ng
en
 v
oo
r h
et
 in
te
rie
ur
.
51
D
e 
m
ee
ste
 N
ed
er
la
nd
er
s s
pr
ek
en
 n
aa
st 
N
ed
er
la
nd
s o
ok
 E
ng
el
s /
 Z
w
ee
ds
 / 
gr
as
 
of
 D
ui
ts.
52
D
ui
tse
 g
lü
hw
ei
n 
is 
ee
n 
w
ar
m
e 
dr
an
k 
/ k
oe
k 
/ l
es
 d
ie
 je
 's
 w
in
te
rs
 n
ut
tig
t.
53
Sn
oo
py
 is
 e
en
 c
ar
to
on
 v
an
 e
en
 w
itt
e 
ho
nd
 / 
ra
t /
 a
an
va
l d
ie
 v
ee
l v
rie
nd
en
 
he
ef
t.
54
D
e 
Sm
ur
fe
n 
zij
n 
kl
ei
ne
 b
la
uw
e 
w
ez
en
s /
 b
er
en
 / 
ke
uz
es
 d
ie
 sa
m
en
 in
 e
en
 d
or
p 
w
on
en
.
55
Ve
rg
el
ek
en
 m
et
 e
en
 g
ul
de
n 
w
as
 e
en
 k
w
ar
tje
 k
le
in
er
 / 
gr
ot
er
 / 
lie
ve
r e
n 
m
in
de
r 
w
aa
rd
.
56
D
e 
m
ee
ste
 m
en
se
n 
in
 S
pa
nj
e 
vi
nd
en
 e
en
 si
ës
ta
 h
ee
l n
or
m
aa
l /
 v
re
em
d 
/ p
aa
rs
 
en
 p
le
zie
rig
.
57
Si
gm
un
d 
Fr
eu
d 
is 
be
ke
nd
 a
ls 
ps
yc
hi
at
er
 / 
vo
et
ba
lle
r 
/ k
au
w
go
m
 in
 W
en
en
.
58
D
e 
ra
m
p 
in
 T
sje
rn
ob
ie
l k
w
am
 d
oo
r e
en
 e
xp
lo
si
e 
/ b
om
aa
ns
la
g 
/ k
le
ur
 in
 
19
86
.
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W
or
ld
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
se
nt
en
ce
s (
co
nt
in
ue
d)
.
59
Jo
ze
f S
ta
lin
 w
as
 e
en
 ze
er
 in
vl
oe
dr
ijk
e 
di
ct
at
or
 / 
m
us
ic
us
 / 
on
tp
lo
ffi
ng
 in
 d
e 
tw
in
tig
ste
 e
eu
w.
60
K
on
in
gi
n 
Be
at
rix
 is
 e
en
 v
ro
uw
 d
ie
 ze
er
 ri
jk
 / 
jo
ng
 / 
vl
oe
ib
aa
r i
s e
n 
ve
el
 re
ist
.
61
Ve
ga
ni
ste
n 
dr
ag
en
 n
oo
it 
sc
ho
en
en
 v
an
 le
er
 / 
pl
as
ti
c 
/ z
an
d 
of
 b
on
t.
62
O
ud
e 
ka
as
 sm
aa
kt
 h
ee
l e
rg
 p
it
ti
g 
/ z
uu
r 
/ l
ila
 e
n 
zo
ut
.
63
H
ar
in
g 
is 
ee
n 
vi
s d
ie
 je
 v
in
dt
 in
 w
at
er
 d
at
 z
ou
t /
 z
oe
t /
 d
ro
og
 is
 zo
al
s i
n 
de
 
N
oo
rd
ze
e.
64
D
e 
zie
kt
e 
BS
E 
be
sm
et
 k
oe
ie
n 
/ b
om
en
 / 
vl
ag
ge
n 
en
 k
an
 o
ve
rg
aa
n 
op
 m
en
se
n.
65
C
ho
co
la
de
re
pe
n 
be
va
tte
n 
ve
el
 c
al
or
ie
ën
 / 
vi
ta
m
in
en
 / 
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Dankwoord
En toen... was het af! Op het meest populaire onderdeel van dit proefschrift na dan. 
Dankwoord-cliché, maar oh zo waar: als ik het alleen had moeten doen dan was dit 
boekje er niet gekomen. Een woord van dank voor iedereen die mij op al dan niet weten-
schappelijke wijze heeft ondersteund is dus zeker op zijn plaats. 
Allereerst wil ik alle deelnemers aan het onderzoek bedanken, alsook de ouders 
van de deelnemers met autisme, die belangeloos veel unieke informatie met mij gedeeld 
hebben. 
Vervolgens mijn promotoren. Peter, dank je voor je kritische blik en de vrijheid 
die je me bij het doen van mijn onderzoek hebt gegeven. Het was prettig dat ik op de 
belangrijke momenten op je standvastigheid kon rekenen. Jan, bedankt voor je toegan-
kelijkheid en bereikbaarheid. Of ik je nou een eenvoudige vraag of een paper stuurde, je 
was altijd bereid om mee te denken en ik kon rekenen op een snelle reactie.
Co-auteurs, bedankt voor jullie bijdrage aan de papers in dit proefschrift. Indira, 
jouw hulp kwam op een belangrijk moment in mijn project en je concrete, heldere ma-
nier van commentaar geven heeft me erg geholpen bij het schrijven. Jan-Pieter, bedankt 
voor je hulp bij het includeren van proefpersonen en het kritisch meedenken. Rutger 
Jan, je enthousiaste, spontane mails als er een paper af of geaccepteerd was werkten mo-
tiverend en je hebt me kennis laten maken met vele kanten van autisme.
Judith, het was erg prettig om met je samen te werken. Niet alleen was het fijn om 
samen op pad te gaan voor het afnemen van ADI’s, maar we vulden elkaar ook goed aan 
en dat heeft geholpen om mijn project op lastige momenten vlot te trekken. 
Guido, gezellig dat je in allerlei opzichten met mij op en neer pendelde tussen 
het Donders en Psychiatrie. Dank voor alle momenten waarop je tijd had of maakte 
voor vragen over analyses, het relativeren van commentaar van reviewers en voor de zeer 
essentiële koffiemomenten.
Tildie, Arthur, Sandra, Bram, Erik en Marek, de meer praktische en onmisbare 
ondersteuning die jullie boden ging vaak samen met een persoonlijk praatje en maakte 
het doen van onderzoek veel aangenamer!
Paul, tijdens scansessies liepen serieuze en minder serieuze gesprekken naadloos 
in elkaar over en jij wist scannen tot een zeer gezellige (en indien nodig ook opbeurende) 
bezigheid te maken. 
Onderzoekscollega’s van psychiatrie: Armand, Arnt, Elke, Gerard, Glenn, Karin, 
Maaike, Martine, Pieter, en alle anderen, dank voor de gezellige borrels met Brabantse 
onnozelheden, Sinterklaas vieren, bowlen en tal van andere bezigheden. 
Maaike, Karin en Martine, het is lachen, huilen en genieten geblazen tijdens de 
ladies nights en hopelijk houden we de vuurwerktraditie in ere (ongeacht of er vuurwerk 
de lucht in gaat). Maaike, onze mailwisselingen over alle belangrijke en onbelangrijke 
dingen in het leven waren onmisbaar voor het op peil houden van de kwaliteit van 
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werken. Ik geniet van onze etentjes waarbij de spreek- en luistersnelheid vaak hoog 
oplopen.
Collega’s van het eerste tot laatste Donders-uur, kamergenoten, PhD students van 
de neurocognition group, allemaal veel dank voor de gezelligheid bij het koffiezetappa-
raat of de lunch, de nuttige meetings, (spontane) borrels, spelletjesavonden en sportieve 
activiteiten variërend van Batavierenrace tot wekelijks BOM-uurtje! Ondanks dat ik 
vast en zeker mensen vergeet (waarvoor sorry!), extra dank aan Carinne, Floris, Guido, 
Hanneke, Jan Mathijs, Joost, Judith, Maaike, Marieke, Mark, Markus, Martine, Miriam, 
Nienke, Nina, Roel, Tessa, Tineke, Valesca.
Dames van De Rode Bank: Nienke, Miriam, Tineke, Tessa en Hanneke, bedankt 
voor de broodnodige “herstelmomenten” op die prachtige bank met (schijnbaar) gene-
zende krachten! Heerlijk dat een mailtje met “nu?” of “pffff!” volstond als teken om 
samen een kop thee te drinken en dat verdere uitleg of aantoonbare reden overbodig 
waren.
Tineke, dank voor alle wijze (onderzoeks)raad. Het was een bijzondere belevenis 
om samen met jou op congres in Florence in het hol van de leeuwin ons “eerste echte 
praatje” te houden. De Bagels & Beans-dagen afgelopen jaar waren gezellig, maar zeker 
ook bevorderend voor de laatste schrijfsels voor mijn proefschrift. Ik ben blij dat ons 
contact niet opgehouden is na mijn vertrek van het Donders, maar zich juist heeft uit-
gebreid met meer etentjes en, later ook, speelafspraakjes!
Miriam, ik kan (bijna) geen onderwerp bedenken waarover we live of via de mail 
nog geen ervaringen of gedachten hebben uitgewisseld! We hadden en hebben zoveel 
te bespreken dat uitwijken naar borrels en etentjes buiten werktijd (gelukkig) onver-
mijdelijk was. Ik ben blij dat we hiervoor nog steeds de tijd kunnen vinden en de stroom 
aan gespreksonderwerpen lijkt voorlopig nog niet op te drogen. Wanneer beginnen we 
aan ons boek?
Marjolijn, we leerden elkaar kennen op het Donders, maar hadden de weten-
schap gelukkig niet nodig om vriendinnen te blijven!
Carolijn, wat bijzonder dat we al zo lang vriendinnen zijn en al jaaaaren ups en 
downs delen. Hopelijk gaan we hier nog heel lang mee door, minstens totdat we “echt” 
oud zijn! 
Mirjam, Sander en Thijs, ik geniet al meer dan vijftien jaar van onze unieke 
vriendschap! We kennen elkaar door en door en hebben veel fijne, hilarische, maar ook 
verdrietige momenten met elkaar gedeeld. Mijn proefschriftperikelen waren voor jullie 
misschien niet altijd goed te volgen, maar het hielp me enorm om ze met jullie te kun-
nen delen. Ik hoop dat we samen nog veel moois gaan meemaken en dat er nog veel 
avonden met lekker eten, goede wijn en bijzondere gesprekken volgen! Arno, leuk dat 
je er sinds kort ook bij bent. 
Marianne en Peter, dank voor jullie interesse en voor de ontspannende momen- 
ten in Maastricht, La Sauvin of Nijmegen.
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Marieke en Joost, gezellig dat jullie ons gezin zijn komen versterken! “Aanhang” is 
op jullie niet van toepassing, want jullie horen er helemaal bij. Dank voor het meeleven 
bij hoogte- en dieptepunten van mijn onderzoek! 
Susanne, wat ben ik blij met een zus(je) zoals jij! Alles kunnen we delen en woor-
den zijn vaak overbodig om te weten wat de ander bedoelt. Nieuwtjes raad jij al voordat 
ik één woord heb kunnen zeggen. Sebas, grote vriendelijke broer, jij beheerst de kunst 
van het relativeren tot in de puntjes en weet me te laten lachen met je droge humor. 
Het was bijzonder om mijn laatste proefschriftloodjes te combineren met jouw eerste 
promotiestappen.
Papa en mama, waar te beginnen met jullie bedanken of eigenlijk waar op te 
houden... Dit proefschrift is voor jullie! Allereerst, dank voor het op Eline passen zodat 
ik mijn handen en hoofd vrij had om dit proefschrift af te ronden. Maar vooral, dank 
dat jullie er altijd voor mij zijn en me geleerd hebben op mezelf te vertrouwen en mijn 
eigen weg te bewandelen, ook als ik hierbij afwijk van “hoe het hoort”. 
Eline, het blijft genieten om met jou je enthousiasme en verwondering over de 
wereld om je heen te beleven. Ik hoop dat we nog veel ontdekkingen met “oh” en “hee” 
momenten mogen delen en elkaar aan het lachen blijven maken.
En tot slot, lieve Pieter, zonder jouw aanhoudende aanmoedigingen, optimisme 
en hulp was dit proefschrift er zeker niet gekomen! Het valt niet in woorden te vangen 
hoe gelukkig het me maakt dat jij bent zoals je bent en dat wij samen zijn zoals we zijn. 
Laten we dit volhouden en hier van genieten, helemaal nu er een proefschriftvrij tijdperk 
aanbreekt!
Dank jullie wel!
Cathelijne
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Peter Hagoort. After finishing her doctoral degrees in 2002 and 2003 she began the 
Ph.D. project described in this thesis, which concerned a collaboration between the De-
partment of Psychiatry (Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre) and Donders 
Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging. In 2008 she started as a neuropsychologist at Sint 
Marie (now Kentalis), working with children with speech and language impairments. In 
2009 she switched to Centrum Autisme Volwassenen of the GGz Eindhoven where she 
worked on the diagnosis and treatment of autism in adults until 2011. Since 2012 she 
does neuropsychological assessment and treatment of children and adolescents at Para-
chute Kinder- & Jeugdpsychiatrie. Cathelijne is married to Pieter Buur. Together they 
have a daughter and are expecting their second child.
150 | Curriculum vitae
List of publications
Spek, A. A., Teunisse, J-P., Tesink, C. M., Mol, A. J., & Noens, I. L. (2012). (Neuro)
psychologisch onderzoek bij volwassenen met ASS en een (boven)gemiddelde 
intelligentie. In C. Kan, W. Verbeeck, & A. Bartels (Red.), Diagnostiek van autis-
mespectrumstoornissen bij volwassenen (pp. 163-182). Amsterdam: Hogrefe Uitgevers.
Van den Brink, D., Van Berkum, J. J., Bastiaansen, M. C., Tesink, C. M., Kos, M., 
Buitelaar, J. K., & Hagoort, P. (2012). Empathy matters: ERP evidence for inter-
individual differences in social language processing. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 7, 173-183.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Buitelaar, J. K., Petersson, K. M., Van der Gaag, R. J., Teunisse, 
J-P., & Hagoort, P. (2011). Neural correlates of language comprehension in autism 
spectrum disorders: When language conflicts with world knowledge. Neuropsycholo-
gia, 49, 1095-1104.
Spek, A., Teunisse, J-P., Tesink, C., Mol, A., & Noens, I. (2010). (Neuro)psycholo-
gisch onderzoek bij volwassenen met een autismespectrumstoornis en een (boven)
gemiddelde intelligentie. De Psycholoog, juni 2010, 44-56.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Buitelaar, J. K., Petersson, K. M., Van der Gaag, R. J., Kan, C. C., 
Tendolkar, I., & Hagoort, P. (2009). Neural correlates of pragmatic language com-
prehension in autism spectrum disorders. Brain, 132, 1941-1952.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Petersson, K. M., Van Berkum, J. J. A., Van den Brink, D., Bui-
telaar, J. K., & Hagoort, P. (2009). Unification of speaker and meaning in language 
comprehension: an fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, 2085-2099.
Van Berkum, J. J. A., Van den Brink, D., Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Kos, M., & Hagoort, P. 
(2008). The neural integration of speaker and message. Journal of Cognitive Neuro-
science, 20, 580-591.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., & Maassen, B. (2004). De ontwikkeling van spraakmotorische 
controle I: Modellen. Stem-, Spraak-, & Taalpathologie, 2, 69-82.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., & Maassen, B. (2004). De ontwikkeling van spraakmotorische 
controle II: Vroege spraakproductie in relatie tot spraakperceptie. Stem-, Spraak-, & 
Taalpathologie, 2, 83-104.
Vingerhoets, G., Van Borsel, J., Tesink, C., Van den Noort, M., Deblaere, K., Seu-
rinck, R., Vandemaele, P., & Achten, E. (2003). Multilingualism: an fMRI study. 
NeuroImage, 20, 2181-2196.
List of publications | 151
1. van Aalderen-Smeets, S.I. (2007). Neural dynamics of visual selection. Maastricht University, 
Maastricht, the Netherlands.
2. Schoffelen, J.M. (2007). Neuronal communication through coherence in the human motor 
system. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
3. de Lange, F.P. (2008). Neural mechanisms of motor imagery. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
4. Grol, M.J. (2008). Parieto-frontal circuitry in visuomotor control. Utrecht University, 
Utrecht, the Netherlands.
5. Bauer, M. (2008). Functional roles of rhythmic neuronal activity in the human visual and 
somatosensory system. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
6. Mazaheri, A. (2008). The Influence of Ongoing Oscillatory Brain Activity on Evoked Responses 
and Behaviour. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
7. Hooijmans, C.R. (2008). Impact of nutritional lipids and vascular factors in Alzheimer’s 
Disease. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
8. Gaszner, B. (2008). Plastic responses to stress by the rodent urocortinergic Edinger-Westphal 
nucleus. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
9. Willems, R.M. (2009). Neural reflections of meaning in gesture, language and action. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
10. van Pelt, S. (2009). Dynamic neural representations of human visuomotor space. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
11. Lommertzen, J. (2009). Visuomotor coupling at different levels of complexity. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
12. Poljac, E. (2009). Dynamics of cognitive control in task switching: Looking beyond the switch 
cost. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
13. Poser, B.A. (2009). Techniques for BOLD and blood volume weighted fMRI. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
14. Baggio, G. (2009). Semantics and the electrophysiology of meaning. Tense, aspect, event 
structure. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
15. van Wingen, G.A. (2009). Biological determinants of amygdala functioning. Radboud 
University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
16. Bakker, M. (2009). Supraspinal control of walking: lessons from motor imagery. Radboud 
University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
17. Aarts, E. (2009). Resisting temptation: the role of the anterior cingulate cortex in adjusting 
cognitive control. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
18. Prinz, S. (2009). Waterbath stunning of chickens – Effects of electrical parameters on the 
electroencephalogram and physical reflexes of broilers. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
19. Knippenberg, J.M.J. (2009). The N150 of the Auditory Evoked Potential from the rat 
amygdala: In search for its functional significance. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands. 
20. Dumont, G.J.H. (2009). Cognitive and physiological effects of 
3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or ’ecstasy’) in combination with alcohol or 
cannabis in humans Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
21. Pijnacker, J. (2010). Defeasible inference in autism: a behavioral and electrophysiogical 
approach. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
22. de Vrijer, M. (2010). Multisensory integration in spatial orientation. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
23. Vergeer, M. (2010). Perceptual visibility and appearance: Effects of color and form. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
24. Levy, J. (2010). In Cerebro Unveiling Unconscious Mechanisms during Reading. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
152 | Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience Series
Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience Series | 153
25. Treder, M. S. (2010). Symmetry in (inter)action. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands.
26. Horlings C.G.C. (2010). A Weak balance; balance and falls in patients with neuromuscular 
disorders. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
27. Snaphaan, L.J.A.E. (2010). Epidemiology of post-stroke behavioural consequences. Radboud 
University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.  
28. Dado – Van Beek, H.E.A. (2010). The regulation of cerebral perfusion in patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.  
29. Derks, N.M. (2010). The role of the non-preganglionic Edinger-Westphal nucleus in sex-
dependent stress adaptation in rodents. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
30. Wyczesany, M. (2010). Covariation of mood and brain activity. Integration of subjective self-
report data with quantitative EEG measures. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
31. Beurze S.M. (2010). Cortical mechanisms for reach planning. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
32. van Dijk, J.P. (2010). On the Number of Motor Units. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
33. Lapatki, B.G. (2010). The Facial Musculature – Characterization at a Motor Unit Level. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
34. Kok, P. (2010). Word Order and Verb Inflection in Agrammatic Sentence Production. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
35. van Elk, M. (2010). Action semantics: Functional and neural dynamics. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
36. Majdandzic, J. (2010). Cerebral mechanisms of processing action goals in self and others. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.  
37. Snijders, T.M. (2010). More than words – neural and genetic dynamics of syntactic 
unification. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
38. Grootens, K.P. (2010). Cognitive dysfunction and effects of antipsychotics in schizophrenia 
and borderline personality disorder. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
39. Nieuwenhuis, I.L.C. (2010). Memory consolidation: A process of integration – Converging 
evidence from MEG, fMRI and behavior. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
40. Menenti, L.M.E. (2010). The right language: differential hemispheric contributions 
to language production and comprehension in context. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
41. van Dijk, H.P. (2010). The state of the brain, how alpha oscillations shape behaviour and 
event related responses. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
42. Meulenbroek, O.V. (2010). Neural correlates of episodic memory in healthy aging and 
Alzheimer’s disease.  Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
43. Oude Nijhuis, L.B. (2010). Modulation of human balance reactions. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
44. Qin, S. (2010). Adaptive memory: imaging medial temporal and prefrontal memory systems. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
45. Timmer, N.M. (2011). The interaction of heparan sulfate proteoglycans with the amyloid β 
protein. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
46. Crajé, C. (2011). (A)typical motor planning and motor imagery. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
47. van Grootel, T.J. (2011). On the role of eye and head position in spatial localisation behaviour. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
154 | Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience Series
48. Lamers, M.J.M. (2011). Levels of selective attention in action planning. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
49. Van der Werf, J. (2011). Cortical oscillatory activity in human visuomotor integration. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
50. Scheeringa, R. (2011). On the relation between oscillatory EEG activity and the BOLD signal. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
51. Bögels, S. (2011). The role of prosody in language comprehension: when prosodic breaks and 
pitch accents come into play. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
52. Ossewaarde, L. (2011). The mood cycle: hormonal influences on the female brain. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
53. Kuribara, M. (2011). Environment-induced activation and growth of pituitary melanotrope 
cells of Xenopus laevis. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
54. Helmich, R.C.G. (2011). Cerebral reorganization in Parkinson’s disease. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
55. Boelen, D. (2011). Order out of chaos? Assessment and treatment of executive disorders in 
brain-injured patients. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
56. Koopmans, P.J. (2011). fMRI of cortical layers. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands.
57. van der Linden, M.H. (2011). Experience-based cortical plasticity in object category 
representation. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
58. Kleine, B.U. (2011). Motor unit discharges - Physiological and diagnostic studies in ALS. 
Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
59. Paulus, M. (2011). Development of action perception: Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying 
children’s processing of others’ actions. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
60. Tieleman, A.A. (2011). Myotonic dystrophy type 2. A newly diagnosed disease in the 
Netherlands. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
61. van Leeuwen, T.M. (2011). ‘How one can see what is not there’: Neural mechanisms of 
grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
62. van Tilborg, I.A.D.A. (2011). Procedural learning in cognitively impaired patients and its 
application in clinical practice. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
63. Bruinsma, I.B. (2011). Amyloidogenic proteins in Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease: 
interaction with chaperones and inflammation. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands.
64. Voermans, N. (2011). Neuromuscular features of Ehlers-Danlos syndrome and Marfan 
syndrome; expanding the phenotype of inherited connective tissue disorders and investigating 
the role of the extracellular matrix in muscle. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
65. Reelick, M. (2011). One step at a time. Disentangling the complexity of preventing falls 
in frail older persons. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands. 
66. Buur, P.F. (2011). Imaging in motion. Applications of multi-echo fMRI. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
67. Schaefer, R.S. (2011). Measuring the mind’s ear: EEG of music imagery. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
68. Xu, L. (2011). The non-preganglionic Edinger-Westphal nucleus: an integration center 
for energy balance and stress adaptation. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
69. Schellekens, A.F.A.  (2011). Gene-environment interaction and intermediate phenotypes in 
alcohol dependence. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience Series | 155
70. van Marle, H.J.F. (2011). The amygdala on alert: A neuroimaging investigation into 
amygdala function during acute stress and its aftermath. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
71. De Laat, K.F. (2011). Motor performance in individuals with cerebral small vessel disease: an 
MRI study. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
72. Mädebach, A. (2011). Lexical access in speaking: Studies on lexical selection and cascading 
activation. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
73. Poelmans, G.J.V. (2011). Genes and protein networks for neurodevelopmental disorders. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
74. van Norden, A.G.W. (2011). Cognitive function in elderly individuals with cerebral small 
vessel disease. An MRI study. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
75. Jansen, E.J.R. (2011). New insights into V-ATPase functioning: the role of its accessory subunit 
Ac45 and a novel brain-specific Ac45 paralog. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
76. Haaxma, C.A. (2011). New perspectives on preclinical and early stage Parkinson’s disease. 
Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
77. Haegens, S. (2012). On the functional role of oscillatory neuronal activity in the somatosensory 
system. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
78. van Barneveld, D.C.P.B.M. (2012). Integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive cues in 
spatial localization. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
79. Spies, P.E. (2012). The reflection of Alzheimer disease in CSF. Radboud University Nijmegen 
Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
80. Helle, M. (2012). Artery-specific perfusion measurements in the cerebral vasculature by 
magnetic resonance imaging. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
81. Egetemeir, J. (2012). Neural correlates of real-life joint action. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
82. Janssen, L. (2012). Planning and execution of (bi)manual grasping. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
83. Vermeer, S. (2012). Clinical and genetic characterisation of Autosomal Recessive Cerebellar 
Ataxias. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
84. Vrins, S. (2012). Shaping object boundaries: contextual effects in infants and adults. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
85. Weber, K.M. (2012). The language learning brain: Evidence from second language and 
bilingual studies of syntactic processing. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands.
86. Verhagen, L. (2012). How to grasp a ripe tomato. Utrecht University, Utrecht, the 
Netherlands.
87. Nonkes, L.J.P. (2012). Serotonin transporter gene variance causes individual differences in 
rat behaviour: for better and for worse. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
88. Joosten-Weyn Banningh, L.W.A. (2012). Learning to live with Mild Cognitive Impairment: 
development and evaluation of a psychological intervention for patients with Mild Cognitive 
Impairment and their significant others. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
89. Xiang, HD. (2012). The language networks of the brain. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands
90. Snijders, A.H. (2012). Tackling freezing of gait in Parkinson’s disease. Radboud University 
Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
91. Rouwette, T.P.H. (2012). Neuropathic Pain and the Brain - Differential involvement of 
corticotropin-releasing factor and urocortin 1 in acute and chronic pain processing. Radboud 
University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
156 | Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience Series
92. van de Meerendonk, N. (2012). States of indecision in the brain: Electrophysiological and 
hemodynamic reflections of monitoring in visual language perception. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
93. Sterrenburg, A. (2012). The stress response of forebrain and midbrain regions: neuropeptides, 
sex-specificity and epigenetics. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
94. Uithol, S. (2012). Representing Action and Intention. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
95. van Dam, W.O.  (2012). On the specificity and flexibility of embodied lexical-semantic 
representations. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
96. Slats, D. (2012).  CSF biomarkers of Alzheimer’s disease; serial sampling analysis and the 
study of circadian rhythmicity. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands.
97. Van Nuenen, B.F.L. (2012). Cerebral reorganization in premotor parkinsonism. Radboud 
University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
98. Van Schouwenburg, M.R. (2012). Fronto-striatal mechanisms of attentional control. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
99. Azar, M.G. (2012). On the theory of reinforcement learning: methods, convergence analysis 
and sample complexity. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
100. Meeuwissen, E.B. (2012). Cortical oscillatory activity during memory formation. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
101. Arnold, J.F. (2013). When mood meets memory: neural and behavioral perspectives on 
emotional memory in health and depression. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands.
102. Gons, R.A.R. (2013). Vascular risk factors in cerebral small vessel disease: a diffusion tensor 
imaging study. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
103. Wingbermühle, E. (2013). Cognition and emotion in adults with Noonan syndrome: A 
neuropsychological perspective. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
104. Walentowska, W. (2012). Facing emotional faces. The nature of automaticity of facial emotion 
processing studied with ERPs. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
105. Hoogman, M. (2013). Imaging the effects of ADHD risk genes. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
106. Tramper, J. J. (2013). Feedforward and feedback mechanisms in sensory motor control. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
107. Van Eijndhoven, P. (2012). State and trait characteristics of early course major depressive 
disorder. Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
108. Visser, E. (2013). Leaves and forests: Low level sound processing and methods for the large-scale 
analysis of white matter structure in autism. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands.
109. Van Tooren-Hoogenboom, N. (2013). Neuronal Communication in the Synchronized Brain. 
Investigating the functional role of visually-induced gamma band activity: lessons from MEG. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
110. Henckens, M.J.A.G. (2013). Imaging the stressed brain. Elucidating the time- and region-
specific effects of stress hormones on brain function; a translational approach. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
111. Van Kesteren, M.T.R. (2013). Schemas in the brain: Influences of prior knowledge on learning, 
memory, and education. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
112. Brenders, P. (2012). Cross-Language Interactions in Beginning Second Language Learners. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
113. Ter Horst, A.C. (2013). Modulating motor imagery. Contextual, spatial and kinaesthetic 
influences. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
114. Tesink, C.M.J.Y. (2013). Neurobiological insights into language comprehension in autism: 
context matters. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
